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The thesis discusses the trajectory of the Belgian socialist thinker and activist Hendrik 
de Man (1885-1953) between 1914 and 1936 ca, with particular attention to his 
endeavours to renew Western European social democracy after the Great War. The first 
half of the thesis deals with de Man’s theoretical evolution. Having become convinced 
of the inadequacy of orthodox Marxism as a conceptual framework for the Left while 
serving as soldier and diplomat during WWI, de Man sought to overcome the split 
between reformism and revolutionary socialism by developing an ethical conception of 
socialism outlined in the book Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus (1926) and, 
subsequently, by elaborating planism, a democratic socialist ideology supposedly more 
in tune with the socio-economic conditions of the 1930s. The second half of the thesis 
focuses on efforts to put de Man’s ideas into practice. Due to his mounting desire to 
have impact on the social democratic movement, de Man became increasingly involved 
in politics and, in late 1933, launched the Belgian Labour Plan with the aim of 
bolstering the Belgian Labour Party and containing the spread of fascism. Planism won 
support from many young socialists all across Europe but was also met with suspicion 
and outright hostility by wide segments of the social democratic establishment, 
including prominent leaders such as Emile Vandervelde and Léon Blum. Eventually, de 
Man accepted to compromise on the full implementation of the Labour Plan and sought 
to accomplish the same goals by serving as Minister, without success. By examining his 
failure as well as the difficulties experienced by his followers in France and Britain, the 
thesis highlights the limits that Western European social democratic parties set to their 
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 Hendrik de Man and the Challenge of Ideological Renewal  
 
Every political judgment helps to 
modify the facts on which it is passed. 
Political thought is itself a form of 
political action. 
 
Edward H. Carr, 19391 
 
Socialism is understood best as a dual 
phenomenon. That is to say, it must 
be studied both as an ongoing 
theoretical debate and as a programme 
of political action.  
 
Jay M. Winter, 19722 
  
 Devoting a chapter of his memoirs to his experience as Social affairs chief of 
staff at France’s Commissariat Général au Plan, between 1962 and 1969, the civil 
servant, socialist politician, and former President of the European Commission Jacques 
Delors encapsulated the whole period as ‘the beautiful years of the Plan’ (les belles 
années du Plan).3 Delors’ recollections were informed by heartfelt admiration for a 
system he referred to as ‘planification à la française’, which he still deemed useful, 
even indispensable, in the twenty-first century.4 Planning – Delors contended – was an 
‘uncertainty reducer’ by which his country had managed to successfully allocate scarce 
resources without neglecting the ‘great parameters’, such as demography, technological 
development, and the environment.5 Moreover, planning allowed the building of a 
‘privileged framework for the social dialogue’ between various interest groups while 
                                                          
1
 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(1st ed. 1939), London, Macmillan and Co. 1961, 5. 
2
 J.M. Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War: Ideas and Politics in Britain, 1912-18, London-
Boston, Routledge & Kagan Paul 1974, 270. 
3
 See J. Delors, Mémoires, Paris, Plon 2004, 48-73. 
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making good use of the ‘work of intellectuals’.6 ‘Modernisation’, ‘more harmonious 
development’, and ‘negotiation’ were all concepts Delors associated to planning.7 
 In 2004, when the book appeared, Delors was odd man out among progressives. 
Under Tony Blair, New Labour was launched on the assumption that ‘the old Left 
solution of rigid economic planning and state control won’t work’.8 Bill Clinton had 
toasted the end of the ‘era of big government.’9 Gerhard Schroeder in Germany and 
Lionel Jospin in France had also embarked on a market-oriented course: as a prominent 
scholar of the socialist movement observed in 1999, ‘all social democratic parties now 
concede that there are limits to the expansion of public expenditure, and that the era of 
nationalisation is over. Privatisation has become acceptable, even desirable.’10 In that 
context, a call for planning sounded like the echo a distant past.  
 That past, however, was not so remote. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s, all 
mainstream parties in Europe had been supportive of the mixed economy, i.e. an 
economic regime in which the public sector was running a number of industries while 
governments took responsibility for ensuring high levels of employment through 
Keynesian demand management techniques. Although the term “consensus” fails to 
capture the underlying tensions between Left and Right during those decades11, it 
remains broadly true that, for the first time in history, a very wide range of political 
actors took for granted that the state would play a major role in the economy by 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., 71-72. 
7
 Ibid. 72. 
8
 T. Blair, ‘Power for a Purpose’, Renewal, 4, 1995, 11. 
9
 Cited in A. Mitchell, ‘State of the Union: Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, declaring “Era of Big 
Government is Over”’, New York Times, 24.1.1996. 
10
 D. Sassoon, ‘Introduction: Convergence, Continuity, and Change on the European Left’, The New 
European Left, G. Kelly (ed.), London, The Fabian Society 1999, 9. See also D. Sassoon, ‘Introduction’, 
Looking Left: Socialism after the Cold War, D. Sassoon (ed.), London-New York, I.B. Tauris 1997, 1-16. 
11
 See, with reference to Britain, B. Pimlott, ‘The Myth of Consensus’, The Making of Britain: Echoes of 
Greatness, L. M. Smith (ed.), Basingstoke, Macmillan 1988, 129-141; The Myth of Consensus: New 
Views on British History, 1945-64, H. Jones and M. Kandiah (eds.), Basingstoke, Macmillan 1996. 
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constraining but not replacing the market, and competing party programmes rested upon 
that axiom. By the late 1950s, the argument that ‘the Welfare State, combined with full 
employment and high earnings, had added to the freedom of the citizen’ was no longer 
anathema to most conservatives; the thesis that the coexistence of capitalism and 
democracy was possible, even though in a ‘state of antagonistic balance’, was accepted 
by most socialists.12 As the French sociologist Raymond Aron observed in 1966, ‘the 
political systems of the advanced Western nations today represent an acceptable 
compromise between the characteristic values of the three schools of liberalism, 
democracy, and socialism. The fact that ideological quarrels in the West have become 
less intense […] is, as it happens, due to the present success of this compromise.’13 
 The post-war settlement required good will, an inclination to find common 
ground, and a high degree of self-discipline to endure. It also required a distinct political 
culture, i.e. a set of core values and ideas to bestow legitimacy on its basic institutions. 
According to the distinguished historian Tony Judt, this was provided by the vision of 
social democracy, namely the Western European centre-left. Social Democrats 
maintained that ‘genuine improvements in the conditions of all classes could be 
obtained in incremental and peaceful ways’, and therefore rejected ‘the nineteenth-
century paradigm of violent urban upheaval’; similarly, they distanced themselves from 
the Communists by refusing ‘to commit to the inevitability of capitalism’s imminent 
demise or to the wisdom of hastening that demise by their own political actions.’14 In 
their view, which had been sharpened through the ordeal of the Great Depression, the 
                                                          
12
 Quotations are drawn from the collective study by the British centre-right One Nation Group, The 
Responsible Society, London, Conservative Political Centre 1959, 34, and from the former Marxist 
intellectual J. Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism, London, Gollancz 1956, 255 respectively. 
13
 R. Aron, ‘Fin des idéologies, renaissance des idées’, Trois essais sur l’âge industriel, Paris, Plon 1966, 
198-199. 
14
 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, London, Pimlico 2005, 363. 
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paramount task of their movement lay in using ‘the state to eliminate the social 
pathologies attendant on capitalist forms of production and the unrestricted workings of 
a market economy: to build not economic utopias but good societies.’15 Social 
Democrats did not excel in political theorising but developed a highly successful 
practice through which civil, political, and social rights were universalised as never 
before: the essence of their creed, which Judt proudly shared, could be condensed in the 
formula ‘the banality of good.’16   
 What Judt omitted to say, however, is that the social democratic wisdom, 
imbued with common sense and moved by a desire to fix, instead of dismantling, 
capitalism, was not the expression of a coherent intellectual baggage but the by-product 
of an excruciating, unsteady, unplanned, and sometimes even undeclared emancipation 
from the overriding system of thought that had permeated it since the mid-nineteenth 
century: Marxism. The full acceptance of the mixed economy was made possible by the 
release from that ideological straightjacket. 17 The Godesberg programme approved by 
German Social Democrats in 1959 may be taken as an emblematic turning point of this 
broader, pan-European trend.18 




 See T. Judt, Thinking the Twentieth Century, New York, The Penguin Press 2012, 331-388. 
17
 Indeed, one could argue that the main weakness of Judt’s genealogy of the European social democratic 
tradition lies in his tendency to downplay its Marxist roots: it is indicative that his greatest heroes were 
two Liberals, Keynes and Beveridge [see T. Judt, Thinking, 333-334; T. Judt, Ill Fares the Land, London, 
Allen Lane 2010, 81-40] Perhaps the most striking example of Judt’s propensity to minimise the strength 
of Marxism can be found in his portrait of the French socialist leader Léon Blum. According to Judt, 
Blum was not ‘a Marxist thinker’ although he, like other French socialists, did ‘pay frequent lip service to 
the unimpeachably Marxist character of their theory and practice. […] Marxism was for Blum always an 
elective affinity not a way of thought.’ [T. Judt, ‘Léon Blum: The Prophet Spurned’, The Burden of 
Responsibility: Blum, Camus, Aron, and the French Twentieth Century, Chicago-London, The University 
of Chicago Press 1998, 52-53]. Assuming Judt was right – something most biographers of Blum would 
probably not concede –, one is left wondering why an outstanding leader as Blum would have professed 
faith in an ideology he did not believe in, had it not been for the resilience of Marxism as a political 
culture. 
18
 See G. Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000, Oxford-New York, 
Oxford University Press 2002, 314-320; J.-W. Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in 
Twentieth-Century Europe, New Haven, Yale University Press 2011, 125-132. 
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The fact that, with the exception of Britain and, to an extent, the Nordic 
countries, centre-left pragmatism grew out of the exhaustion of a revolutionary 
paradigm is not a minor detail in the study of the tortuous development of social 
democracy as a historical force, and explains much of its seemingly post-ideological 
character in the 1950s.19 At least from the late 1890s till the outbreak of the Second 
World War, the lingering problem of how to cope with Marx’s legacy drew conspicuous 
energies from nearly all the intellectual and political leaders of the socialist movement. 
For Marxism was not only the ideological cement of the various socialist factions which 
had founded the Second International: it was also, in its popular, vulgar form, a 
Weltanschauung, and the rock-solid faith of millions of people who had espoused the 
socialist cause. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that, other than a theory, 
Marxism was a secular religion, with its rites, its dogmas, and its clergy.20 This is why 
revising Marxism during this period was a delicate and potentially dangerous task:  it 
could put what Leszek Kolakowski called ‘the spiritual certainty’ of the masses in 
jeopardy, and weaken the trust they had placed on their institutional representatives, the 
trade unions and the socialist parties.21 For the very same reason socialist intellectuals 
were fearful that revisions, however necessary, might be carried out in anarchic, 
destructive, or polarising way. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, the high 
priest of German Marxism, Karl Kautsky, admitted to himself: ‘If Lenin is right, then 
my whole life’s work devoted to the propagation, application, and further development 
                                                          
19
 ‘The Exhaustion of an Utopia’ is how the sociologist Daniel Bell summarised the trajectory of 
socialism in the third party of his most famous book: see D. Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Political 
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (1st ed. 1960), Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1988, 
273-407. 
20
 Milorad M. Drachkovitch persuasively argued that ‘the energetic force of Marxism’ lay in the ‘alloy of 
rational, scientific elements and preconceived ideas of religious character.’ [M.M. Drachkovitch, De Karl 
Marx à Léon Blum: la crise de la social-démocratie, Geneva, Droz 1954, 18] For further discussion of 
this point, see chapter I of this dissertation. 
21
 L. Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. Vol. III: The 
Breakdown, Oxford, Clarendon Press 1978, 526. 
20 
 
of the ideas of my great masters, Marx and Engels, has been in vain.’22 What is truly 
remarkable in Kautsky’s words is not his assessment of the Leninist threat but the 
candid admission that his theoretical contribution to socialism had amounted to keeping 
the flame of Marxism alive. In the context of the late nineteenth-early twentieth century, 
Engels, Kautsky, and others set strict boundaries to the degree of ideological 
nonconformity that the socialist élite could tolerate. In their judgement, Marxism and 
socialism were woven together, and they wanted them to remain so even in the future. 
This dissertation deals with – if one sticks to the analogy with religion – a 
heresy, namely an endeavour not to revise Marxism but to overcome it. It shows how a 
Belgian socialist, Hendrik de Man, left Marxism after the outbreak of the Great War 
and, building on that departure, sought to reinvent democratic socialism by laying down 
new philosophical and psychological foundations for it. It also explains how, amidst the 
Great Depression, relying on his previous insights and intellectual prestige, de Man 
launched a political project, the Belgian Labour Plan, as well as a doctrine, planism, 
with which he thought Marxism could be replaced, and social democracy be rescued 
from the rising tide of fascism. Finally, it investigates how de Man, despite achieving a 
prominent position within the Belgian Labour Party, did not manage to get the Labour 
Plan approved – a failure that contributed to pull him towards collaboration in 1940 –, 
and how his ideas were received and assessed in the two biggest European countries 
still committed to democratic rule after 1933, France and Britain.  
This thesis argues that de Man’s ideas were shaped by his multiple experiences 
across the world (he lived in Germany, Russia, the United States, and Germany again 
before becoming a key player in Belgian politics during the 1930s) and that he was a 
                                                          
22
 K. Kautsky, ‘Preface’, Bolshevism at a Deadlock (1st ed. 1930), London, George Allen & Unwin 1931, 
16. This preface is not included in the original German edition. 
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truly innovative thinker insofar as he shrewdly blended together a variety of inputs from 
different strands of thought as well as from what he saw first-hand. However, this thesis 
also contends that de Man’s success as an intellectual stemmed from a more widespread 
desire, especially within the socialist youth, to reinvent democratic socialism after the 
Great War, which had exposed the limitations of the Kautskian interpretation of 
socialism. Finally, this thesis argues that de Man’s planism failed to gain further ground 
not only because of the external socio-economic and political constraints of the interwar 
period but also because of the relentless opposition of substantial parts of the socialist 
party establishment in Belgium and France, and its lukewarm reception in Britain. 
Largely because of that opposition from, or lack of interest by, other socialists, its 
accomplishments in the political sphere were far more limited than they might have 
been. 
This dissertation is neither an exhaustive biography of de Man nor a 
comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Western European socialism between the 
wars but a study of the intersection and subsequent entanglement between de Man’s life 
and the trajectory of Western European socialism from 1914 to 1936 ca. In this period, 
the more the crisis of social democracy deepened, the more de Man’s unorthodox views 
became potentially appealing to significant sections of the socialist movement. These 
dynamics made him less and less a peripheral figure and eventually provided him with a 
window of opportunity to become, albeit for a short time, a high-ranking national 
politician with an international network of admirers and followers. But the demise of 
the Belgian Labour Plan and the parallel rise of the French Popular Front overshadowed 
him once again. He remained an important player only in Belgium, and by 1937, he 
struggled for influence even in his own country. Eventually, his call for collaboration 
22 
 
with the Germans under the occupation shattered his reputation and made him an 
outcast within the socialist camp. Neither de Man as an individual nor Western 
European socialism as a collective movement, therefore, are placed squarely at the 
centre of this dissertation. The focus lies on de Man’s efforts to reshape Western 
European socialism, first theoretically then practically, and how other Western 
European socialists reacted to his challenge. 
The remainder of this introduction develops as follows. First, a succinct but 
critical overview of the existing literature will be delivered. Second, the elements of 
originality in this dissertation as well as the methodology employed will be clarified. 
Finally, the content of each chapter will be briefly outlined. At this stage, it would not 
come as a surprise to the reader that, unlike those celebrated by Delors, the years of the 
(Belgian Labour) Plan were neither joyful nor particularly rewarding for its architect. 
De Man’s career ended in ruin: convicted in absentia for treason in 1946, he died in 
voluntary exile seven years later. It remains to be seen whether planism – a radical, non-
Marxist ideology which stood for the creation of a mixed economy – did not anticipate 
some ideological changes which occurred after 1945, and whether de Man can be 
regarded as a forebear of post-war social democracy. Further remarks on this point can 
be found in the conclusion. 
*** 
The literature on Hendrik de Man, the Belgian Labour Plan, and planism can be 
roughly divided into six types of secondary sources: 1) general histories of Belgium; 2) 
biographies of, autobiographies of, and recollections by public figures linked to de Man; 
3) political histories of Belgian socialism and/or Belgium in the interwar years; 4) 
studies centred on specific aspects of de Man’s thinking and/or de Man’s political 
23 
 
career; 5) full biographies of de Man; 6) comparative and transnational studies of 
planism. 
By and large, general histories of Belgium help clarify the national context but, 
being often short surveys, tend to devote limited space to de Man.23 In fact, some 
neglect him entirely.24 More specific, and thus more valuable, information is contained 
in a few biographies of public figures close to de Man, such as Emile Vandervelde25, 
Paul-Henri Spaak26, Paul Van Zeeland27, and King Leopold III.28 The relationship 
between de Man and the King became indeed a source of controversy among historians 
concerned with the so-called “Royal Question” as de Man’s influence on Leopold III, 
particularly with regard to the latter’s decision to surrender to Germany in May 1940 
without the consent of the Belgian government, remains unclear.29 Memoirs and 
recollections by socialists involved in the campaign for the Belgian Labour Plan, like 
Jef Rens30, Paul-Henri Spaak31, and Isabelle Blume32, are occasionally illuminating as 
only insiders’ accounts can be but they inevitably lack the critical detachment of a 
                                                          
23
 See e.g. R. Avermaete, Nouvelle histoire de Belgique, Brussels, Antoine 1983, 545, 548, 557-559, 561; 
X. Mabille, Nouvelle histoire politique de la Belgique, Brussels, CRISP 2011, 215, 240. 
24
 See e.g. A. de Meeüs, History of the Belgians, London, Thames & Hudson 1962; V. Mallinson, 
Belgium, London, Ernest Benn 1969. 
25
 See R. Abs, Emile Vandervelde, Brussels, “Labor” 1973; passim; J. Polasky, The Democratic Socialism 
of Emile Vandervelde: Between Reform and Revolution, Oxford, Berg 1995, passim. 
26
 See J. H. Huizinga, Mr. Europe: A Political Biography of Paul Henri Spaak, London, Weidenfeld & 
Nicholson 1961, esp. 57-65; J. Willequet, Paul-Henri Spaak: un homme, des combats, Brussels, La 
Renaissance du Livre 1975, esp. 38-42, 73-98; M. Dumoulin, Spaak, Brussels, Racines 1999, esp. 50-61, 
91-98. 
27
 See V. Dujardin and M. Dumoulin, Paul Van Zeeland: 1893-1973, Brussels, Racines 1997, esp. 44-48, 
95-103. 
28
 See e.g. A. Fabre-Luce, Une tragédie royale: l’affaire Léopold III, Paris, Flammarion 1948, esp. 122-
129; R. Aron, Léopold III: ou le choix impossible, février 1934-juillet 1940, Paris, Plon 1977, esp. 173-
179, 299-330; R. Keyes, Echec au Roi: Léopold III 1940-1951, Paris-Gembloux, Duculot 1986, esp. 67-
71. 
29
 For an overview, see J. Gérard-Libois and J. Gotovich, L’an 40. La Belgique occupée, Brussels, CRISP 
1971, esp. 216-232; E.J. Nachtergale, ‘Les relations Léopold III – Henri de Man (1938-1940)’, Res 
Publica, 1, 1978, 21-40. 
30
 See J. Rens, Rencontres avec le siècle: une vie au service de la justice sociale, Gembloux, Ducoulot 
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scholarly treatment. Other memoirs – particularly those dealing with collaboration 
and/or written by opponents of de Man – must be taken with a grain of salt for their 
sometimes contentious claims.33 This cautionary remark applies to de Man’s memoirs 
too, the use of which in this dissertation will be clarified later in the introduction. 
Needless to say, biographies of, autobiographies of, and recollections by public figures 
offer, at best, insightful sketches of de Man, not a full picture of him. 
Political histories of Belgian socialism and/or Belgium in the interwar years 
sometimes strike a very good balance between the overall setting and the leaders who 
occupied the main stage. An early example of this kind of historiography – written from 
a Catholic perspective but sympathetic towards de Man – is a tract by Xavier Legrand.34 
Mieke Claeys-Van Haegendoren’s book on the Belgian Labour Party between 1914 and 
1940 can be regarded as a robust piece of work in which strong emphasis is put on party 
strategies and parliamentary negotiations35, a feature common to Carl-Henrik Höjer’s 
commentary on the Belgian parliamentary system between the wars.36 Jean 
Vanwelkenhuyzen’s close scrutiny of the events of 193637 as well as his masterful 
analysis of the ‘disorder’ of the 1930s38 deserve mention for successfully blending 
domestic and foreign policy together. Official histories of the Belgian Labour Party, on 
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the other hand, are more problematic as they tend to mirror the alternate fortunes of de 
Man: in the 1930s, they placed him under a good light39 whilst, after the Second World 
War, they relegated him to the background.40 All these contributions, however, refer to 
de Man’s thought only insofar as it had repercussions on his party and/or his country. 
There are many notable studies centred on specific aspects of de Man’s thinking 
and/or his political career. A long essay by Pierrette Rongère elaborates on de Man as 
an ethical socialist, and ties this in with André Philip and Christian socialism.41 Antoine 
de Decker had a similar take42 whereas both Peter Dodge and Adriaan M. Van Peski 
insisted on voluntarism as the key to explain de Man’s departure from Marxism.43 
Influences on de Man have been also investigated quite thoroughly. De Man’s lasting 
fascination with Jaurès has been underscored by Paul Aron.44 Alfredo Salsano pointed 
to his prolonged interest in scientific management, and social engineering more 
generally.45 Erik Hansen stressed his role in fleshing out planism46 whereas Dick Pels 
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has been intrigued mostly by his alleged attraction for fascism.47 More recently, Paul 
Pierson selected de Man as a case study in a comparative analysis of intellectuals who 
left Marxism.48 On the political side, despite not focusing on the interwar years, Marcel 
Libeman’s two volumes on the origins of Belgian socialism49 and Martin Conway’s 
examination of collaboration in Belgium50 make brief but insightful references to de 
Man’s career. Finally, one can only praise the tireless commitment to research displayed 
by the Association pour l’étude de l’œuvre d’Henri de Man. Founded by a group of 
scholars, de Man’s former friends and followers in the aftermath of an international 
conference held in Geneva in 197351, the Association issued thirty-eight bulletins 
between 1974 and 2013. In addition, it published the proceedings of fourteen colloquia 
devoted to topics more or less closely linked to de Man as separate volumes. Altogether, 
this material is an invaluable source of information about de Man and his legacy.52 
Nevertheless, all the sources cited in this paragraph, including the articles in the 
bulletins, deliberately concentrate on certain parts of de Man’s thinking and/or record 
only, and often have a narrow scope. None of them addresses the relationship between 
de Man and Western European socialism in full. 
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For a comprehensive synthesis, one has to turn to biographies of de Man, two 
available in English, one in Dutch, and one in French.53 Yet all these books, for 
different reasons, do not always do justice to the complexity of de Man’s trajectory. 
Dodge’s account is brilliant in summarising de Man’s key insights but it relies almost 
exclusively on published sources, including de Man’s memoirs. This approach has the 
obvious limitation of echoing de Man’s own version of events.54 Van Hagendoren’s 
contribution is richer as the author took consulted de Man’s private papers then located 
in Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Brussels. Yet his focus remains heavily national. A 
historian of Belgian socialism who wrote from a Flemish angle, Van Hagendoren 
provided important information about the Belgian political environment but paid little 
attention to the international significance of de Man’s work. Much better in this respect 
is Michel Brélaz’s 800-page, painstakingly researched volume, which charts de Man’s 
evolution between 1914 and 1933. Brélaz – who devoted his entire academic career to 
the study of de Man – must be credited for having accomplished the arduous task of 
situating de Man’s thinking in the context of ongoing theoretical debates within the 
socialist movement. Some of the chapters are impressive, and at times even ground-
breaking, such as those comparing de Man to Gramsci or to the members of the 
Frankfurt School. Nonetheless, Brélaz was clearly more interested in the theoretical 
contributions made by de Man than in his political activism, as his decision to terminate 
his account in 1933 rather than in 1936, when the Labour Plan was finally abandoned, 
demonstrates. Consequently, de Man’s involvement in party politics is treated only 
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marginally, including its failure to implement the Plan, and the potential tensions 
between his thinking and his public role are not addressed. 55 Last but not least, Dan S. 
White authored a highly readable collective biography of the ‘socialists of the Front 
generation’, featuring de Man as one of the main protagonists, but did not make a 
compelling case for grouping diverse figures under such a vague umbrella term. 
Moreover, the necessity of shaping a single narrative encompassing a range of 
heterogeneous characters – besides de Man, Marcel Déat, Oswald Mosley, Carlo 
Mariendorff, and Theodor Haubach were chosen – forced White to overstate the 
similarities between them. In general, it is worth stressing that these biographies, except 
for White’s, overlook the impact of de Man’s Labour Plan outside Belgium. Because of 
this, they seem to suggest that such international influence was limited, or absent 
altogether. On the contrary, as this dissertation will show, the history of the Labour Plan 
was far from being a purely Belgian affair. 
A latent inclination to pin down de Man as a purely national figure can also be 
found in Mario Telò’s otherwise sharp comparative study of different social democratic 
responses to the Great Depression. To him, the Labour Plans (plural) were a pan-
European phenomenon but their roots lay in a set of distinct national traditions. Had 
Telò added France to his study of Britain, Belgium, and Sweden, he would have 
probably realised that de Man was the pivotal figure of that interwar pan-European 
planist turn.56 This is indirectly confirmed by a wide range of authors who acknowledge 
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de Man’s ascendancy over French socialism during the 1930s: Philippe Bauchard57, 
Georges Lefranc58, André Philip59, Julian Jackson60 and Michel Dreyfus61 are among 
those who point this out in unambiguous terms. 
Gaps created by national and comparative narratives have been frequently filled 
by transnational histories of the Left, which underscore the existence, and the relevance, 
of cultural transfers across countries, and have indeed spotted the international 
dimension of planism. This approach, though, is not without drawbacks. Sometimes this 
kind of history is written as if certain nations regularly outweighed others: in Sheri 
Berman’s commendable endeavour to trace the development of post-war social 
democracy, for instance, Germany and Sweden are central whilst Britain is excluded.62 
In other cases, the need to craft loose, all-encompassing labels obscures what, at the 
time, were substantial differences: Donald Sassoon, for example, pigeonholed interwar 
left-wing advocates of economic planning, de Man included, as “‘Neo-Socialist’ 
Planners” only to admit that ‘no single definition would do justice to the multifarious 
diversity of this catch-all category.’63 A possible antidote can be found in combining 
multi-archival research with a focus on relatively small networks of interlinked people 
among which ideas circulated and exchanges were frequent and traceable.  
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By adopting this approach, two books by Gerd Rainer Horn64 and Gilles 
Vergnon65 are truly outstanding, and proved a constant source of inspiration in writing 
this dissertation. Neither of these works are specifically about planism, as they deal with 
the competing strategies envisaged by left-wing parties in the aftermath of Hitler’s 
seizure of power, and their time span is quite very limited. Nevertheless, both are based 
on extensive, multi-lingual archival work, including the private papers of the main 
actors discussed. Both recognise de Man’s prominence during the interwar period, the 
reverberations of the Belgian Labour Plan abroad, and the ultimate incompatibility 
between a planist strategy (in which a socialist party produces a Plan with the aim of 
rallying voters around it) and a united front or Popular Front strategy (in which 
socialists join forces with other parties to win a parliamentary majority). However, an 
important difference lies in the fact that the main thread running through these books is 
the dichotomy between moderation and radicalism whereas this dissertation insists upon 
the dichotomy between continuity and discontinuity.  To put it simply, Horn and 
Vergnon were interested in explaining how, and to what extent, the Left was radicalised 
by the events of 1933, and evaluated the Labour Plan accordingly, as part of this 
assessment. To them, therefore, de Man’s decision to join the Van Zeeland government 
in March 1935 marked the demise of (radical) planism. By contrast, this thesis set out to 
explain how, and why, the events of 1933 allowed de Man to remould the agenda of the 
Belgian Labour Party, pushing ideological renovation further. Consequently, the failure 
of Belgian planism is not identified with de Man joining the Van Zeeland government, 
which was part of de Man’s intended gambit to overcome resistance from his own party, 
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but with de Man’s later disappointing record as Minister and the outcome of the 1936 
legislative election. Apart from the different angle from which planism is discussed, as 
well as a different chronology, this dissertation builds on Horn’s and Vergnon’s 
previous research and corroborates, expands, and strengthens most of their findings. 
The fundamental assumption on which this thesis rests is that de Man, between 
1914 and 1936 at least, was, by all standards, a democratic socialist – a socialist ‘of the 
West’, as one of his Belgian associates would later argue –.66 This would sound obvious 
to anyone having first-hand knowledge of de Man’s writings and career but the 
clarification is made necessary by the claims of the historian Zeev Sternhell, according 
to whom de Man ‘had developed a political ideology that in all respects was already 
fascist’ well before the Second World War and his infamous manifesto in which he 
disbanded the Labour Party and urged its former members to collaborate with the 
German occupants in late June 1940 was ‘merely the outcome of a process that had 
been in operation for nearly twenty years’.67 Sternhell’s interpretation of the origins of 
French Fascism is highly controversial, and several distinguished French historians have 
already taken on his ‘very strange approach to history’, marked by a highly selective use 
of primary sources, a decontextualized reading of texts, sweeping judgments, a 
teleological bias, and an almost complete indifference to evolving historical 
circumstances as well as to political events in general.68 Furthermore, thanks to Michel 
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Brélaz, the mischaracterisation of de Man as a fascist in disguise had been debunked 
through a meticulous examination of Sternhell’s assertions.69 Confuting Sternhell here 
would therefore be redundant: for the limited purposes of this study, it should be enough 
to point out that not only de Man regarded himself as a socialist between 1914 and 1936 
but that not even his harshest critics of the time called into question his commitment to 
the socialist movement. Hopefully, this dissertation will contribute to dispel the myth of 
de Man as a fascist that still has some currency in the Anglo-Saxon academic world.70 
 ***  
This thesis offers an original contribution to the literature reviewed above in 
three important aspects. 
First, it rejects any artificial separation between de Man’s intellectual and 
political commitments as well as any attempt to categorise de Man as a figure relevant 
exclusively in and for Belgium. This dissertation argues that the problem that dominated 
de Man’s life between the outbreak of the Great War and the mid-1930s was the 
reinvention of Western European socialism through severing its ties from what he 
thought was a crumbling and outmoded ideological Marxist framework. During the 
twentieth-century, few intellectuals came so close to governing a party and a country, 
and few politicians had a better grasp of the ideology to which their own party or 
movement adhered than de Man did. By the same token, this thesis contends that de 
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Man’s thinking cannot be understood in a vacuum but only in close connection with the 
circumstances and constraints under which he operated, i.e. the surrounding 
environment that he sought to transform.71 The fact that, as this thesis shows, de Man 
spent years working out a comprehensive critique of Marxism before developing his 
own doctrine and entering into politics is a further confirmation of the fact that 
ideologies operated as ‘cognitive structures with legitimising functions’ in left-wing 
twentieth-century politics.72 
Second, this thesis relies on Belgian sources which are relatively new and have 
been scarcely used by scholars. The bulk of de Man’s private papers, now held in 
Amsterdam and Ghent, has already been accessed, and widely cited, by other 
researchers. In contrast, the Archief van Belgische Werkliedenpartij and the Archief van 
BWP-Bureau voor Sociaal Onderzoek, both of which only became available in the 
1990s, have been underutilised, despite casting new light on de Man’s political 
activities and transnational connections. 
Third, the thesis delves into the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan abroad and 
incorporates the United Kingdom as a case study, hence filling a lacuna which is present 
even in Horn’s and Vergnon’s work. Although de Man’s brand of planism did remain 
marginal in Britain, the dissertation reveals connections between the Belgian Labour 
Party and the British socialist milieu, and sets out a new interpretation about why the 
Belgian Labour Plan did not become a major source of inspiration for British socialists. 
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In terms of methodology, the dissertation is based on the textual analysis of 
published and unpublished sources, including speeches and draft chapters of books, as 
well as on the examination of a wide array of letters, minutes of meetings, reports of 
party congresses, memoirs, and articles in the press. Whenever possible, texts have been 
consulted in the original language and quotations used subsequently translated into 
English (although comparisons between texts in German and Dutch and the respective 
English, French or Italian translations, when available, have been occasionally made). 
De Man’s memoirs have been an important source of information but have not been 
regarded as completely reliable, particularly for the period 1933-1936. The fact that de 
Man revised them twice suggests that they should not be treated as neutral accounts but 
as linguistic acts by de Man aimed a projecting a certain image of himself.73 For this 
reason, priority has been given to Après Coup, the first version of his memoirs and thus 
chronologically the closest to the events narrated. Yet, under no circumstances have de 
Man’s claims, when politically sensitive or controversial, been accepted unless 
corroborated by other sources. This is noteworthy as Après Coup was published in 
1941, during the German occupation of Belgium, and de Man may have had an interest 
in exaggerating his estrangement from the Labour Party during the interwar period in 
that context.  
  *** 
This dissertation comprises of seven chapters. 
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Chapter one provides an overview of Western European social democracy 
before 1914, and highlights its theoretical foundations as well as its main weaknesses. 
This chapter underscores the tensions between social democratic theory and practice, 
pointing to the survival of a revolutionary mythology, an anti-statist rhetoric, and the 
tendency to understand the proletariat as an international unitary actor.  
  
Chapter two introduces de Man and accounts for his ideological evolution 
throughout and immediately after the Great War. This chapter spells out the originality 
of de Man’s war experience and his tentative conclusions about the impact of the war, 
which put him at odds with other socialists who chose to fight. 
 
Chapter three is centred on de Man’s magnum opus written in 1926, Zur 
Psychologie des Sozialismus, a comprehensive critique of the Marxist tradition. This 
chapter discusses how the book was attacked by distinguished socialist leaders such as 
Emile Vandervelde and Karl Kautsky but also highly appreciated by a group of young 
intellectuals, based in different Western European countries, who shared de Man’s 
disenchantment with mainstream social democracy. 
 
Chapter four investigates the emergence of the idea of the Plan in de Man’s 
writings and speeches between 1930 and 1934, in reaction to the downfall of the 
Weimar Republic and the Great Depression. This chapter shows how de Man was able 
to merge a variety of themes and insights drawn from different sources into an original 




Chapter five deals with de Man’s drafting of the Belgian Labour Plan and his 
endeavours to spread planism, both in Belgium and abroad, between 1933 and 1936. 
This chapter explores the difficulties and opposition that the campaign for the Belgian 
Labour Plan faced, both within and outside the Belgian Labour Party, and how the Plan 
was eventually discarded. 
 
Chapter six analyses the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan in France. This 
chapter focuses on three competing groups – the neosocialists, the SFIO planists, and 
the CGT planists – and how their separate calls for a French Labour Plan failed to win 
over the SFIO leadership, first and foremost Léon Blum. 
 
Chapter seven examines the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan in Britain. 
This chapter stresses the existence of a growing consensus within the Labour Party 
about the necessity of an immediate programme for action centred on extensive 
nationalisation after 1931 but also how the most influential left-wing pressure group, the 
Socialist League, decided to champion a more radical platform than de Man’s. 
 
The conclusion compares de Man’s original planism to post-1945 developments 











The Paradox of European Social Democracy before 1914 
 
We no longer speak of socialism, and rightly so. 
[…] Moral epidemics, like physical epidemics, 
last for a while, and, when they have reigned in a 
country, move into another one. 
   
Adolphe Thiers, 187774 
 
Even if the Marxian system be regarded as a 
tissue of errors, the fact that millions of men 
accept it makes it significant. 
 
Vladimir G. Simkhovitch, 190875 
 
 
 Reflecting on the period 1870-1914 in the aftermath of the Paris peace 
conference, John Maynard Keynes vividly portrayed it as an ‘economic Eldorado’ for 
Europe: an extraordinary, even unprecedented age of capital accumulation and 
increasing purchasing power.76 Although, Keynes admitted, standards of comfort 
remained low for the great majority of the population, most people were, ‘to all 
appearances, reasonably contented’ with their condition; moreover, he argued, ‘escape 
was possible for any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average into the 
middle and upper classes for whom life offered, at a low cost and with the least trouble, 
conveniences, comforts, and amenities beyond the compass of the richest and most 
powerful monarchs of other ages.’77 Despite mocking Victorian liberals for thinking 
that such state of affairs was natural and therefore everlasting, Keynes shared with them 
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a complacent view of the Belle Époque, during which declining food prices and rising 
productivity purportedly boosted social mobility and spread prosperity. Around two 
decades later, the Austro-Hungarian-born writer Stefan Zweig observed – much more 
accurately – that the ‘golden age of security’ he believed he had lived before the First 
World War was but ‘a castle of dreams’ protected by the privileged status of his parents: 
‘they were wealthy people, who had become rich gradually, even very rich, and that 
filled the crevices of wall and window in those times.’78 Class divisions lay at the heart 
of European societies, and inherited money created barriers that individual initiative 
could rarely overcome.79  
 It remains true, however, that the economic landscape of Europe had changed 
remarkably during the forty-five years pinned down by Keynes. Estimates suggest that 
per capita growth was higher than in the period 1820-1870 (1.22 to 0.86), largely due to 
technological innovation and the industrial take-off in Germany and, to a lesser extent, 
France. On average, Europe’s GDP grew 2.15% per annum. The development of the 
steel and chemical industry, the diffusion of electricity, new discoveries in the field of 
combustion engines, the extension of railways as well as further improvements in 
communication systems increased output levels and generated better economies of 
scale.80 The cumulative results of these transformations stood in stark contrast to the 
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‘unusually and visibly archaic’ earlier phase of industrialism.81 In broad terms, 
continental countries – the latecomers – began to catch up with Britain, whose 
predominance in the financial sector was nonetheless unmatched.82 
 The main consequences of this long-term expansion of production were the 
increase in the overall population and a further shift towards urbanisation. Between 
1870 and 1913, Europe moved from 314 to 471 million inhabitants, close to a third of 
the world’s population.83 Greater London’s residents jumped from less than 4 million to 
more than 7 million; Paris’ and Berlin’s rose to over 4 and 3.7 million respectively, a 
process by which capitals absorbed neighbourhoods and turned into megacities.84  
By the same token, the share of workers employed in agriculture declined 
everywhere, although regional differences persisted. In North-Western Europe 
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) it dropped from 31.7% to 20.9%; in Southern Europe (France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) from 58.6% to 49.3%; in Central and Eastern Europe (Austria-
Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Romania, Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland) from 56.6% to 
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54.9%, with Germany and Switzerland experiencing the greatest reductions.85 By 1913, 
more Germans were employed in the secondary sector than in the first one (37.9% to 
34.5%), a pattern well established in Britain (44.1% to 11.8%), Belgium (45.5% to 
23.2%) and other Northern countries.86 In general, productivity was higher in 
manufacturing than in agriculture; industrialisation, therefore, resulted in an increase of 
the national income. Uneven growth rates throughout Europe, however, had political 
repercussions as they could sway the balance of power. The impressive economic 
performance of the German Reich, which displaced France as the most powerful 
Continental economy, was one of the most remarkable developments of the period 
1870-1914, and a major source of instability for the international system.87 
 Industrialisation had social and psychological implications too. As Eugen Weber 
noted in his masterful account of the incorporation of the French peasantry into the 
modernising national community of the Republican state, ‘isolation [of countryside] 
made for ignorance, indifference, for rumors that spread like wildfire in contrast to the 
stubbornly low assimilation of current events’ but – he added – ‘it also made for local 
solidarity, which was reinforced for mutual aid – a practice that may have arisen out of 
sheer necessity in the absence of other alternatives but that had generally become 
ritualized by tradition.’88 The physical concentration of workers in huge, increasingly 
mechanised factories deprived them of the safety nets entrenched in the rural order, and 
exposed them to new forms of discipline and social control. Between the late nineteenth 
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and the early twentieth century, sociologists Ferdinand Tönnies, Emile Durkheim, and 
Georg Simmel all pointed to the different forms of solidarity that existed within agrarian 
and industrial societies, the latter being more much more individualistic and 
impersonal.89 It is no accident that trade unions flourished in reaction to the 
disintegration of the cultural environment of the pre-industrial era, becoming not only 
useful instruments to protect or advance workers’ rights but also self-conscious 
institutions, based on a common culture, shared values, and specific structures of 
feeling: some of the largest organisations – the German Generalkommission der 
Gewerkschaften Deutschlands (GGD), the French Confédération Général du Travail 
(CGT) – were set up between 1890 and 1900, and immediately gathered hundreds of 
thousands of adherents. In 1913, unionised workers in France were around one million, 
three million in Germany; Britain – the country with the oldest tradition of working 
class organisation – still dominated the rankings with more than four million.90 
 In general, trade unionism was ideologically heterogeneous and often driven by 
short-term, practical concerns. In most European countries, trade union leaders 
developed a relatively pragmatic attitude towards industrial disputes, and restrained the 
more radical impulses of the rank-and-file.91 In the political sphere, on the other hand, 
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workers increasingly embraced a doctrine that the ruling class, especially after the Paris 
Commune of 1871, tended to view as dangerously subversive: socialism. Not every 
worker became a convert, of course, and opposition to socialism among industrial 
workers was not negligible.92 Still, the link between mass industrialisation and the 
growth of socialism remains a strong one. Socialism turned into a mass movement 
exactly because its advocates identified the working class, broadly defined, as the 
fundamental agency of political change and succeeded in getting backing from wide 
segments of it. This is tantamount to saying that, whereas socialist ideas circulated 
before the second-half of the nineteenth century, it was only under the peculiar socio-
economic conditions of the industrial age that they gained enough popular support to 
become politically relevant.93 By 1914, social democratic parties polling between 15% 
and 35% existed in all Western European countries, with the notable exceptions of 
Britain and the Netherlands.94 
 This chapter sets out to investigate the theoretical foundations of the European 
socialist movement between 1870 and 1914. First, it sketches out its ideology, 
essentially a crude and simplified version of Karl Marx’s thought that took root in 
Germany and spread gradually throughout the rest of Europe. Second, it discusses three 
weaknesses of that ideology: its failure to penetrate in Britain, where the working class 
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was especially numerous and well-organised; its ambiguity in setting the limits of a 
fruitful, albeit circumscribed, cooperation with the bourgeoisie; its difficulty in adapting 
to new social and political conditions, with particular reference to the arguments 
advanced by Eduard Bernstein and Georges Sorel. Third, it highlights three major 
sources of tensions, or contradictions, between socialist theory and social democratic 
practice: a reiterated commitment to a palingenetic view of the revolution coupled with 
a gradualist conduct aimed at getting concessions from the ruling class; an anti-statist 
conception of the political order at odds with policies aimed at strengthening the State; a 
tendency to conceive of workers as an international unitary actor despite the socialists’ 
difficulties in cooperating internationally and the resilience of nationalism. Fourth, it 
briefly explores the ultimate paradox of social democratic parties as an organised force 
by 1914. This paradox can be summarised as follows: the more the socialist movement 
grew in strength, the less its ideology could effectively steer its course. From this it does 
not follow that vulgar Marxism had become useless: quite the contrary. As a set of vivid 
images and inflammatory words, it remained a powerful tool to mobilise the militants, 
and there is no doubt that both the leaders and the rank-and-file were emotionally 
attached to it: in that sense, an ‘ideological passion’ – to cite François Furet’s fortunate 
expression – existed well before the Bolshevik revolution.95  Yet, by the very nature of 
vulgar Marxism, social democrats operated under theoretical constraints that made their 
statements increasingly untenable and their long-term expectations unrealistic. The 
outbreak of the Great War triggered a crisis in the socialist Weltanschauung whose seed 
had been planted in the previous half-century. It is against that background that Hendrik 
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de Man’s subsequent endeavours to reinvent Western European socialism must be 
evaluated. 
*** 
 Despite Karl Marx’s relentless efforts to shape the international labour 
movement, and its German branch even more forcefully, his views were not 
immediately and uncritically shared by European socialists during his life. Nor was 
Marxism initially regarded as a clearly defined, self-standing set of ideas. Rather, the 
concept was polemical: Mikhail Bakunin was perhaps the first to lambast his opponents 
by using the word ‘Marxist’ during the 1870s, and Marx himself rejected the label, half 
seriously, half in jest, to disown some of his French disciples in 1882.96 The 
dissemination of Marx’s ideas and their subsequent articulation in a rigid template was a 
consequence of Engels’ activism as well as of the parallel rise of German social 
democrats. It is hard to overestimate the ‘immense and lasting influence’ of Engels in 
defining Marxism:  in 1878 he authored the Anti-Dühring, whose abridged version, 
published two years later under title Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie 
zur Wissenschaft (The Development of Socialism from Utopia to Science), quickly 
became ‘the most popular introduction to Marxism apart from the Manifesto.’97 It is 
through the systematisation made by Engels that the ideologues of the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (SPD), August Bebel and Karl Kautsky, 
managed to get access to the core of Marx’s thinking, in which they injected a strong 
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dose of positivism that they drew from Charles Darwin.98 In some cases, popularisation 
came at the expense of quality. In France and Italy, the works of Marx and Engels were 
less read and known than those, often shallow and poorly written, of Paul Lafargue, 
Gabriel Deville, or Wilhelm Liebknecht.99 In Central and Eastern Europe, on the other 
hand, Kautsky’s reputation grew enormously, also thanks to the echo generated by his 
journal, Die Neue Zeit.100 Whether Marx would have been entirely comfortable with 
Engels’ and Kautsky’s rearrangement of his thought remains an open question.101 For 
sure, they succeeded where Marx had failed: their brand of Marxism, often referred to 
as vulgar or orthodox, became the intellectual bedrock of the European socialist 
movement, and through public and private interventions – Engels, for instance, issued 
detailed guidelines to German, French, Italian, and Austrian parties by mail – they had a 
direct and immediate impact on how social democratic politics unfolded.102  
 In a nutshell, vulgar Marxism boiled down to a handful of theoretical 
propositions, coupled with a few prescriptions. First, a theory of knowledge: men’s 
consciousness is determined by the mode of production of material life. Second, a 
theory of historical development: the history of all hitherto existing societies is a history 
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of class struggles; the capitalist society is a transient social order that will be 
undermined by its inherent contradictions. Third, a theory of exploitation: under 
capitalism, wages are lower than they ought to be, for the owners of capital appropriate 
the surplus value generated by the workers. Fourth, a theory of pauperisation: capitalism 
tends to increase the misery of the workers. Fifth, a theory of concentration: the means 
of production fall in the hands of a continuously decreasing number of capitalists, until 
a full concentration is achieved and expropriation by the working class takes place. The 
main task for socialists was, therefore, to organise the working class in independent 
political parties, fight for reforms that would make living conditions more bearable, and 
develop class consciousness in preparation for the inevitable collapse of the capitalist 
system.103 
 However well-crafted, effectively propagandised, and generally effective in 
superseding older strands of socialism – those that Marx and Engels had categorised as 
utopian or bourgeois104–, vulgar Marxism faced obstacles that hindered its 
advancement. To begin with, even in its rough form, it was not unanimously accepted. 
Most notably, the British working class showed little interest in vulgar Marxism as in 
any other rejectionist ideology that implied the overthrowing of the parliamentary 
system. Several factors might explain that attitude – from the fragmentation of the 
patterns of employment to alienation, from the persistence of communitarian loyalties to 
the attachment to the monarchy –, including the lack of a revolutionary intellectual 
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class.105 Virtually all British thinkers, it has been noted, ‘aimed not at fusing the classes 
but at reconciling them by rebuilding the human relations which had been destroyed by 
the growth of industrial, urbanised ways of living’, consistently with an ethical and 
religious outlook strikingly at odds with the materialism that underpinned vulgar 
Marxism.106 Equally important was the emphasis on efficiency that permeated the most 
distinguished socialist circle of the 1880s and 1890s, the Fabian Society. Its most active 
members, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, were not only committed to gradualist methods 
but steeped in an empiricist culture that, after an early interest in the subject, led them to 
dismiss Marx’s thought as an obscure and convoluted example of German 
metaphysics.107 In The Fabian Essays in Socialism, published in 1889, Marx is 
mentioned only three times, and Engels publicly complained about ‘the Fabian Church 
of the Future’ being built on economic foundations that contradicted Marx’s labour 
theory of value.108 When a Labour Party finally came to light, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it secured an electoral alliance with the Liberals – a strategy that was 
anathema to many Continental socialists – and pressured the Asquith government to 
pass major pieces of social legislation. The accomplishments of the Liberal-Labour 
alliance were far from negligible and ended up strengthening the pre-existing 
evolutionary inclinations of British socialists.109 However peculiar, the British exception 
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– largely acknowledged by Continental socialists, including Marx – was a powerful 
remainder that the degree of organisation of the working class and its acceptance of 
revolutionary means did not necessarily go hand in hand.110 
 Secondly, vulgar Marxism did not always set clear boundaries of acceptable 
political behaviour, as the highly contentious issue of ministerialism demonstrated. In 
principle, most socialist leaders favoured parliamentary cooperation with bourgeois 
parties to improve the living standards of the workers; on the other hand, they felt that 
allowing individual party members to serve in non-socialist cabinets was a step too far 
for any credible revolutionary party; plus, it would undermine efforts to coordinate with 
socialists abroad. In 1899, the French socialist deputy Alexandre Millerand sparked 
outrage by entering a Radical-led cabinet. Kautsky officially censored him, although he 
subtly argued that, under exceptional circumstances, government participation could be 
authorised, as long as socialist ministers were given a specific mandate by their party 
and promptly resigned in case the government took an anti-labour stance.111 Millerand 
used his position to achieve substantial reforms, such as the reduction of working hours 
and the creation of labour councils, but his insubordination made him a political outcast. 
Rather unfairly, millerandisme became synonymous with opportunism, and some 
pragmatic reformers, including the former trade unionist and future Prime Minister 
Aristide Briand, severed their ties with the Section Française de l’Internationale 
Ouvrière (SFIO), the unitary socialist party founded in 1905, after the Marxist faction 
headed by Jules Guesde and like-minded anti-participationists gained a position of 
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strength within it. Even then, ideological tensions lurked beneath the surface, as 
Guesde’s heavily materialistic and almost sectarian type of socialism remained 
controversial, but thanks to the energetic campaigns that he and his followers waged 
throughout the 1890s and 1900s the language of class struggle was absorbed into the 
French socialist mainstream and reduced the room of manoeuvre for the moderate 
wing.112 
  A third, much greater problem for vulgar Marxism was its difficulty in adapting 
to evolving historical circumstances. Kautsky insisted that Marx never intended to 
develop an ossified doctrine; in practice, however, the core propositions of vulgar 
Marxism were often regarded as articles of faith by militants and sympathisers.113 
Particularly deep-seated was the confidence in the inescapable downfall of capitalism, 
an argument that lent socialism an aura of inevitability.114 Because of that, and the high 
level of systematisation provided by Engels, Kautsky, Bebel and other propagandists, 
the line between suitable adjustments and apostasy was blurred, especially when key 
components of Marx’s thought underwent scrutiny. 
The revisionist debate that took place in 1896-1899 between the most 
distinguished theoreticians of the SPD, Kautsky and Eduard Bernstein revealed the 
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limits of public dissent within the movement. A former editor of the newspaper Der 
Sozialdemokrat and Engels’ literary executor, Bernstein had impeccable Marxist 
credentials. Furthermore, he was a party loyalist: an exiled activist during the anti-
socialist repression carried out by Otto von Bismarck, he co-authored with Kautsky the 
most succinct and widely circulated Marxist statement in German history: the SPD 
programme of 1891, named after the city of Erfurt.115 At that time, Bernstein still agreed 
with Engels and Kautsky about the party’s commitment to a revolutionary 
transformation of society. His paramount concern, however, was developing an 
effective parliamentary action, and the realisation that the SPD – whose seats in the 
Reichstag increased steadily during the 1890s – could play a greater role in passing 
social legislation prompted second thoughts about the relationship between long-term 
and short-term goals. By 1896, Bernstein had become convinced that overemphasising 
the need to suppress capitalism to usher in an entirely new society was a liability to the 
socialist movement, and a serious theoretical revision of Marxism was required. To that 
overriding task he devoted a series of articles he started publishing in Die Neue Zeit, 
under the heading ‘Probleme des Sozialismus’ (Problems of Socialism).116  
At first, Bernstein criticised the theory of concentration by claiming that, the 
growth of monopoly notwithstanding, medium and small ownership was likely to 
survive both in industry and agriculture. That position did not cause any uproar.117 
Much more contentious was the idea, fully expressed in another piece released in 
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January 1898, that socialism could triumph in the absence of the ‘great, all-embracing 
economic crisis’ that social democrats believed would surely break out at some point, as 
the result of ‘an absolute law of nature’. On the contrary, Bernstein suggested that a 
‘piecemeal realisation of socialism’ was possible under capitalism, through a steady 
increase in economic regulation, the consolidation of public management, and the 
democratisation of local government. Even worse, he argued that ‘any celebratory work 
worthy of the name of “scientific socialism” would have to examine how far the actual 
development of things has departed from the assumptions made in the Manifesto and its 
associated literature, as well as establish which of its forecasts have been proved 
correct’, hence implying that the works of Marx contained serious flaws.118 Although 
Bernstein maintained that he intended to amend Marx’s thought, not discard it, and 
considered himself a Marxist for the remainder of his life, the doctrinal changes he 
proposed were profound. The most problematic was the replacement of the crucial pillar 
of Marx’s system, the dialectic, with an evolutionary philosophy which abolished 
finalism: this move would result in abandoning the prospect of a revolutionary 
transition to socialism.119 Such an argument could not pass under silence. Rosa 
Luxemburg, George Plekhanov, Jean Jaurès, and Max Adler were among the many who 
weighed in against Bernstein, whose almost complete isolation among the international 
socialist intelligentsia was soon apparent.120 In an extended version of his case, he 
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relinquished some of his most provocative claims, including the one about the 
irrelevance of final goals for socialism, and tried to back up his views with evidence 
from Engels’ writings, a clear sign of yielding to the orthodoxy.121 That was not enough, 
however, to persuade Kautsky, who believed that reformism – as Bernstein’s views 
were dubbed – could succeed only in Britain, and was disturbed by his colleague’s 
inclination to question Marx’s authority.122 During the Stuttgart conference, held in 
October 1898, the SPD delegates enthusiastically received Kautsky’s speech, hence 
shattering Bernstein’s hopes for a revision of the Erfurt programme. Bernstein’s 
reputation within the party never fully recovered from that defeat, although his ideas 
remained popular among pragmatic party functionaries, members of the cooperative 
movement, and trade unionists.123   
Other socialists were expressing dissatisfaction at the deterministic trappings of 
vulgar Marxism. The implications of arguing, as Kautsky did, that an economic 
catastrophe was bound to happen at some point in the future regardless of human will 
were ambiguous. On the one hand, that position could lead to dismissing parliamentary 
activity as a merely tactical device while awaiting the Armageddon, as Bernstein had 
feared; on the other hand, it could be used to justify passivity. From the latter 
perspective, Kautksy’s predicaments entailed the risk of driving social democrats 
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towards the acceptance of the capitalist system.124 Hostility to fatalism and quietism 
inspired the writings of George Sorel, a French eclectic engineer-turned-philosopher 
heavily influenced by the Germanist Charles Andler. A lonely, self-proclaimed socialist 
with no party, Sorel aimed at demolishing dialectical materialism, which he regarded as 
a forgery, the arbitrary connection of ‘a few sentences’ from Marx’s works ‘commented 
on as the evangelical texts are by theologians.’125 The author of The Communist 
Manifesto, Sorel boldly claimed, never formulated any law of historical development, 
not even the one about the inevitable collapse of capitalism: maybe he ‘simply wanted 
to give some practical advice to the revolutionaries, inducing them not to pursue 
dangerous attempts and highlighting which conditions might be favourable for 
undertaking popular action.’126 He lauded Bernstein for having questioned the ‘dogma 
of social palingenesis’ and exposed Kautsky’s hypocrisy.127 Yet his tendencies were far 
from reformist. To him, Marxism as a closed, all-encompassing system of thought had 
been consciously fabricated by German social democrats to strengthen their party 
machine: all considered, the revisionist controversy was less about theoretical 
disagreements than internal factionalism, as the entire SPD was but ‘a workers’ 
organisation under the direction of vehement orators’, ‘an oligarchy of demagogues’ 
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which aimed at controlling the working class and stifling the trade unions.128 Sorel, who 
understood socialism not as doctrine but as an act – ‘the emancipation of the working 
class that organises itself, educates itself, and creates new institutions’ – started 
developing a radical theory of direct action that he finally set out in Réflexions sur la 
violence (Reflections on Violence), published in 1908.129 In order to retrieve Marx’s 
original spirit and rescue socialism from philistinism and decadence, Sorel contended, a 
new myth was needed, ‘a set of images capable of evoking intuitively and all together, 
before any well-thought analysis, the mass of sentiments that correspond to the different 
manifestations of the war undertaken by Socialism against modern society.’130 That 
myth was the general strike, namely an abrupt insurrection carried out by the proletariat 
aimed at destroying the bourgeois State. Sorel refrained from explaining how the 
general strike would occur – although he was surely familiar with the activities and 
propaganda of La Federation des Bourses du Travail headed by the anarchist Fernand 
Pelloutier, one of his few friends –  but insisted on its merits as a mobilising tool: ‘In 
virtue of this idea, Socialism remains ever young; attempts made to bring about social 
peace seem childish; the desertions of gentrifying comrades, far from discouraging the 
masses, only excite them still more to rebellion; in a word, the line of cleavage is never 
in danger of disappearing.’131 In Sorel’s view, the general strike would have an 
apocalyptic character, and pave the way for a new society resting upon the ‘ethics of the 
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producers’, a heroic, self-governing breed of workers freed from ‘democratic 
superstition’ fuelled by ‘financial and political parasites.’132 
Sorel’s visionary claims rested on a poor knowledge of the reality of the labour 
movement. After Pelloutier’s death, in 1901, revolutionary syndicalism had lost traction 
in France as much as elsewhere, and trade unionism became increasingly moderate. 
Until 1909, Sorel wished to convert the CGT to his ideas; when he realised that the 
organisation leaned towards a stable cooperation with the SFIO, albeit refusing to give 
up its independence, he quickly moved to the opposite side of the spectrum and sought a 
highly unlikely alliance with the royalist movement Action Française.133 That choice is 
indicative of Sorel’s distaste for representative democracy and humanitarian values: in 
his erratic search for ‘primordial forces to destroy the old order and to create the new’, 
he would end up praising both Lenin and Mussolini, and being heralded by Italian 
Fascists as a mentor.134 Following the publication of his Réflexions and his flirtation 
with the monarchists, he was no longer perceived as a respectable socialist – most of his 
admirers, such as the publisher Georges Valois, came from the anti-parliamentary Right 
–  but his itinerary sheds light on the endless opportunities for blending Marx with other 
thinkers, such as Nietzsche or Bergson, once the theoretical framework built by Engels 
and Kautsky had been dismissed.135 
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 However contrasting in their conclusions, the reflections of Bernstein and Sorel 
originated from the same problem, namely the difficulty of reconciling vulgar Marxism 
as a set of theories with social democratic practice. Since the 1870s, the gap between 
what was done and what could be said – to cite Ignaz Auer’s private views on social 
democratic tactics – had widened so spectacularly as to put theory under strain.136 In 
retrospect, three major sources of tension – not to say contradictions – caused by that 
gap can be easily nailed down. 
 The first lay in sticking to a commitment to revolution while getting involved in 
a prolonged, and largely successful, confrontation with the upper classes to extract 
concessions and expand the role of workers in public life. Of course, a conflict of 
attrition with a fluctuating pattern is not inconsistent with the prospect of an all-out 
victory: in that sense, social democratic parties could still claim to be working for the 
long-term overthrowing of the capitalist system even when they compromised with the 
enemy.137 Yet, some of their battles objectively decreased the chances of victory for 
socialism in the short term. A clear example is the fight for universal suffrage. The 
introduction of equal political rights ranked among the most urgent demands of social 
democratic parties, as severe restrictions based on gender, wealth, and ethnicity still 
applied in all European countries. Socialist mobilisation was highly effective in that 
respect: the extension of manhood suffrage in Belgium (1893), Austria-Hungary (1897 
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and 1907), Norway (1898), Finland (1906), Sweden (1909), and Italy (1912) took place 
under significant pressure from below.138 The consequences of a sudden increase in the 
number of people eligible to vote, however, were mixed. Social democrats advanced 
everywhere, and in some countries managed to elect deputies for the first time, but – 
also due to the overrepresentation of rural districts – failed to gain the majority of votes 
or, for that matter, seats. Being too powerful to disregard representative assemblies but 
not enough to control them, socialists were now stuck in an uncomfortable position. 
Furthermore, bourgeois parties could play on deep ethnic and cultural cleavages to 
remain in power. Left-wing anticlericalism, for instance, led many working-class 
Catholics to support either a conservative Catholic party (in Belgium) or moderate 
Liberal candidates who pledged to defend Catholic values (in Italy).139 Even in urban 
areas, where social democratic parties were expected to have the upper hand, 
conservative candidates could rely on racial prejudices, demagoguery and anti-liberal 
economic platforms to appeal to previously disenfranchised sections of the population: 
Karl Lueger’s successful building of a middle and lower-class power bloc in Vienna 
allowed him to serve as Mayor for fourteen years.140 But the implications of running for 
office ran deeper than that, and revolved around the issue of legitimacy. Assuming the 
Parliament would cease to be a purely bourgeois institution, and faithfully reflect the 
balance of power between the classes – e.g. by embracing proportional representation –, 
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could Socialists still claim the right to suppress it? The Russian Revolution of 1905 
marked a turning point in this respect. The constitutional concessions made by the Czar, 
which included the establishment of a multi-party assembly, exacerbated the split 
between those, such as Julius Martov, who wished to use legal methods, including 
parliamentary rule, to advance the socialist cause, and those, like Vladimir Lenin, who 
dismissed them as deceptive.141 In Germany, being pressed by unionists radicalised by 
Russian events, Bebel sought to escape the dilemma by arguing that a revolution might 
still be necessary as a defensive means after an electoral victory, to protect what had 
been achieved through the ballot box from the bourgeois reaction.142 It was a subtle 
attempt to have it both ways – many social democrats would reiterate the point 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s143 – but Bebel’s argument could hardly exhaust the 
issue, already raised by Bernstein, of whether the development of mass democracy was 
making revolution superfluous.144 
 The second contradiction within the socialist movement was the adherence to an 
anti-statist view of the future socialist order while pushing for an agenda that expanded 
the role of the State. Socialist anti-statism predates Marx’s writings, and can be traced 
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back to nineteenth-century anarchists. One of them, the French author and journalist 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, was among the first to explicitly identify socialism properly 
understood, which he preferred to call ‘mutualism’, with a stateless society. In his own 
words: ‘Whether direct or indirect, simple or compound, the government of the people 
will always be the deceit (escamotage) of the people.’145 For this reason, he vehemently 
objected to any form of centralised control over property. When, following the 1848 
revolution, Republican Minister Louis Blanc stood for the nationalisation of railways 
and the creation of State-sponsored social workshops, measures that other 
revolutionaries applauded, Proudhon was outraged. To his mind, only the federal union 
of workers and families, based on the principle of voluntary association and exchange, 
would safeguard their dignity and independence: ‘Here, the worker is no longer a State 
servant, swamped by the ocean of the community; he is a free man, truly his own 
master, who acts on his own initiative and personal responsibility, sure that he will get a 
fair and rewarding price for his products and services, and that his fellow citizens will 
offer him the maximum degree of loyalty and the best guarantees for the goods he will 
consume.’146 Although Marx did not share Proudhon’s sympathy for small-property 
holders and farmers, he surely agreed with his view of the bourgeois State as an exterior 
entity, a constraint on the proletariat’s ability to govern itself. As he and Engels 
famously wrote in the Communist Manifesto: ‘The executive of the modern State is but 
a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’, whose society 
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was to be replaced by ‘an association (eine Assoziation) in which the free development 
of each is the condition for the free development of all.’147  
 Truth be told, some passages in Marx’s writings, albeit ambiguously, suggest a 
more positive role for the State, especially in the transition from capitalism to 
communism, during the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat.148 Yet Marx’s anti-
statism was subsequently underscored, and probably accentuated, by Engels. In the 
Anti-Dühring, he set out to elucidate the relationship between socialism and the State by 
pointing at the dissolution of the latter under communism. Historically, Engels 
explained, the State had been the ‘official representative of the entire society, the 
gathering of it together (Zusammenfassung) in a visible body; but it was this only in so 
far as it was the State of that class which itself represented, in its time, the whole 
society’; with the ultimate disappearance of classes, ‘the State makes itself superfluous 
(überflüssig). As soon as there is no longer a social class to be held in subjugation […] 
there is nothing more to repress, and a special repressive force, a State, is no longer 
necessary.’149 He also contended that communism would be essentially post-political: 
‘The government over persons is replaced by the administration of things and the 
management of the process of production. The State is not “abolished”; it withers away 
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(er stirbt ab).’150 Arguably, Engels’ remarks reflected the need to steer a middle course 
between the anarchists, such as Bakunin, who never stepped claiming that Marx was a 
Jacobin in disguise151, and the followers of the German lawyer and activist Ferdinand 
Lassalle, who thought only the State could ensure the ‘training and development of the 
human race to freedom’, including the working class.152 In the following decades, 
anarchists were expelled from nearly all social democratic parties, whereas Lassalle’s 
reputation – which was still remarkable twelve years after his death, at the foundation of 
the SPD153  – was slowly overshadowed by that of Marx and Engels. In his commentary 
to the Erfurt programme, released in 1892 and reprinted eight times until 1909 without 
changes, Kautsky confidently held that ‘The State will not cease to be a capitalist 
institution until the proletariat, the working-class, has become the ruling class; not until 
then will it become possible to turn it into a socialist co-operative Commonwealth 
(Genossenschaft).’154  In 1918, the leader of the Parti Ouvrier Belge (POB) Emile 
Vandervelde went so far to produce a substantive theoretical work – partly conceived 
before 1914 – entitled Le Socialisme contre l’État. ‘In the economic as well in the 
political order, and in general in all the spheres of collective life’ Vandervelde argued, 
‘socialism is not statist, is anti-statist’, for under socialism ‘the great cooperative of 
social work, having achieved its full autonomy, governs itself, without any 
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governmental interference.’155 Even though Vandervelde made a distinction between the 
State as the organ of authority (l’Etat organe d’autorité) and the State as an organ of 
management (l’Etat organe de gestion) – with the latter supposed to remain in place –, 
it is highly significant that anti-statist themes were still present in socialist discourses in 
the aftermath of the Great War.156 Reconciling that approach with social democratic 
programmes advocating more regulations and higher taxes to fund a wide range of 
welfare policies, from labour insurance to old age pensions, however, was not an easy 
task – especially in the light of social and economic trends that suggested capitalism 
was not on the verge of implosion. It is no coincidence that Bernstein, in his call for a 
revision of vulgar Marxism, argued that the Anti-Dühring’s definition of the State had 
become obsolete and that, ‘however decentralised an administration we envisage, there 
will always be a large number of tasks which are incompatible with the notion of the 
autonomous activity of society’, such as the administration of transport or the 
maintenance of public order.157 Yet, by sticking to Kautsky’s interpretation of Marxism, 
social democrats failed to complement their libertarian conception of the political order 
with a credible theory of State intervention. 
 The third contradiction within the socialist movement consisted of fuelling the 
myth of the working class as an inherently international actor despite the social 
democrats’ chronic difficulties in cooperating internationally. The fierce contest for the 
leadership between Marx and Bakunin plagued the International Workingmen’s 
Association (IWA), later known as the First International, and caused its split in 
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1872.158 The World Socialist Congress held in Ghent in 1877 proved that anarchist 
positions were losing ground, but anti-socialist laws in Spain, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland as well as the mushrooming of regional and factional gatherings prevented 
the reunification of social democratic parties under a single framework for nearly two 
decades. Because of that, the new International – established in 1889 – came to light 
when socialism had already assimilated national peculiarities, thus being much more 
diversified and fragmented than in the 1860s.159 The general acceptance of vulgar 
Marxism, facilitated by the strength of the SPD vis-à-vis the other funding members, 
was the only source of internal cohesion.160 Still, its motto ‘Working Men of all 
Countries, Unite!’ was hardly appropriate for an organisation that included the 
nationalisation of the means of production among its core aims and solemnly 
proclaimed that the permanent relations between socialist parties could not ‘violate the 
autonomy of national groupings, which are the best judges of the tactics to be adopted 
in their own country.’161 Given these premises, the Second International was bound to 
remain a consultative forum for highly independent parties: the permanent Bureau, 
established in 1900, ensured some institutional continuity and enhanced internal 
coordination among members but was not bestowed with executive powers. In a typical 
fashion, its secretary Camille Huysmans felt he could not intervene as a mediator in the 
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ongoing dispute between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks within the Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party unless both wings authorised him to arrange a reconciliatory 
meeting.162  
 The feebleness of the International originated from a greater underlying 
problem, which social democrats tended to downplay: the resilience of nationalism. 
Neither Marx nor Engels completely overlooked its strength or the necessity to come to 
terms with it: the latter even claimed, in 1893, that ‘without restoring the autonomy and 
unity of each nation, it will be impossible to achieve the international union of the 
proletariat, or the peaceful and intelligent cooperation of these nations towards common 
aims.’163 Both of them, however, understood nationalism as a transient phenomenon 
inextricably linked to a particular stage of capitalist development. Socialists could 
therefore exploit calls for national self-determination tactically, so to advance the cause 
of world revolution, bearing in mind that the increasing integration between previously 
separate national markets would inevitably result in weakening, and finally 
undermining, the appeal of nationalism.164 Kautsky admitted, privately as well as 
publicly, that Marx’s views on the matter had been occasionally simplistic or 
superseded by events.165 He nevertheless maintained – in one of his few, scattered 
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contributions on the topic – that economic centralisation would settle the issue of 
nationalities ‘painlessly’, by blending peoples together in a world polity.166  
The most perceptive voices of social democracy were aware that nationalist 
surges could endanger the prospect of international socialism, especially outside 
Western Europe. As Rosa Luxemburg warned in 1896, the consequences of backing 
demands for national self-determination from Central and Eastern European minorities 
could be calamitous: ‘Rather than a working class organized in accordance with 
political realities, there would be an espousal of organization along national lines, which 
often goes astray from the start. Instead of political programs, nationalist programs 
would be drawn up. Instead of a coherent political struggle of the proletariat in every 
country, its disintegration through a series of fruitless national struggles would be 
virtually assured.’167 Still, most social democratic parties preferred not to address the 
issue openly, or do it under the highly dubious postulate that nationalism was a dying 
force. Living under an increasingly polarised empire, Austrian social democrats were 
the most thoroughgoing in investigating the relationship between socialism and national 
self-determination. Drawing on the works of his comrade Karl Renner, the young 
theorist Otto Bauer controversially argued in Die Nationalitätenfrage und die 
Sozialdemokratie (1907) that national autonomy was a ‘necessary demand’ for any 
section of the working class waging the class struggle within a multinational state.168 
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And yet, for all his non-conformism, Bauer too confidently concluded that ‘the 
international division of labor will necessarily lead to the unification of national polities 
in a social structure of higher order.’169  Without grasping that quasi-religious faith in 
the virtues of economic interdependence and in the spontaneous growth of international 
solidarity among workers, it is impossible to understand why social democrats grossly 
underestimated the risk of a major war between imperialist powers before 1914. 
Grounded in the strictly Marxist assumptions that nationalism was above all an 
expression of bourgeois false consciousness and the world was marching towards an 
ever-closer economic unity, they miscalculated about the possibility that workers would 
fight against each other. In that spirit, it seemed reasonable to argue, as the French 
socialist leader Jean Jaurès did in 1910, that replacing standing armies with popular 
militias would make conflicts much less likely for offensive war ‘in the world of 
democracy and labour is completely outdated, absurd, and criminal.’170  
*** 
 In his last book devoted to political messianism, historian Jacob L. Talmon 
compared the trajectory of Marxism from 1848 to World War I to a process of 
psychological relaxation: since ‘messianic expectations’ had failed to materialise, local 
parties ‘began to feel more like members of a loose international federation than 
sections of a church militant – the socialist international. They were fighting the class 
enemy at home according to the parliamentary rules of the game, and were trying to 
become the national party which shaped the character of the nation liberated from class 
rule, instead of waiting for the call from a revolutionary GHQ to man a concerted 
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assault laid down by an international proletarian strategy.’171 Talmon’s analogy is 
impeccable except for the fact that it fails to convey the buoyancy and sense of 
fulfilment that socialists experienced between 1870 and 1914. Industrialisation was 
breeding a huge working class, on whose numerical expansion the success of social 
democratic parties ultimately depended; national economies were more and more 
integrated; technological progress was boosting productivity; social reform was 
moderating the effects of capitalist exploitation. In that context – whether through an 
endless process of reforms or a sharp revolutionary break – the advent of a classless 
society seemed only a matter of time, even though it would probably begin in in the 
most advanced economies. An American activist, Isador Ladoff, captured the spirit of 
the age by triumphally proclaiming, in 1901, that ‘the economic structure of our modern 
society is clearly drifting towards the socialization of industry, and Socialism is 
preparing the people for this revolutionary change.’172 
 Considering that mood, it is easy to realise why social democrats could carry on 
their ordinary tasks without feeling a pressing need to unpack at least some of the 
concepts, or revisit some of the arguments, on which vulgar Marxism rested. Ideology 
was no longer able to offer any detailed or compelling insight to dictate politics; rather, 
its function was now twofold: first, to provide a framework of legitimacy within which 
marginal differences in convictions and lines of conduct could be accommodated; 
second, to encompass crystallised symbols and rites in order ‘to keep up the enthusiasm 
of the troops and to transform the prosaic nature of everyday political claims.’ by which 
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the enthusiasm of the militants could be aroused or kept alive.’173 The ultimate paradox 
of social democracy before 1914 lies in this disconnection between theory and practice, 
or more specifically, in the growing reluctance to reconcile the two by producing a 
comprehensive assessment of the limitations of Engels’ and Kautsky’s systematisation 
of Marx’s thought. Subsequent, traumatic events would lead some socialists to 
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Hendrik De Man and the Legacy of the Great War 
 
  
War is the creator of all great things. All that is 
meaningful in the stream of life has emerged 
through victory and defeat. 
  
Oswald Spengler, 1922174 
 
Neither do I intend to tell you so-called "trench 
stories", of which a number of people seem to 
be very fond. There are two sorts of trench 
stories, those that are beautiful and those that 
are not. Beautiful trench stories are not usually 
true, and the true trench stories are seldom 
beautiful. 
 
Hendrik de Man 1918175 
 
 The killing of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, is 
usually credited for unleashing the chain of events that culminated in the outbreak of the 
First World War. Yet, in the perception of many European socialists, another murder 
came to symbolise the passing of an age, about one month later. In that case, the victim 
was Jean Jaurès, shot at point blank range in the back by a nationalist student, Raoul 
Villain, while sitting at the Café Le Croissant, in Paris, on July 31. 
 Jaurès was not only the most distinguished and authoritative leader of the SFIO, 
which he had helped to found, but also a great orator, a defender of Alfred Dreyfus, and 
an outspoken advocate for Franco-German reconciliation after the crushing defeat of 
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1871. Revanchisme was alien to him. Spellbound by German culture, he had even 
devoted his doctoral dissertation – in Latin – to the study of the early foundations of 
socialism in the works of Luther, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.176 His homicide could thus 
be viewed as an act against some of the core values of the Enlightenment: tolerance, 
solidarity, cosmopolitanism, peace. Writing to a friend in 1916, the French historian and 
philosopher Élie Halévy, who never indulged in apocalyptic rhetoric, held that ‘the day 
Jaurès was assassinated and the fire of Europe was kindled, a new era has begun in the 
history of the world.’177 Instinctively, many Parisians felt the same way – and reacted 
accordingly, driven by a sense of imminent doom and despair. A large crowd gathered 
in Montmartre, grieving and shrieking Ils ont tué Jaurès, c’est la guerre. Hundreds of 
militants, some asking for vengeance but many more dumbstruck, surrounded the 
headquarters of the socialist newspaper L’Humanité, whose journalists could barely find 
the strength to speak. In Belleville, police charged and dispersed spontaneous 
demonstrators while in the Elysée the Ministry of the Interior, Louis Malvy, informed 
the rest of the cabinet that the city was on the brink of revolution. The news of Jaures’ 
death rapidly spread across the country. Awakened by the doorbell in the middle of the 
night, the wife of the socialist parliamentarian Marcel Sembat thought a declaration of 
war had been issued. Once informed, she burst into tears.178  
Around noon the following day, a 28-year old Belgian socialist who had just 
arrived in the French capital, Hendrik de Man, witnessed not riots, as Malvy had feared, 
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but a full, disciplined mobilisation of troops, very similar to the one he had bumped into 
at dawn, in his own country. De Man had got up early in the morning, in Brussels, 
determined to ignore the reservists, go fishing, and enjoy some rest after a few busy 
days. Yet, as soon as he learned about Jaurès, his priorities shifted dramatically. Once in 
Paris he felt wrapped in an uncanny, dream-like atmosphere. ‘The weather was hot and 
sultry, there was not a breath of air, nature itself seemed to be waiting in suspense. Huge 
clouds of a lurid sulphurous colour threatened thunder, which never came’, he would 
later recall. ‘Men and women walked about almost in silence with the ghostlike 
detachment of people who have suddenly lost their own volition and henceforth obey 
the will of a fate which they do not understand, but the hostility of which is brought 
home to them by everything around them.’179 Much like his French comrades, the 
Belgian now realised how real was the ongoing downhill slide towards war. Unlike 
most of them, he had experienced first-hand how little Socialist leaders had done to stop 
it.  
 De Man had just taken part in the extraordinary meeting of the International 
Socialist Bureau (ISB) held in Brussels, within the offices of the Workers’ Education 
Committee that he directed, on July 29-30. The ‘most fateful conference’180 in the 
history of the International was attended by many of its prominent members, including 
Jaurès, Édouard Valliant, Jules Guesde, Hugo Haase, Karl Kautsky, Victor and 
Friedrich Adler, Rosa Luxembourg, Angelica Balabanoff, and Pieter Jelles Troelstra. 
Notable absentees were Friedrich Ebert and Vladimir Lenin. Being fluent in four 
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languages, de Man served as interpreter. In this guise, he was present at the debates 
marking, in his subsequent assessment, the ‘moral bankruptcy’ of the organisation.181 
 Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia had been delivered six days before and British 
pressures on the Kaiser to mediate had had no effect. Still, the delegates reached 
Belgium lacking a sense of immediate danger and believing that, at worst, a minor 
conflict in the Balkans would occur. Jaurès sided with the most confident. According to 
Charles Rappoport, then representing Argentina, ‘until the last minute [he] thought 
reason and common sense would prevail’, largely due to his deep-seated conviction that 
France and Germany would recoil from the prospect of a massive bloodbath.182 The 
President of the LSI, Vandervelde, similarly recalled ‘the steadfastness of his 
optimism’. When leaving, Jaurès predicted that ‘this crisis will pass as the others’ and 
asked Vandervelde to accompany him to an art gallery to see some Flemish paintings.183 
Vandervelde himself stunned Paul Hymans, a Belgian liberal he met on July 30, with 
his relative cheerfulness. Both he and Jaurès believed it was not too late to exert 
effective pressure on national governments, putting the bit – in the latter’s words – in 
Attila’s trembling horse’s mouth.184  
 Jaurès and Vandervelde, though, were in good company: no delegate seems to 
have been quite prescient of the upcoming disaster. On July 29, the German social 
democrat Haase proudly reported that in Berlin, the day before, thousands of workers 
had demonstrated for peace in twenty-seven different gatherings, proving that the 
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German proletariat was immune to chauvinistic attitudes. He helped Jaurès in drafting a 
joint resolution, and stood close to him during a crowded rally on July 30, after the 
closing of the official ISB session, to stress the socialists’ determination to stay 
united.185 The debate often revolved around minor issues. Plunged into administrative 
problems, British delegate Dan Irving and Valliant bickered about the location of the 
forthcoming Congress whereas Troelstra questioned its extraordinary character. 
Participants finally agreed to meet up in Paris on August 9 to address the topic “The 
Proletariat and the War”. However pained and gloomy to the point of annoying Rosa 
Luxembourg when he portrayed Austrian socialists as powerless in preventing the 
escalation against Serbia, Victor Adler too ruled out the possibility of a general war.186 
The passivity displayed by him and the Bohemian Anton Nemec baffled de Man: ‘Even 
the most radical elements were struck with amazement and awe when they saw how the 
huge cruel machinery of mobilisation began to move.’187 Leaders in Brussels, lulled by 
official declarations, were grossly underestimating the gravity of the situation and failed 
to produce a coordinated strategy when it was needed the most.188 
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 The killing of Jaurès shattered most of those illusions and increased the urgency 
of hammering out a common position for French and Germans alike. For that reason, de 
Man, on the morning of August 1, travelled to Paris along with Camille Huysmans, 
secretary of the ISB, and Hermann Müller, the SPD politician and future Weimar 
Chancellor. That afternoon, with the mobilisation for war well under way, the three met 
a group of French socialists at the Palais Bourbon and later in the offices of 
L’Humanité. The mood was grim and tense, epitomised by the ‘pale face and the tired 
suffering eyes’ of Pierre Renaudel, a long-time associate of Jaurès who had been sitting 
close to him when Villain opened fire.189 Müller’s main task was to gather information 
about French attitudes, in view of the SPD meeting scheduled for August 3: he had no 
mandate, therefore, to speak on behalf of his party. He nevertheless reassured the 
audience that German social democrats were split between a majority willing to vote 
against war credits and a minority inclined to abstain: casting a vote in favour was not 
even considered an option. He wished French socialists would take a similar stand and 
stressed the Kaiser’s determination to avoid war.190 One point he made, though, proved 
controversial. To a French spokesman arguing that, in case of a deliberate act of 
aggression, socialists of victim states would be right in siding with their country, Müller 
replied that any distinction between aggressor and attacked states was ‘out of date’, for 
the present dispute originated from ‘capitalist Imperialism, and the responsibility for it 
recoils upon the governing classes of all the countries concerned.’191 That answer, 
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framed in stiff Marxist terms, sparked a lively debate. Having no binding force, the 
meeting ended with a vague pledge to hold further bilateral consultations, after which de 
Man, Huysmans, and Müller took the last train east, already packed with soldiers. In 
Brussels, which they reached after a troubled trip, ‘the last connecting link between the 
socialists of the two groups of powers’ was severed, with Müller heading on to Berlin, 
where his party was succumbing to the fear of Russia striking first.192 On August 3, 
German troops invaded Belgium. The day after, Hugo Haase – the very man who had 
worked side by side with Jaurès in Brussels – addressed the Reichstag and explained, 
echoing Müller’s arguments, that imperialist policies were to blame for the crisis but 
also announced that his party refused to leave ‘the Fatherland in the lurch in the hour of 
danger.’193 At the defining moment, the SPD swung in favour of war credits; French 
socialists did the same. The dispute over self-defence de Man had heard in Paris now 
affected him personally: were all powers to be regarded as equally responsible for the 
outbreak of the war? Was German foreign policy driven by overriding structural factors 
that prevented its government from pursuing a fundamentally different course? Were 
Belgian socialists morally entitled to resist? All of a sudden, de Man’s commitment to 
neutrality vanished: ‘There was a decisive impulse at last I felt such an overmastering 
movement of repulsion against cowardly brutality, of active sympathy with the victim 
of an unprovoked aggression, of instinctive desire to share the sacrifice of those who 
willingly gave up everything for honour's sake, of admiration for the little plucky one 
against the big brute, that I could not doubt a minute that this call came from what was 
                                                          
192
 H. de Man, The Remaking, 45.  
193
 Cited in F. Osterroth and D. Schuster, Chronik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Hannover, Dietz, 
1963, 157. For an account of the SPD’s vote and how it contributed to fuel the myth of the German 
people enthusiastically welcoming the war, see J. Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and 
Mobilisation in Germany, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2000, 157-161, 166-169.  
76 
 
good and true in me, and had to be obeyed.’194 Propelled by such a ‘resurrection of 
combative instincts’195, the self-proclaimed pacifist Hendrik de Man abruptly joined his 
national army to fight against Germany, to which he owed ‘the essentials’ of his 
‘scientific and socialist culture.’196 
 Examining the week between July 29, when the ISB met in Brussels, and August 
4, which saw the capitulation of German social democrats, is essential to understand not 
only de Man’s reaction to the unfolding of the events but also the backdrop against 
which he analysed the Great War. Regrettably, no diary and only a few letters written 
by de Man in 1914-1918 are left in the archives and it is therefore impossible to trace 
the step-by-step evolution of his views. Nevertheless, The Remaking of a Mind: A 
Soldier’s Thoughts on War and Reconstruction, a book he published in English in 1919, 
and La leçon de la guerre, the collection of articles released in French in 1920, are a 
useful proxy and provide a clear picture of the ideological transformation de Man 
underwent during the conflict. 
 This chapter focuses on that transformation, which can be summarised as an 
outright rejection of vulgar Marxism, the strand of thought that had dominated 
European socialism until 1914.197 First, it briefly discusses de Man’s pre-war views and 
his early involvement in socialist activism. Second, it analyses the impact of the war on 
de Man’s thinking through his twofold experience, as a soldier and as a diplomat. Third, 
it assesses the originality of de Man’s departure from Marxism as well as the 
peculiarities of his new approach, being a hybrid variant of democratic socialism built 
                                                          
194
 H. de Man, The Remaking, 50. An interesting parallel may be drawn between de Man and the later 
British prime minister Clement Attlee, another pacifist who volunteered immediately after the invasion of 
Belgium [see N. Thomas-Symonds, Attlee: A Life in Politics, London, I.B. Tauris 2010, 21-22]. 
Unfortunately, there is no account of Attlee’s emotional reaction to the event. 
195
 H. de Man, Après coup, 106.  
196
 H. de Man, La leçon de la guerre, Brussels, Librairie du Peuple, 1920, 5.  
197
 See chapter I of this dissertation. 
77 
 
on loathing for communism, faith in the egalitarian potential of capitalism – if wisely 
managed and properly reformed –, and an interest in social psychology. Although de 
Man would subsequently revise some of the arguments made in 1919 and challenge the 
theoretical foundations of Marxism from a different angle after having returned to 
Europe from the U.S. in 1920, the key themes outlined in his early post-war writings 
continued to loom large on his intellectual journey. Because of that, The Remaking of a 
Mind and La leçon de la guerre can be seen retrospectively as the first salvo in de 
Man’s offensive aimed at reinventing Western European socialism. 
*** 
Born in Antwerp in 1885, Hendrik de Man grew up in a well-to-do, 
cosmopolitan family steeped in the values of the austere, industrious Flemish upper 
class. At the age of sixteen, however, the young Hendrik started displaying a rebellious 
temper which, coupled with an increasing awareness of the appalling gap between his 
prosperity and the miserable condition of the Belgian working class, led him to 
challenge the alleged hypocrisy and aloofness of his peers. He joined the Jeune Garde 
Socialiste (JGS), the socialists’ youth organisation, in 1902, soon becoming the leader 
of its anti-militaristic wing.198 When, in 1905, he was expelled from a prestigious 
institute in Ghent for his participation in an anti-czarist rally in the aftermath of the 
Bloody Sunday massacre, he broke with his parents and moved to Leipzig.199 
Germany was the right place to sharpen a socialist mind: the SPD had recently 
renewed its commitment to Kautsky’s brand of Marxism against Bernstein’s attempts to 
revise it.200 De Man could not agree more. A thoroughgoing supporter of revolutionary 
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socialism, he engaged in several publications and educational activities aimed at 
moulding class-consciousness, one of the paramount tasks in preparation for the 
ultimate seizure of power. Theoretically, his views were informed by Kautsky’s 
historical materialism: in his first important pamphlet, he laid out a comparative 
analysis of the attitudes displayed by various socialist parties towards parliamentary rule 
building on Kautsky’s Die soziale Revolution (The Social Revolution), and indeed 
acknowledging him as a major source of inspiration.201 Strategically, de Man found 
himself close to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, helping the latter in setting up 
the International Federation of Socialist Young People’s Organizations (IFSYPO) in 
1907, soon endorsed and funded by the Socialist International.202 Both Luxemburg and 
Liebknecht underscored the need for intensifying class struggle instead of cooperating 
with non-revolutionary forces, and de Man’s journalistic writings reiterated that 
point.203 Nor was his dislike of gradualism tamed by his long stay in England in 1910, 
as he maintained that universal suffrage under capitalism was deceptive: bourgeois 
democracy, he believed, was no panacea for workers’ exploitation.204 
De Man’s radicalism must be seen in the context of his frustration with the 
establishment of his own party, the POB, whose willingness to mediate and 
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compromise, he thought, badly served the labour movement.205 His doubts about the 
POB’s real commitment to revolutionary socialism were legitimate. Under the influence 
of the syndicalist César de Paepe, it had originally leaned towards collectivism, a 
doctrine that prescribed the socialisation of the means of production without resorting to 
violence.206 Only in 1894, nine years after its foundation, did the POB issue an official 
declaration of principles, the Charte de Quaregnon, which incorporated key Marxist 
ideas, such as the necessity to suppress capitalism to maximise the freedom of the 
workers and participate in the international struggle for the emancipation of the 
proletariat. At the same time, the document greatly emphasised social reforms and 
parliamentary action to achieve those goals.207 Its author, Emile Vandervelde, was to 
become not only the party leader and the most distinguished advocate of Marxism in 
Belgium but also one of the staunchest supporters of parliamentary rule. Vandervelde’s 
thinking was subsequently celebrated within the POB as an example of ‘astonishing 
dynamism’, a ‘miraculous synthesis […] of all forms of proletarian, political, trade 
unionist, and cooperative action.’208 In fact, Vandervelde excelled in squaring a genuine 
admiration for Marx’s conceptual apparatus with the necessity to accommodate the 
progressive integration of the socialist movement within the Belgian legal and political 
structures after the introduction of universal male suffrage, in 1893. There is no reason 
to think that Vandervelde, who opposed Bernstein during the revisionist debate, did not 
truly believe in the inevitable demise of capitalism – except that, by setting the event in 
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a distant future, he provided a rationale for focusing on short-term, practical tasks. It is 
also because of Vandervelde’s lightly worn theoretical baggage that reformist practices 
gained wide currency within the POB and meant that in Belgium debates about the 
possibility of pursuing an organic alliance with the Liberals, which social democratic 
parties with deeper Marxist roots had already excluded in the 1880s and 1890s, dragged 
on until 1914.209 
Before the Great War, however, de Man’s criticism was levelled at the 
symptoms, rather than at the cause, of the POB’s lacklustre political culture. Appointed 
director of the Centrale d’Éducation Ouvrière (Workers’ Education Committee) – an 
institution aimed at training party members and trade union cadres – in 1910, de Man 
did not refrain from crossing swords with moderate elements, often former Liberals of 
middle-class background who, in his view,  ‘failed to defy the intellectual and moral 
limitations – such as political careerism – of their class’ mentality’, accusing them of 
switching parties ‘the same way a mercenary would change sides.’210 His assaults 
reached their peak in March 1911 when, in a leaflet published by the Die Neue Zeit, he 
lambasted the ‘cooperative cretinism’ developed by structures like Vooruit (Forward), 
the main socialist consumer organisation based in Ghent: by claiming that British-style 
mutualism was nurturing ‘the dominant parochialism of the labour movement’, de Man 
was consciously targeting the ‘intellectual misery’ of his party, stifled by a ‘practical 
revisionism [...] resting upon the illusions of a decreasing class antagonism and the 
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utopia of a peaceful transition to socialism.’211 By doing so, however, he alienated 
Vooruit’s powerful president, Edward Anseele, and forced Vandervelde to publicly 
brush off the ‘trivial things’ denounced in the piece.212 The bitter dispute between 
Anseele and de Man ended a year later with a formal censure of the latter’s opinions and 
an appraisal of the cooperatives’ ‘admirable work’ issued by a panel of distinguished 
party members.213 Using the most authoritative Marxist journal to criticise the Belgian 
socialists’ deviance from the orthodoxy was surely a defiant act – but also a misstep for 
an inexperienced and still relatively unknown party member with no major political 
accomplishment to claim credit for.214 In retrospect, the controversy about Vooruit is 
significant for two reasons. First, it revealed de Man’s tendency to overplay his hand in 
dealing with the POB, which would remain a constant in his career. Second, it showed 
Vandervelde’s inclination to protect the ideological and institutional heritage of the 
party, a major cause of friction with de Man in the subsequent decades. It took nothing 
less than the Great War to shake de Man's defiant, quasi-religious devotion to historical 
materialism. His hostility to any revolutionary verbalism that was aimed at concealing 
unprincipled pragmatism, however, would not change, and would rather be magnified 
by his war experience. 
*** 
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The most enduring consequence of the 1914-1918 period on de Man’s mind-set 
was his abandonment of vulgar Marxism, driven by his determination to critically 
engage with assumptions and arguments that pre-war socialists had neither spelled out 
clearly nor seriously questioned.215 Though still praising some aspects of the SPD’s 
inner organisation during the 1920s216, de Man’s uncompromising allegiance to the 
German strand of socialism died away in the summer of 1914, confronted by the 
contrast between the theory and the real behaviour of the working class. 
The starting point of The Remaking of a Mind was the acknowledgement that 
socialists had tragically underestimated the strength of nationalism. Being proudly 
attached to his Flemish roots, de Man had been grappling with the problem of national 
identity at least since 1905, getting acquainted with the works of Otto Bauer and the 
Austro-Marxists during a semester he spent in Vienna.217 Despite his ongoing 
opposition to militarism218, only his momentous decision to enlist forced him to 
recognise that the lack of international solidarity displayed by the proletariat originated 
from the inherent limitations of international socialist bodies, which merely linked up 
‘autonomous national organizations for purposes of mutual help and information’, and 
therefore fell short of establishing a genuinely transnational sense of belonging.219 
Socialists were, somewhat paradoxically, victims of their own success for the struggle 
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to improve workers’ conditions at national level had led the latter to identify their state 
as the guarantor of their welfare: ‘the more national movements increased their strength 
and influence in their own sphere, the less were they prepared to receive directions from 
abroad.’220 
However, this failure went beyond politics and, according to de Man, was a 
consequence of the socialists’ reluctance to seize on psychology. Incidentally, this 
argument highlighted another source of disagreement between him and many of the 
radical comrades he had been close to until 1914. In de Man’s view, well-intentioned 
Marxists gathering at Zimmerwald, in September 1915, and Kienthal, in April 1916, 
rightly argued that the war had been caused by competing imperial interests.221 On the 
other hand, by calling for a policy of non-collaboration with bourgeois governments, 
they were equating all the powers involved, blind to the fact that a victory of the Central 
Powers would have been ‘incompatible with the progress of any movement which 
requires political freedom, democracy and peace for its normal development’, socialism 
included.222 Even worse, they were unable to explain why the overwhelming majority of 
workers accepted taking up arms, being neither ‘traitors’ nor ‘victims of nationalist 
intoxication’ as they erroneously claimed.223 Refuting the strand of absolute pacifism 
within the socialist movement, therefore, demanded a closer examination of the 
soldiers’ mentality. 
De Man conceded that coercion and propaganda played a part in the early phases 
of mobilisation. At best, however, this was a half-truth. Building on his first-hand 
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experience, he argued that, after an initial outburst of enthusiasm, a new feeling 
emerged among the troops: a ‘sense of duty’, stirred by ‘the tremendous elementary 
power of the desire not to disappoint others who expect something of you. It is this 
instinct that makes it normal for the least educated of common labourers to do his job 
well.’224 The enormous grip that  this readiness to obey held up on thousands of people, 
fully ignorant of the political implications of the war, came as shock to de Man, 
alongside other spontaneous reactions, such as the burgeoning ‘instinct of solidarity’ 
within the trenches and the less admirable but deeply human ‘desire to retaliate’ against 
the enemy.225 
De Man was far from glorifying the soldier’s life. To him, war remained nothing 
but a carnage that spread hatred and acquainted human beings with violence: as he later 
wrote commemorating his friend Karl Liebknecht after his murder in 1919, the conflict 
‘had bred more beasts than heroes.’226 Still, he could not find any better word than 
heroism to label ‘a capacity of the will to subjugate impulses or circumstances adverse 
to the fulfilment of a duty dictated by conscience’ that he witnessed in most soldiers.227 
Under different circumstances, that self-discipline which helped curb the chronic fear of 
death, he speculated, could be exploited for progressive aims, as de Man held that ‘the 
fundamental instincts of our race’ could serve ‘the purposes of our present social ethics 
to the same extent as […] they were the moral cement of the earlier forms of human 
society.’228 Those non-materialistic aspects of the human mind, he argued, could no 
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longer be overlooked by any ‘rationalistic philosophy or Utopian desires’ that sought to 
impose upon the masses ‘a conception of the brain or an ethical imperative contrary to 
the native instincts and material interests that are the driving power of their common 
actions.’229 By 1919, de Man was willing to acknowledge that ‘ideal forces, like the 
attachment to liberty, the spirit of justice and of chivalry’ were powerful drivers of 
human action, and to criticise ‘the Marxian philosophy that had thus far confined my 
outlook too exclusively to the economic aspects of things.’230 
Dissatisfaction with Marxism was not limited to the theoretical realm. After 
three years at the front, during which he became commander of a trench mortar battery 
receiving an Iron Cross for his bravery231, in May-June 1917 de Man was sent to Russia 
at the request of the Belgian government along with Vandervelde and Louis de 
Brouckère, at the moment when the Entente powers feared the Russian provisional 
government led by Georgy Lvov might seek a separate peace.232 By then de Man was 
well qualified to speak up in the name of socialism and patriotism, and insist on the 
necessity of marrying them. In a speech given before the First Revolutionary Regiment 
in Petrograd, he introduced himself both as a ‘soldier of the homeland’ and a ‘soldier of 
the revolution’, interested neither in ‘annexations’ nor in ‘conquests and exactions’ but 
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in preventing ‘a German militaristic hegemony’ over Europe and, perhaps, the entire 
world. Whereas pacifists in Germany were justified in their refusal to fight, the 
circumstances compelled those living in attacked countries to wage ‘a desperate 
struggle for that liberty which is necessary to live.’ Belgian and Russian socialists alike 
shared the same destiny: ‘As we cannot fight for socialism, we must fight at least for 
democracy, in order to maintain that minimum of freedom without which socialism will 
never prosper. That minimum of freedom existed among us, it existed within Western 
democracy. But it did not exist in Germany.’ In addition, Russians deserved a universal 
praise for having got rid of the Czar’s hideous regime, hence making clear that ‘only 
emancipated nations are part of the Entente, struggling against a few, still enslaved 
peoples.’ The ‘moral unity’ born out of such an outright rebuttal of autocracy was 
arguably Russia’s greatest contribution to the war effort, de Man contended.233 
In praising Kerensky and his endeavours to reform the ramshackle imperial 
system de Man was not simply delivering Belgian propaganda: private correspondence 
suggests that he truly believed the Socialist Revolutionary Party was right in supporting 
a wartime coalition government.234 By contrast, his relationship with the Bolsheviks – 
‘men of another mood, if not another stripe’ – was strained from the outset.235 The 
Russian far left, he complained, was composed of ‘intellectuals and semi-intellectuals, 
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most of them Jews, Letts, Georgians, and other members of oppressed nationalities, 
who had been imprisoned or exiled from their native country in their youth.’236 Cut off 
from the public sphere, with no opportunity to engage in daily politics, ‘they had to 
confine themselves to theorizing. Their main activity consisted in meeting from night 
till morning in small groups around a friendly samovar, in smoking an endless number 
of cigarettes and in vehement discussion of abstract theories.’237 That estrangement 
made their temper ‘bitter and intolerant’, a condition Lenin was eager to exploit when 
he established ‘despotism from below’, which turned out to be an ‘unorganised mob-
rule by disbanded soldiers with their machine-guns.’238 Bolshevism, de Man contended, 
had little to teach socialists living in Western Europe: ‘Practically it was nothing but the 
response of the hungry war-weary masses to the call for support of the only people who 
could at least promise them a way out of their misery. Theoretically, it was an attempt 
to adapt artificially to Russian conditions, aggravated by military and economic 
disorganization, an abstract doctrine conceived in exile and distilled from social 
conceptions corresponding to a stage of economic and political development existing 
abroad but as different from that of Russia as is a hydraulic-press from a sledge hammer 
in a village smithy.’239 Their strategy was equally short-sighted. By killing capitalism in 
its cradle, Bolsheviks were bound to dash all hopes for a real democratisation of the 
country: like a ‘man up a tree’, de Man quipped, they seemed ‘busily engaged in sawing 
off the branch’ upholding them.240 
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A second official mission – this time to the United States, between April and 
November 1918 – strengthened his conviction that a workable, decent socialist system 
needed solidly liberal and democratic foundations. The trip also marked the beginning 
of an enduring fascination with America and its culture. At first, his admiration for the 
United States was instinctive, aroused by the dynamic, creative, pioneering spirit of the 
New World. ‘I have clearly seen its shortcomings and, particularly after a couple of 
months, I have a sharp understanding of what is still missing and raw in a young 
civilization like this’ de Man confessed to Louis de Brouckère in August 1918 ‘but its 
greatness, democratic idealism, spirit of enterprise and bravery are so fascinating that, 
for my temper and my age, I cannot resist their impact.’241 He found the same passions 
buoying the U.S. labour movement, fully committed to victory and just peace – an 
attitude he linked to the unions’ non-Marxist character –.242 Moreover, the streak of 
individualism still permeating the American mind, especially in the West, went against 
the overarching trend towards big business and centralisation. De Man was well aware 
that America was neither on the verge of dismantling the free-market system nor likely 
to swing to the Left in any foreseeable future.243 However, he wished farmers and 
industrial workers could come together and, in the long run, form the bedrock of a 
home-grown social democratic movement.244 The contrast with Bolshevism could 
hardly be more striking: ‘In Russia, I have seen socialism without democracy. In 
America, I have seen democracy without socialism. My conclusion is that, for my part, 
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if I had to choose, I would prefer living in a democracy without socialism than under a 
socialist regime without democracy.’245  
De Man’s belief that the U.S. was set on a fundamentally progressive course was 
buttressed by his study of its industrial system – that was the purpose of the trip, and de 
Man found the subject deeply intriguing. By getting familiar with scientific 
management as theorised by Frederick W. Taylor and tentatively introduced in some 
factories from the Atlantic to the Pacific he realised that the ‘principles of the good 
economy […] to achieve the maximum degree of production with the minimum effort 
and the minimum waste’ could have massive implications for the socialist movement.246 
‘Until now, Taylorism, as a method of organising manpower, has served capitalist 
interests only, against those of the mass of producers and of the nation as a whole’ he 
claimed in the report summarising the findings of his mission, released in 1919.247 
However, ‘Europe would only benefit from quickly and fully adopting the American 
principle: high salaries, low costs of production. That means: an improved mechanical 
equipment, thanks to the concentration of production, the standardization of products 
and machinery, production in series, and specialization, so to minimize the intervention 
and the use of labour; in turn, higher productivity, greater wealth and possibility of 
reducing almost indefinitely the workday while raising wages.’248 It was true that 
workers, once involved in a such a uniform, rationalised process, could be easily 
deprived of the pleasure of craftsmanship, and degraded to the rank of cogs in a 
machine out of their control – that was, in his view, the most disturbing aspect of 
scientific management, and one of the reasons why American workers resisted the 
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imposition of Taylor’s most reactionary principles.249 Yet, while ensuring better, more 
agreeable working conditions was a cause worth fighting for, socialists had to bear in 
mind that only ever-higher outputs would allow living standards to rise steadily and 
peacefully. In short, de Man came to see American capitalism as a cooperative and 
emancipatory enterprise rather than as a zero-sum game based on pure, naked 
exploitation, allowing him to square the circle and discard Marxism even on economic 
grounds. His penchant for economic social engineering would also give a distinctly 
technocratic flavour to some of his subsequent writings on economics.250 
 In the final chapter of his The Remaking of a Mind, de Man ventured to predict 
that no overthrow of bourgeois institutions would occur in the United States: ‘I believe 
that in such an atmosphere socialism can evolve gradually and experimentally from 
capitalism by the mere play of the tendency to indefinite improvement in efficiency 
which is inherent to the cooperative system, and by the movement towards more and 
more political self-determination of the masses, which gives them the power to 
counteract the detrimental effects of monopolisation.’251 By no means, however, did de 
Man believe America was unique in that regard: even Europe, despite a very different 
historical background, could follow a similar path, provided an ideological reorientation 
took place. That was the aim of ‘New Socialism’, a doctrine he outlined with the 
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purpose of suiting all industrialised nations, in a chapter at first entitled, tellingly 
enough, ‘The Remaking of the World.’252 
  New Socialism, de Man held, differed sharply from Bolshevism, the latter being 
‘destructive of that very freedom which is the motive power’ of positive change where 
democracy was already in place.253 The ‘germs’ of Russian-style socialism were 
becoming ‘as widespread as those of Spanish influenza’, and forced democratic 
socialists to recognise that the socialist movement was irremediably split into two 
opposing factions: on the one side, de Man placed those aiming at ‘the gradual seizure 
of political power through propaganda aimed at forming a majority’, retaining ‘all the 
correctives to unbound majority-rule implied by the constitutionally safeguarded 
liberties of opinion, press, speech, and opposition by representative bodies’; on the 
other, the advocates of ‘State socialism’, a system which would ‘entrust a tyrannic and 
incapable officialdom with a power more absolute than that of any Czar, since it would 
fetter not only the political, but also the economic sphere.’254  
New Socialism would pursue bold economic reforms without suppressing the 
private sector. Despite claiming that ‘private property in land and in the principal means 
of production and transport is no longer justified’, de Man refrained from 
recommending extensive public ownership: ‘joint bodies representing both employer 
and the employed’ were ‘the only means by which satisfactory conditions of labour can 
be provisionally secured and increased productivity attained, without augmenting the 
individual strain’, prompting ‘collaboration between the management and the 
managed.’255 Under the new system, the state would act as a regulator as well as a 
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competitor of private enterprise. This mixed regime, categorised as ‘competitive and 
experimental socialism’, would be less a monistic, command-driven structure than a 
pluralistic framework, putting the ‘incentive of competition and the constant increase of 
human productivity, which we owe to capitalism’ at the service of ‘the ideals of 
freedom, equality of rights and chances, and universal solidarity, which we owe to 
democracy. Only thus can the reconciliation of the two equally vital, but still 
antagonistic, principles of individual liberty and social unity be effected.’256 By calling 
for a ‘revision’ of the doctrine of class struggle, which overlooked the ‘much larger 
field [...] where the interests of all classes coincide’, de Man came to share some key 
tenets of Fabianism – a strand of thought he had previously scorned.257 
*** 
What to make of de Man’s elaborations on his war experience? For sure, their 
impact on the public was limited: we know, for instance, that The Remaking of a Mind 
failed to reach a big audience.258 Furthermore, not every argument laid down there and 
in La leçon de la guerre stands out as very deep or particularly original. Presenting the 
conflict as an all-out struggle between the forces of democracy and German imperialism 
was quite a platitude, especially among English-speaking and French-speaking 
socialists.259 Nor did de Man escape some obvious pitfalls in describing America as a 
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force for good.260 In particular, his admiration for Wilson led him to underestimate the 
mounting tide of conservatism that was soon to sweep American society – as he 
discovered to his own cost in 1920 when, having returned to the U.S. with the intention 
of applying for citizenship, he was forbidden to teach and subjected to police 
surveillance because of the left-wing sympathies. The Red Scare and the subsequent 
pro-business policies pursued by the Republicans would put an end to the most ground-
breaking experiments in workers’ control that de Man had witnessed, and praised, 
during the war.261 
Nonetheless, from a wider perspective, de Man’s accounts are highly original, 
perhaps even unique. Psychologically, the trauma of World War I stirred up in some 
veterans the feeling of belonging to a lost generation, crushed by an unparalleled degree 
of violence, whose faith in progress had been dashed and for whom a return to 
normality was impossible.262. For de Man quite the opposite is true: the conflict 
energised him, drove him into two countries he had not previously visited, and got him 
acquainted with new patterns of thought that prompted a thorough revision of his 
thinking. Ideologically, trench experiences often paved the way to a brutalised form of 
politics, underpinned by a bellicose civic religion.263 Once again, de Man moved in 
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another direction: the more he put his own beliefs under examination the more he 
shrank away from zealotry and extremism. A comparison between his trajectory and 
that of former pacifists of the far left such as the Frenchman Gustave Hervé, the Italian 
Benito Mussolini, the German Karl Liebknecht, and the Belgian Victor Serge, is 
revealing. Like de Man, Hervé had been an unwavering opponent of militarism: he used 
to sign his editorials as Sans-Patrie and lost his job as a teacher for his convictions. In 
1914 he abandoned insurrectionism, took the side of France, and celebrated the 
proletarian character of its army. He too rejected materialistic and rationalistic 
philosophies, but eventually converted to a belligerent and socially conservative form of 
nationalism whereas de Man claimed to fight for progressive principles that were nobler 
than the defence, or the glory, of a single country.264 First-hand experience of trench 
warfare ties de Man to Mussolini, who had become a towering figure of Italian 
revolutionary socialism due to his opposition to the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911. Yet 
Mussolini’s diaries, written between 1915 and 1917, are imbued with much more 
rhetoric than anything de Man wrote during the conflict. Besides, Mussolini ended up 
theorising trincerocrazia, namely the rule of former war combatants in opposition to 
parliamentary institutions whilst de Man came to recognise the significance of the latter 
for the development of a pluralistic socialist society.265 Neither Karl Liebknecht nor 
Victor Serge abandoned their non-interventionist stance during the conflict. However, 
they became convinced, in 1917, that Communism was a cause worth fighting for. 
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Liebknecht, who had co-founded the IFSYPO with de Man, staunchly opposed 
German’s war effort through his movement Spartakusbund, a position that earned him a 
heartfelt tribute from his former comrade. In 1919, following the Soviet example, 
Liebknecht proclaimed the establishment of a German Free Socialist Republic in Berlin, 
under which workers’ councils were meant to replace the bourgeois State. After that 
insurrection failed, he was executed by the Freikorps troops who carried out the 
repression of the uprising on behalf of the German government. As for de Man, 
internationalism remained Liebknecht’s pole star – except that his hero was Lenin, not 
Wilson.266 Serge shared with de Man an early militancy in the JGS before turning to 
anarchism and moving to Paris. In 1914 he was in prison, due to his connections with 
the Bonnot gang. Released, expelled from France then arrested again for having come 
back, he was sent to Moscow thanks to a prisoner swap deal in January 1919. There he 
joined the Communist Party, becoming a close associate of Trotsky. While the First 
World War pushed de Man to defend his country, an attraction to the Bolsheviks 
induced Serge to break with it, and rediscover his Russian roots in the name of a 
universalist revolutionary ideology.267 Obviously, all these socialists, or former 
socialists, parted ways: Hervé and Mussolini moved to the right, Liebknecht and Serge 
to the left. The important point is that all of them were, to an extent, radicalised and 
drifted away from liberal democracy; on the contrary, de Man veered towards it. 
The Remaking of a Mind and La leçon de la guerre also deserve scrutiny in the 
context of de Man’s intellectual journey. The most immediate change from his pre-war 
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thinking was, of course, the acceptance of the most fundamental tenet of democratic 
socialism: the idea that collectivism, if imposed through a dictatorship, would bring 
about slavery instead of equality. On that level, de Man’s aversion to Bolshevism 
echoed that of his old mentor, Kautsky.268  
Still, de Man had no interest in denouncing Lenin for acting ‘in contrast with the 
essential and immutable principles of Marxist socialism.’ 269 His appetite for American 
ideas led him to envisage a mixed economy that would spring out of a steady increase in 
productivity: in this he anticipated some reformists, such as Hyacinthe Dubreuil, who 
would discover the advantages of rationalisation for the working class in the late 
1920s.270 His loss of faith in historical materialism and economic determinism spurred 
his interest in social psychology, in line with the teachings of Austrian psychotherapist 
Alfred Adler.271 Altogether, these elements made him a thinker difficult to pigeonhole, a 
far out figure who had broken with vulgar Marxism to shift towards Fabianism and 
ethical socialism in general rather than acquiescing to mainstream Continental social 
democracy.272 
The inward-looking character of The Remaking of a Mind and La leçon de la 
guerre is a source of strength of those books but also their main weakness. Both weave 
an intriguing narrative of an ideological evolution yet the theoretical justification for it 
                                                          
268
 See K. Kautsky, Die Diktatur des Proletariats, Wien, Ignaz Brand & Co. 1918.  
269
 L. Blum, Pour la vieille maison: intervention au Congrès de Tours (1920), Paris, Librairie Populaire 
1934, 10. The powerful indicdtement of Bolshevism made by the French socialist deputy and future party 
leader Léon Blum rested on the assumption that Lenin was not a true Marxist. 
270
 See H. Dubreuil, Standards: le travail américain vu par un ouvrier français, Paris, Bernard Grasset 
1929. On the American view of productivity and its spread across Europe after the First World War, see 
C. Maier, ‘Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European Ideologies and the Vision of Industrial 
Productivity in the 1920s’, Journal of Contemporary History, 5, 2, 1970, 27-61; B. Settis, Fordismi: 
storia politica della produzione di massa, Bologna, Il Mulino 2016, esp. 107-204. 
271
 See e.g. A. Adler, ‘Bolschewismus und Seelenkunde’, Internationale Rundschau, 4, 1918, 597-600. It 
is unclear whether de Man was already familiar with Adler at this point. In Zur Psychologie des 
Sozialismus, Adler is extensively praised. 
272
 One could argue that, of the three Labour’s utopias sketched out by Peter Beilharz, de Man was close 
to Fabianism whilst Kautsky embodied Social Democracy: both rejected Bolshevism. [see P. Beilharz, 
Labour’s Utopias: Bolshevism, Fabianism, Social Democracy, London-New York, Routledge 1992] 
97 
 
remains flimsy: de Man told the reader how and why he distanced himself from 
Marxism; he did not offer a compelling argument to explain why Marxism was doomed. 
































Turning the Old House Upside Down: 
Hendrik De Man and Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus 
 
 
Everywhere, in the world, a revision of 
socialism had been undertaken in the light of 
changes that had occurred in the dual 
domain of ideas and facts. 
 
Gaétan Pirou, 1939273 
 
During the Thirties, Henri de Man enjoyed 
an exceptional reputation. Forgotten today, 
he seems to me the only theorist of 
democratic socialism between the wars.  
 
Raymond Aron, 1975274 
 
Seven years passed before de Man managed to turn the core underlying theme of 
The Remaking of a Mind – his rejection of Marxism – into a new book, sparking a 
debate which, for breath and depth, if not for animosity, might be compared to the 
revisionist controversy.275 De Man’s main purpose, however, was less the calling out of 
the obsolete parts of Marx’s thought and more the renewal of the foundations of 
Western European socialism by endowing intellectuals with a brand new conceptual 
apparatus. Bernstein wanted Marxism to evolve; de Man aimed at transcending it. His 
intention was to renew socialism in light of recent developments in social sciences such 
as the emergence of sociology and, even more importantly, social psychology as new 
ways of understanding human behaviour and collective action. ‘Socialism must free 
                                                          
273
 G. Pirou, Néo-libéralisme, néo-corporatisme, néo-socialisme, Paris, Gallimard 1939, 139. Pirou 
referred to de Man, the German Werner Sombart, and the British G.D.H. Cole. 
274
  R. Aron, ‘Post-scriptum to «Au delà du marxisme»’, Contrepoint, 16, 1975, 166. Aron’s review of 
Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus originally appeared in the journal Libre Propos in January 1931. It was 
republished in 1975, following the 1974 re-edition of de Man’s book by Seuil.  
275
 See chapter I of this dissertation. 
99 
 
itself from Marxism’ he wrote in his memoirs, summarising his feelings in the mid-
1920s. ‘Not like someone who trashes an enemy whom he had considered a friend for a 
long time, having suddenly realised he was wrong, but like someone who get rids of 
formulas which, once alive and vivifying, have been surpassed by the evolution of facts 
since long time and fallen back into the state of harmful prejudices.’276 
This chapter focuses on de Man’s critique of Marxism as expressed in his most 
relevant theoretical work, Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus. It also discusses how the 
book was received by Kautsky and Vandervelde, who aimed at preserving Marxism as 
the ideological cornerstone of the international socialist movement. The dispute 
between them and de Man, far from being a mere clash of ideas, revealed a generational 
divide between two leading figures of the Second International, sceptical about 
conceptual renovation and fearful of the consequences of breaking with the existing 
framework of analysis, and a breed of intellectuals in their mid-20s-early 30s, based all 
across Europe, persuaded that de Man had simply spotted the obvious, namely the 
inadequacy of Marxist categories in accounting for the post-1914 realities. By 
scrutinising the reaction to Zur Pyschologie by three Belgians (Max Buset, Yves Lecoq, 
and Ivo Rens), a Dutchman (Hendrik Brugmans), an Italian (Carlo Rosselli) and a 
Frenchman (André Philip) the chapter stresses not only the similarity between de Man’s 
concerns and theirs but also, in some cases, the existence of a common background 
between them and de Man, an element that contributed making Zur Psychologie the 
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rallying cry for significant sections of the socialist youth. Finally, the chapter will 
evaluate strength and weaknesses in de Man’s analysis. 
 *** 
 The origins of de Man’s decision to return to full-time academic research must 
be traced to the frustrations of the early post-war period. Contrary to his expectations, 
the Versailles Treaty bore little resemblance to Wilson’s war aims and was perceived at 
the time as imposing a Carthaginian peace upon the vanquished.277 Unable to acquire 
American citizenship, his sympathies went now to the Weimar Republic, ‘the 
democratic and unarmed Germany’ whose prospects of stability and economic recovery 
were threatened by the unmitigated hostility of the neighbouring countries.278 Belgium’s 
acceptance of Poincaré’s foreign policy was another major source of disappointment. 
When, in January 1923, the Theunis cabinet agreed to occupy the Ruhr, an outraged de 
Man resigned from the military reserve force, denouncing the ‘violence’ of the 
government’s conduct, perpetrated through an army which had become ‘instrumental to 
a policy which is in flagrant contradiction with the principles for which I have 
fought.’279 His disenchantment could hardly have been spelled out more clearly. The 
choice of moving back to Germany reflected, therefore, not only a genuine commitment 
to social theory but also an increasing estrangement from the post-war settlement.280 
 It was in Darmstadt, where he taught social psychology, that de Man laid the 
groundwork of his magnum opus published in 1926, Zur Psychologie des 
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Sozialismus.281 This hefty, carefully written book, first published in German, soon 
revised with minor changes and slightly abridged, then translated into all major 
European languages282, covered a wide range of topics, distilling de Man’s efforts to 
recast socialism as a cultural and ethical phenomenon, rooted in the workers’ search for 
self-fulfilment in performing a job.283 According to de Man, Marxism – as much as 
other social theories elaborated in the nineteenth century – suffered from ‘determinism, 
causal mechanism, historicism, rationalism, and economic hedonism’, having failed to 
acknowledge that ‘the realisation of socialism does not depend upon the automatic 
fulfilment of an economic law’ but rather ‘upon the deliberate activity of the labour 
movement, upon an activity working in opposition to this alleged economic law, upon 
activity which aims at maintaining or restoring the workers’ joy in labour.’284 
Contending that the ‘essential driving force of the labour movement’ was mainly a 
‘question of dignity’ rather than a desire for material gains, de Man argued that working 
class solidarity developed out of the ‘ancestral community instincts which had been 
modelled into ethical norms by Christianity and by the social experience of past 
centuries.’285 The socialist creed, therefore, did not stem from class conflict in itself but 
from an ongoing ‘moral revolt’ (Auflehnung) prompted by ‘a specific sense of justice’ 
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(Rechtsempfinden zu suchen) which the rise of capitalism, by separating the producer 
from the whole process of production through the division of labour, deeply 
offended.286 In many respects, capitalism engendered a ‘distaste for work’ 
(Arbeitsunlust) to which further increases in prosperity or a less unequal distribution of 
wealth would offer no solution. A ‘mere change in property relationship’, de Man 
insisted, would not suffice to make the industrial worker feel ‘the master of his own 
work.’287 
 Socialists operating under the influence of Marx, de Man contended, failed to 
realise that a key source of strength for socialism lay in the instinctive, spontaneous 
rejection of capitalism on psychological and moral grounds, and that workers who had 
permanently lost, or never experienced, joy in work could hardly establish or live in a 
cooperative society. Soviet Russia too, de Man held, hinting at Lenin’s New Economic 
Policy, ended up resorting to capitalist management techniques as communists had ‘not 
succeeded in providing the masses with new working motives in place of the old.’288 On 
the contrary, socialism would thrive only if ‘the endeavour to upbuild a better social 
system becomes in the long run an endeavour to make men better and happier, an 
attempt to develop the psychological forces which will make such a system possible.’289 
 In the second and third part of the book, de Man engaged with the practical 
implications of neglecting non-rational factors for socialist parties across the Western 
world. The tendency to present the socialist society as the inevitable outcome of 
conflicting material forces, he argued, led socialists to disregard intellectual renovation, 
turning Marxism into dogma and obliterating the ‘enduring spiritual creative force’ 
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which informed the various strands of socialist thought that developed throughout 
history.290 In turn, such a stiff adherence to historical materialism estranged the 
intellectuals – broadly defined as skilled labour, namely those employees whose work is 
based on knowledge rather than on physical force – for socialists got used to splitting up 
that class ‘into two or three fragments which they assign […] to the capitalist class, to 
the proletariat, or to the middle class’ and treating its members as ‘camp followers’ 
(Mitläufer) unless ‘they wholly adopt the mentality of the working masses.’291 The most 
remarkable consequences, however, were party bureaucratisation and a crisis in 
internationalism, to which de Man devoted some of the most biting pages of Zur 
Psychologie. 
  At first the battle for political and social democracy, he noted, was waged by 
socialists with passionate, semi-religious intensity: ‘This struggle for a remote end 
inspired them with a heroic emotional frame of mind. Their aims were a little vague, 
perhaps; but they were certainly such as tended to arouse enthusiasm.’292 The successful 
consolidation of party structures, however, resulted in the dwindling of that crusading 
spirit: ‘The leader becomes a professional leader, and his activity takes the form of 
office work. By slow degrees the motive of the organisation changes. The distant goal 
of the primary desires is not repudiated’ but, in its daily activities, the organisation 
displays a tendency ‘towards self-preservation and towards becoming an end in 
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itself.’293 Such a ‘displacement of motives’ (Motivverschiebung) in socialist psychology 
caused the shift from a revolutionary to a predominantly reformist mindset among 
leaders and militants alike during the second half of the nineteenth century: socialist 
cadres started confusing ‘the cause of socialism with the cause of the party’ as if the two 
were the same thing.294 Trade unionism and the cooperative movement went down the 
same path. A similar set of unintended consequences, de Man claimed, operated with 
regard to the prevailing attitudes towards the State. The more the working class gained 
influence, the more socialist forces were incorporated into the existing political system, 
holding power at local and, from time to time, national level. As a consequence, the 
buoyant internationalism of the early days was gradually replaced by an emotional 
attachment to the institutions already in place, nurturing a widespread social patriotism 
that socialist leaders proved unable to rein in. ‘Since the days of the First International’, 
de Man argued, ‘the working-class movement has undergone an increasing national 
differentiation of mentalities and methods; has displayed a growing tendency on the part 
of the national organisations towards intellectual autonomy; has manifested a 
progressive intensification of the motives leading the workers of the respective 
countries to be integrated as national communities.’295 Defying the expectations of 
Marx and Engels, socialist parties had thus become ‘the true buttress of the State’ across 
Europe.296 De Man was not appalled by the trend as he understood the international 
socialist movement as ‘a plurality rather than a unity’, and was keen to praise the 
national sentiment as ‘an integral part of the emotional content of socialism of each 
country’ insofar as it was tempered by a deeper commitment to humanitarianism and 
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world peace.297 On the other hand, both bureaucratisation and the waning of 
internationalism within the Left raised serious doubts about Marxism as a valuable 
conceptual framework for socialists living in the 1920s. ‘Every organised intellectual 
movement’, de Man warned, ‘reaches a stage of development when the power of the 
organisation becomes the main obstacle to the realisation of the ideal on behalf of which 
the organisation was founded.’298 Once that point has been reached, a radical turn both 
in party management and in its ideology is required.299 
 De Man was therefore pointing to the need for a new doctrine so to ‘invigorate 
the pursuit of partial objectives by relating them to some great common end’, both 
domestically and internationally, and the book did end with a call for ‘a renovation of 
socialist conviction by means of the moral and religious consciousness.’300 This was a 
long way from a detailed programme for action yet many passages of Zur Psychologie 
not only suggest de Man was consistent with the conclusions reached in The Remaking 
of a Mind but also reveal an even stronger ascendancy of British socialism over him. It 
is worth stressing that, among the remedies to the bureaucratization of the socialist 
movement that de Man proposed, strong emphasis was placed on the importance of 
involving workers in industrial management, as recommended by Guild Socialism, ‘the 
most modern and the most carefully thought-out form of the socialism of the 
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intellectuals.’301 Although it is unclear whether de Man had already met its leading 
theorist, G.D.H. Cole, there is no doubt that he was well familiar with Cole’s work, 
especially Self-Government in Industry (1917) and Guild Socialism Restated (1920).302 
Equally generous was his assessment of the British Labour Party, which he regarded as 
an example of dynamism, flexibility and immunity from dogmatism in comparison with 
the German SPD. Without denying the often ‘opportunist’ conduct of Labour, de Man 
cheered its ‘progressive’ outlook: ‘British socialists, engaged in a daily struggle on 
behalf of immediate demands, which are, however, justified by ethical motives, can 
watch the growth of their achievements while animating all their activities with a moral 
enthusiasm whose inspiration widens as their reformist activities prove increasingly 
successful.’303 In his view, the ‘rapid advances of socialism in England’ originated from 
the virtuous interaction between trade unions and ‘the most advanced members of the 
intelligentsia’, such as the Fabians.304 Finally, his support of democracy was 
unwavering. ‘To the Marxists, the labour movement is nothing more than a simple 
struggle between the interests of various classes; and they regard political democracy as 
only a means which will ensure the victory of the working class because the workers 
outnumbered the non-workers.’305 Socialists, on the contrary, had to refute the 
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dictatorship of the proletariat as a beneficial or necessary step towards a socialist 
society, and anchor socialism to the idea of self-rule: ‘We must abandon the disastrous 
belief that there are “means” independent of the “end” [...]. We must contrapose to the 
communist fallacy of a socialism without democracy, the proud conception of a 
humanitarian ideal which will consciously derive its energies from centuries of 
equalitarian aspiration.’306 This line of argument allowed de Man to link socialism to 
the core values of Christianity. Both socialism and Christianity, he wrote, stand for the 
principle that every human being has dignity and deserves respect. For this reason, 
‘Christian sentiment remains one of the most bountiful sources of democratic and 
socialist convictions.’307 In all likelihood, de Man was here alluding to Christian 
socialism, a strand of thought particularly strong in Britain, and quite possibly drawing 
from to the work of the Fabian Richard H. Tawney.308  
  *** 
De Man’s endeavours to sever socialism from Marxism, i.e. the intellectual tradition 
underpinning German social democracy, while bestowing dignity on some of the most 
controversial aspects of the British socialist tradition, including its anti-materialistic 
outlook, could hardly have gone unnoticed, within and outside Germany.309 In 
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particular, the book stunned two distinguished figures who had played a major role in de 
Man’s intellectual and political upbringing: Karl Kautsky and Emile Vandervelde.  
De Man encouraged Kautsky not to take his criticism of Marxism personally, as he 
considered their friendship strong enough to survive disagreements, but both men 
realised that a book calling the ideology of the SPD into question compelled the party’s 
main ideologue to hit back, and the controversy that would follow would inevitably 
unveil some ‘formal breaks’ (formalen Brüchen) in their assessment of the past, the 
present, and the future of socialism.310 Kautsky, then seriously ill and busy completing 
Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung (1927), a two-volume work aimed at 
revising historical materialism by filling some gaps in Marx’s and Engel’s thought, 
managed to come out publicly against Zur Psychologie only in January 1927.311 
Unsurprisingly, the importance of safeguarding Marx’s reputation and legacy was the 
key underlying theme of his remarks. Instead of fully engaging with de Man’s own 
arguments, Kautsky quickly dismissed his fundamental premises – the possibility of 
developing a non-materialistic understanding of workers’ exploitation – and flagged up, 
in a rather patronising way, a number of passages allegedly proving a misreading of 
Marx’s writings: ‘Presenting and criticising certain ideas that are impossible to find in 
Marx and that, at times, Marx himself outrightly rejected as ‘Marxist’ is a common 
technique among Marx’s critics. In this case, each Marxist has not only the right but, on 
occasions, the duty to refute that criticism as false by referring to what Marx actually 
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said.’312 Kautsky was not blind to the fact that Zur Psychologie had sparked a 
significant debate and caught the interest of many left-wing intellectuals. Yet he 
claimed that de Man, being a ‘talented writer’, had only been able to capitalise on a 
latent ‘disposition of spirit’ already present in the youth: ‘war infused the generation 
grown up under its reign with great revulsion and disdain for systematic hard work’ in 
social theory, and their lack of first-hand knowledge of Marx’s thought drove them into 
the arms of de Man.313 In the second part of his review, Kautsky denied that Zur 
Psychologie had something valuable to offer. Claiming that Marxism never neglected 
the role of intellectuals in society, he criticised de Man for sketching out a theory which, 
if put into practice, would have reactionary implications: ‘the establishment of the 
intellectuals as ruling class within the State’, oppressing the working class instead of 
lifting it up.314 Empowering intellectuals without addressing economic exploitation, i.e. 
the extraction of surplus value under capitalism, could hardly be a satisfactory solution, 
for it would simply pit intellectuals and unskilled workers against each other in the long 
run. In sum, Kautsky bemoaned, Zur Psychologie was based on ‘empty assertions’ and 
‘inaccurate accounts of both the history of our party and our theories.’315 Kautsky’s 
unabashed defence of German Marxism prompted an extensive reply by de Man, who 
went through a meticulous discussion of specific sections of Das Kapital in order to 
demonstrate his acquaintance with the text.316 No common ground, however, could be 
found between the 73-year old co-editor of the Erfurt programme (1891) and a 42-year 
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former protégé who had rejected the analytical framework of his mentor.317 Seven years 
later, in October 1934, the two would cross swords once again after de Man referred to 
‘the degenerate and ossified Marxism of social democracy during the last quarter of the 
previous century’ epitomised by Kautsky and August Babel, whose conception of the 
State had ‘an undeniable lingering odour of barracks.’318 The vitriolic language used by 
both suggests that no reconciliation had occurred in the meantime, nor that had de Man 
softened his views about the theoretical limitations of German social democracy.319  
Vandervelde, who had fewer reasons to take on a friend and POB member, 
found himself embroiled in an intellectual contest with de Man following a speech he 
gave Paris in May 1927, centred on the incompatibility between Bolshevism and 
democratic socialism. Le Patron briefly referred to Zur Psychologie, praising the book 
at first, calling it ‘the most important work on socialism, perhaps, that has been 
published since the war’ and celebrating de Man’s experience as ‘a propagandist, 
academic, manual worker, as well as an intellectual, an educational director, and even a 
war volunteer.’320 Yet, having surely read Kautsky’s review and taking up its main 
points, the leader of the POB voiced his dissatisfaction with a purely psychological 
understanding of the social inferiority complex, and confessed his ‘astonishment’ 
regarding some of de Man’s conclusions. ‘By departing from historical materialism’, 
Vandervelde warned, de Man was moving back to ‘the idealism of Jaurès but, whereas 
the latter, coming from an opposite pole, never ceased to get closer to Marx, de Man 
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seems to have the preoccupation of moving away from it, and to replace the immanence 
of a class movement with the transcendence of a group of intellectuals.’321 According to 
him, such an ‘aristocratic conception’ was bound to collide with the ‘profound feeling’ 
of ordinary social democrats, who expected to be rescued by their own conscious action 
rather than by a ‘revelation from without.’322  
Vandervelde’s comments triggered de Man’s response less than a month later, 
when he addressed a cohort of socialist students in Brussels. Not only had Le Patron 
misquoted him about the role of intellectuals, de Man held, but he had also missed the 
deeper implications of his conception of human agency: ‘There are no final causes that 
social science can know, neither ideological nor economic. It is the very principle of 
causality that I attack. And the method of this attack is psycho-analytic: I have tried to 
show that […] every sociological theory elevates to historical causes the current motives 
on which it wishes to act.’323 Even if Marxism was helpful in highlighting ‘le milieu’, 
e.g. the material conditions under which socialists operated, its determinism could not 
explain the appeal of socialism itself.324 To strengthen his case, de Man took his critic as 
an example: ‘in order to explain Vandervelde’s convictions, we must acknowledge an 
ethical purpose, the reaction of the thinking individual against the environment, which 
means that socialism is not only wanted but wanted as something just; it is necessary to 
presuppose an absolute scale of ethical values.’325 
In January 1928, seeking to outline the historical relationship between Marxism 
and socialism, de Man made a more sophisticated case against Vandervelde in which 
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the generational element loomed large. Hinting at the times in which he used to criticise 
Belgian socialists for not being Marxist enough, de Man noticed there was an element 
of irony in their squabbling, as Vandervelde was currently busy defining ‘Marxism 
against my heresies, whereas fifteen or twenty years ago, he defended his heretical 
politics against my Marxist orthodoxy.’326 He also argued that Vandervelde’s concerns 
were driven by a mixture of emotional attachment to the past and strategic calculations 
in dealing with other socialist parties. According to de Man, Vandervelde, who ‘owes to 
Marx the foundations of his socialist thinking’, naturally resisted the idea of pursuing a 
new course; moreover, being ‘first of all the man of the International’, he was hostile to 
any endeavour that could jeopardise ‘the traditional cement’ uniting Western European 
socialists, namely their common, carefully crafted set of ideological tenets developed by 
Marx and Engels.327 However polite in his wording, de Man came close to levelling a 
charge of opportunism against his party leader by suggesting that he refused to ‘sever 
the intellectual link which unites his party to the brotherly parties across the Rhine’ due 
to his ‘temperament’ and his ‘deep love for working class unity’.328 Vandervelde 
ignored this ad hominem attack and challenged the key arguments of Zur Psychologie in 
a review that was first published in L’Avenir social, the Belgian Labour Party’s official 
journal, and soon after reprinted in Die Gesellschaft – unsurprisingly, in the light of 
Vandervelde’s reputation, closeness to Kautsky and high esteem of the latter’s work.329 
After having summarised de Man’s thesis, Vandervelde conceded that the book 
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contained insightful observations on certain degenerations of the socialist movement, 
such as the ‘excessive bureaucratisation of workers’ organisations.’330 However, 
echoing Kautsky’s comments, he distanced himself from de Man’s ‘supersocialism’ 
which, in his view, aimed at empowering intellectuals as a class not only distinct but 
also superior to the rest of the workers, as well as from his ‘complete bergsonisme’, i.e. 
irrationalism, shown by his disregard of economic interests in explaining human 
action.331 Furthermore, Vandervelde argued that de Man’s zeal against Marx was 
essentially misguided, resting on a straw man argument. A ‘brutally materialist 
Marxism, aggressively atheist’ as the one depicted by de Man had been advocated only 
by a tiny number of radicals – including, Vandervelde jibed, the young de Man himself 
– and never crept into the socialist mainstream.332 In a rejoinder, de Man insisted that he 
never intended to suggest intellectuals were naturally entitled to lead the socialist 
movement. Rather, by envisaging a ‘new Fabianism’, he had hinted at ‘a movement of 
ideas – which at first entails little or no organisation – aimed at preparing individually 
its adherents to certain socialist tasks which do not fit in the immediate framework of 
collective class conflicts’, along the lines of the burgeoning cooperation between the 
Belgian Groupement universitaire d’études socialistes, the British Fabians, and the 
French CGT or the Heppenheim colloquium, that de Man was then helping to set up.333 
Vandervelde, de Man went on, also missed the whole point about the social inferiority 
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complex. Without denying the existence of exploitation as an objective fact, de Man had 
rejected the assumption according to which material exploitation alone would suffice to 
trigger the rise of a countermovement: ‘the formation of the working class’ socialist 
mentality is not a direct consequence of its milieu of life but rather the product of a 
psychic reaction which presupposes a preliminary fixing of the mentality by certain 
moral beliefs and certain notions of social equality.’334 The corollary of de Man’s 
reasoning was that without establishing those cultural and ideological preconditions 
socialists could hardly succeed, even under favourable economic conditions. De Man 
cited the United States, where capitalist expansion had not been matched by the rise of 
an equally powerful working class, as a concrete example of the threats socialism would 
face in the future, if clinging to an outmoded, materialistic and deterministic outlook. 
His purpose, thus, was to point out the need for a reaction, by lying down ‘by acts of 
conscious, reasoned and doctrinally motivated will’ the real prerequisites of a successful 
socialist strategy.335 That clash notwithstanding, evidence suggests that the relationship 
between de Man and Vandervelde remained warm, leaving room for cooperation 
between the two in the future.336 
*** 
 Apart from their intellectual content, Kautsky’s and Vandervelde’s uneasy, and 
at times resentful, reception of de Man’s book demonstrated that, for better or worse, 
the author of Zur Psychologie was right in stressing a generational divide within the 
socialist camp. It is highly significant that the only prominent socialist praised by de 
Man, who praised de Man in turn, albeit privately, was the director of the International 
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Labour Office Albert Thomas – an outcast in the golden age of the Second International 
for his rebuttal of Marxism and eccentric defense of reformism –.337 No less important 
is the evidence of the appeal exerted on young socialists in search of inspiration. A 
former teaching assistant of de Man then in his early thirties, Max Buset translated Zur 
Psychologie into French and got it released by the Belgian left-wing publishing house 
L’Eglantine in 1927.338 After having fought during the Great War, Buset, who had 
grown up in a poor family, managed to be admitted to the Central d’éducation ouvrière 
established by de Man in 1920, then specialised in economics at the Université Libre de 
Brussels. He had a first-hand knowledge of British socialism, having been a visiting 
student to Ruskin College, one of the most distinguished institutions devoted to 
workers’ education, in 1921, at the very moment when Guild socialism was gaining 
wide currency among Labour intellectuals.339 Given this background, it is hardly 
surprising that Buset was heavily impressed by Zur Psychologie, arguing that such ‘a 
masterful book’, far from epitomising ‘a simple passing vogue’, was causing ‘a 
singularly active ferment’ within the socialist movement, and was bound to ‘leave 
traces’ there.340 Other students in Brussels had the same feeling. Yves Lecocq, born in 
1908, who came across the Belgian version of Zur Psychologie while taking courses at 
the ULB, found there a groundbreaking application of insights from disciplines they 
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were taught about but which orthodox Marxists tended to dismiss as irrelevant, such as 
pedagogy and psychology. De Man’s work, Lecoq later claimed, was ‘precious’ in 
bolstering ‘emerging convictions, rather sentimental at first’, but was also an endless 
source of intellectual and emotional stimulus, whose ‘breath’ repeatedly fed his 
enthusiasm.341 Having met de Man in Frankfurt in December 1930, Lecoq admittedly 
developed ‘a kind of fascination with his personality’, similarly to many of the young 
people working for him, whose ‘constancy, fidelity to every challenge, devotion’ in 
championing de Man’s ideas was remarkable.342 One of them, Jef Rens, had also met de 
Man for the first time while he was in Germany. Having won a one-year fellowship 
from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in 1931, Rens moved to Berlin but soon 
relocated to Frankfurt in order to take classes from the author of Zur Psychologie: ‘This 
work marked me, like many young people of my generation [...]. The book of Henri de 
Man arrived at the right time to arouse the interest of the socialist youth. Au-delà du 
marxisme certainly did not satisfy us entirely but we found a language in it that was 
ours, as well as a lucid analysis of the problems of our time.’343 Rens’ curiosity was also 
piqued by the eclectic figure of de Man, a widely respected theorist who, despite having 
his roots in Antwerp, was barely known by local party members, strongly committed to 
the party’s official ideology: ‘From time to time a leader came to give us a lecture on a 
so-called doctrinal problem. But these expositions were rather rare and most of the time 
heavily imbued with a Marxism more or less well understood.’344 Rens was spellbound 
by de Man’s public persona for he ‘did not fit the stereotype of the professor’, being 
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athletic and a lover of open-air life.345 Furthermore, Rens recalled, he was an extremely 
talented orator, especially in the academic context, and an acute observer, thanks to his 
ability to stay focused: ‘undoubtedly, that force enabled him to consider social 
phenomena in a more thorough manner than we did, and to grasp certain aspects that we 
did not see.’346 The two became friends, keeping strong ties across politics and 
academia which proved mutually beneficial when de Man moved back to Belgium: 
Rens, then a trade unionist, was a key supporter of the Labour Plan whilst de Man 
helped him achieve a doctorate with a thesis on German National Socialism, based on 
early findings dating back to his stay in Frankfurt.347 
 The admiration for de Man was not limited to a cohort of young Belgians. Even 
when reading Zur Psychologie did not result in an early acquaintance with the author, 
the provocative character of de Man’s thinking struck a chord with highly educated 
militants based in other countries already baffled by their own experiences in dealing 
with the working class. A fascinating testimony in that regard has been given by the 
Dutch politician Hendrik Burgmans, later on a prominent advocate of European 
federalism and founder of the College of Europe. As a 26-year-old teacher, Brugmans 
moved from Amsterdam – where he was born and got the essentials of his socialist 
education – to the small town of Terneuzen, in the Zeelandic Flanders, in 1932, taking 
up a job at the local high school. There he found out that the Dockers who formed the 
backbone of the local branch of the Dutch Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP) 
had developed a genuine sense of solidarity towards each other, despite not having read 
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‘a line of Marx.’348 Moreover, they seemed uninterested in the grandiose debates urban 
intellectuals regularly engaged in. Brugmans was soon to conclude that his ‘Marxist 
education did not correspond with the proletarian reality.’349 To him, the allure of Zur 
Psychologie lay mainly in two aspects: first, de Man’s inductive method to analyse the 
workers’ movement for, unlike leaders and trade unionists who kept an elitist approach 
to the issue, he had ‘drawn his conclusions from his work as educator’; second, his 
insistence on ‘the national question’, addressed through the lens of his decision to join 
the Belgian army in 1914, as an important component of the workers’ self-identity 
which Marxism had failed to address.350 In his view, de Man was the natural heir of 
Bernstein, an intellectual who provided a theoretical rationale for the daily ‘cultural 
reformism’ Brugmans was keen to undertake, both as a teacher and as a militant.351 A 
fervent supporter of the Labour Plan during the 1930s, Brugmans continued to defend 
de Man’s reputation as a philosopher even after the Second World War.352 
 Even richer is the evidence about the impact of Zur Psychologie on the Italian 
anti-fascist activist Carlo Rosselli and the French economist André Philip. Undertaking 
a closer examination of their reading of the book is a valuable exercise, not only 
because of the remarkable influence that both Rosselli and Philip exerted on the 
socialist movement in their respective national contexts but also for the different ways 
in which Zur Psychologie crossed their human and theoretical paths.  
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Born in Rome in 1899 from an upper class family of Jewish origins, Rosselli 
was no Marxist in his youth. Still, being steeped in the radical and republication 
tradition of Garibaldi and Mazzini, he was a harsh critic of the monarchy and despised 
the conservative role played by the Catholic Church within Italian society. Seeing the 
Great War as the opportunity to complete the unfinished business of Risorgimento, 
namely national unification, Rosselli supported Italy’s intervention in 1915. Drafted in 
June 1917, he spent the winter of 1918-19 as a member of an Alpini division on the 
northeastern front, finally being discharged with the rank of lieutenant in February 
1920. Unlike de Man, Rosselli had a relatively limited experience of trench life. The 
conflict, however, crushed his family – his older and beloved brother, Aldo, had 
volunteered and was killed in action in 1916 – and shook the foundations of his 
patriotism.353  There was little doubt, Rosselli argued in 1924 while reflecting on the 
reasons why Italian fascism tended to appeal to the youth, that the Great War brought 
about a ‘gigantic upheaval’, for those who had gone through it could hardly harbour 
illusions about the virtues of violence and, by the same token, had gained a much better 
grasp of politics: young soldiers who, Rosselli pointed out, ‘had left with an abstract 
ideal […] were put in the position of understanding many things that they would have 
missed, in their class or professional isolation.’354 On the other hand, most fascists, 
being too young to be drafted and therefore to face the realities of trench warfare, 
remained attached to an idealised conception of warfare: to them, ‘brotherhood, love, 
internationalism, peace’ were meaningless words, ‘laughable ideals’ to be replaced by 
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‘violence, strength, might.’355 In their naïve enthusiasm for direct action and 
revolutionary rhetoric, Rosselli observed, the ‘younger brothers’ (fratelli minori) of 
those who fought could have become ‘communists’, had the latter expressed a ‘resolute 
will to act.’356 By the time he was writing, Rosselli had embraced humanitarian 
socialism – becoming, according to the Italian standards of the age, a reformist, yet one 
of another stripe from older party leaders such as Filippo Turati, born in 1857, and 
Claudio Treves, born in 1869. Like de Man, Rosselli increasingly looked at the British 
Labour Party as a model, and at Guild socialism as a promising theoretical approach. 
‘Trade Unionism’ (Il sindacalismo) became the title as well as the topic of his final 
dissertation in social sciences, submitted in 1921 at the University of Florence. In his 
thesis, aimed at comparing the strategies followed by the Labour movement in different 
European countries, he paid careful attention to the cooperative system envisaged by the 
Webbs and to G.D.H. Cole’s blueprint industrial democracy, being more sympathetic 
with the anti-statist framework of latter. In his assessment, Cole deserved credit for 
having succeeded in ‘imposing on the trade union movement, giving a concrete shape to 
vague, increasingly urgent demands and aspirations of the masses, the two fundamental 
motives of struggle: workers’ control and self-government in industry.’357 In 1922 he 
visited Britain for the first time; he came once again one year later, together with his 
mentor Gaetano Salvemini, attending the Fabian Summer School, doing some research 
at the London School of Economics and developing contacts with the British Trade 
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Union Congress: in July-August, he met Cole and Tawney.358 Rosselli’s anglophile 
sentiments – further bolstered by a third stay in London, in 1924, during which he 
extensively commented on the downfall of Ramsay MacDonald’s minority government 
for the socialist newspaper La Giustizia359 – put him at odds with the establishment of 
the Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU), the only official social-democratic party existing 
in Italy.360 As he fiercely claimed in November 1923, for fifteen years the Italian 
socialist movement had been ‘suffering from intellectual paralysis […]. As the body of 
the party expanded, membership multiplied, the seats in city councils and in Parliament 
increased, the cultural level and the fervour of intellectual life declined at an impressive 
pace.’361  Three years before de Man, Rosselli argued that ‘the most serious mistake’ 
made by reformist leaders during the previous decades was to ‘elevate the Marxist 
doctrine to official thought’, a tendency that inhibited new theoretical developments. 
‘An honest theoretical evaluation of Marxist doctrine’ on ‘essentially scientific and 
realistic grounds’, Rosselli insisted, was badly needed in order to distinguish ‘what is 
alive and what is dead in Marxism.’362 In a curious anticipation of the clash between de 
Man and Kautsky, Rodolfo Mondolfo – a well-known Marxist philosopher – expressed 
strong reservations about dismissing Marx’s thought for this would result in depriving 
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the socialist movement of intellectual rigour and a proper historical consciousness.363 In 
his rejoinder, Rosselli emphasized a generational gap between his views and those of 
his critic: ‘The “elderly” often believe that socialism and socialist culture are to be 
passed from generation to generation, almost by endosmosis. Not at all: you must be 
ready to start all over again!’364 Given these premises, it is no wonder that Rosselli 
found in de Man a soulmate within the socialist camp.365 
Arguably, Rosselli’s interest in Zur Psychologie can be traced to late 1927-early 
1928, soon after the French edition became available.366 By then, Rosselli was bearing 
the consequences of his anti-fascist activism. Having helped to arrange Turati’s escape 
to France, he was sentenced to ten months of imprisonment on the island of Lipari. 
There he plunged into study, and evidence suggests that de Man’s book had a huge 
impact on him. In a set of personal notes written in December 1928, Rosselli expressed 
unreserved admiration for Zur Psychologie and his author: ‘Here is a book, indeed here 
is the book, my book, the book that I had dreamed of writing so many times, so often 
begun, always abandoned. It is the courageous, honest, fierce confession of a 
disenchanted Marxist, or rather of a committed and practising socialist who sees the 
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Marxist verb under the light of the facts and of his own experiences.’ After summarising 
de Man’s tortuous life, including the ‘fundamental, revolutionary, shocking’ experience 
as soldier during the First World War, Rosselli carefully scrutinised all the major claims 
of Zur Psychologie, which he repeatedly endorsed: the blistering attack on the ‘Vestals 
of the sacred Marxist heritage’, namely the leaders of the Second International; the 
failure of Marxism in providing ‘a faith’ to be proven in practice, the lack of joy in 
work as the main source of ‘discontent of the working class.’ Particularly significant for 
him – and unsurprisingly so, in the light of the Italian situation – was de Man’s vibrant 
defence of democracy, coupled with his neo-Fabian emphasis on intellectuals as the 
pivotal actors in the fight for socialism. Fully agreeing with de Man’s attempt to put 
‘social science at the service of will’, Rosselli believed Zur Psychologie would be 
regarded as a watershed in the history of socialist thought.367 Socialismo liberale, 
Rosselli’s most ambitious theoretical work, written in 1928-29 and first published in 
French in 1930, also built on de Man’s critique of Marxism, presented by Rosselli as ‘a 
picture which cannot be more suggestive or more powerful.’368 Although Rosselli’s 
main concern was to develop an inclusive and progressive ideology appealing to a wide 
range of anti-fascists, important analogies between Zur Psychologie and Socialismo 
liberale could be easily spotted.369 Through Rosselli’s book and the official journal of 
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Giustizia e Libertà, house organ of a clandestine movement that Rosselli had 
cofounded, some of de Man’s key ideas crept in the Italian anti-fascist tradition.370  
If the war experience and the dissatisfaction with orthodox Marxism were key 
factors in leading Rosselli to revere de Man, Andre Philip was probably attracted by the 
idealistic and quasi-religious conception of socialism outlined in Zur Psychologie. 
Being born in June 1902, Philip was too young to be drafted during the First World 
War. Nevertheless, he was deeply affected by the violence brought about by the conflict 
and grew up determined to reconcile his Protestantism with the pursuit of social justice. 
In a letter to a friend, written in July 1920, Philip already expressed reservations about 
Marxism because of its materialistic bias: ‘You call me a Marxist; let’s distinguish, 
please […]. Except for a few points that I think are inaccurate, I admire Marx as an 
economist but I cannot accept his supposedly philosophical ideas on historical 
materialism […]. Believing that a revolution will be brought about by economic forces 
and by personal or class interests, that’s stupid. Interest is undoubtedly an excellent 
instrument of conservation, it is not creative.’371 The early 1920s became a turning point 
in his political education as, while studying law in Paris, he met Élie Halévy, then 
teaching a popular course on British socialism.372 Halévy, an eclectic Anglophile, had 
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good connections with some Fabians, including Graham Wallas, and this may have 
helped Philip spend two summers in Britain, in 1921 and 1922, during which he also 
gained access to G.D.H. Cole’s personal library in Oxford for his doctoral work.373 The 
published version of his thesis, on Guild Socialism, reveals the extent to which Philip 
was passionate about the subject.374 To him, Cole and his followers were 
‘revolutionaries’, animated by ‘a profound idealism’ and even ‘a true mysticism’ who 
nonetheless recoiled from dogmatism and the stiffness of systemic thought: ‘The Guild 
Socialists have not sought to establish a dogma, to deduce from their principles the 
consequences of an absolute logical rigor, to constitute, by pure reasoning, an ideal-type 
of society […]. They wanted first and foremost to educate, fuelling a revolutionary 
realism among workers that would enable them to solve all the problems of the day, 
according to the revolution to come.’375 By fleshing out a moral, rather than economic, 
argument against capitalism, they were able to acknowledge the value of craftsmanship: 
‘Their aim […] is to provide the worker with the most complete independence so his 
work can become a joy for him.’376 Despite refusing to adhere to their overoptimistic 
conception of human nature, Philip praised Guild socialists for their anti-statism and 
faith in the workers’ capacity of self-government. Furthermore, the theory offered ‘an 
endeavour to reconcile’ revolutionary socialism and reformism as it combined elements 
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of the two strands together.377 In the ethics of trade-unionism, Philip found an antidote 
not only to selfishness but also to a wider spectrum of utilitarian and materialistic 
principles of conduct, the replacement of ‘selfish individualism’ with ‘a spirit of 
fraternal help and reciprocal devotion.’378 The contrast between the vitality of trade-
unionism and the constraints imposed by parliamentary tactics lay at the core of Philip’s 
second work centered on Britain, L’Angleterre moderne: le problème social, 
l’expérience travailliste, published in 1925, which anticipated de Man’s criticism of 
social democratic practice. Reflecting on Ramsay MacDonald’s short-lived minority 
cabinet (January-November 1924), Philip highlighted the paradox of a party which 
‘remained in office only by giving up its programme.’379 In his view, that impasse 
originated from Labour’s difficulties in coping with the new dynamics sparked by the 
Great War: on the one hand, a higher degree of government intervention and control 
over the economy; on the other, higher level of concentration and collusion in business. 
According to Philip, Macdonald’s inability to capitalise on the increasingly left-leaning 
tendencies of trade unions spoke volumes about the need for a fresh, ground-breaking 
economic programme for socialist parties. Warning against the dangers of making ‘new 
concessions’ in order to return to power, Philip wished a stronger role for ‘left-wing 
labour’ (le travaillisme de gauche) within the Labour movement, being the only force 
seemingly inclined to carry out a genuine revolution by legal means, i.e., establishing 
workers’ control over industry.380 Besides their commitment to an ethical variant of 
socialism and their engagement with Cole’s ideas, a third factor pulled Philip closer to 
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the de Man: a trip to the US. Thanks to the support of Charles Rist, a French economist 
and technocrat who held him in high esteem, Philip secured a scholarship from the 
Rockefeller Foundation and travelled across the North and the West, visiting New York 
– where he attended the seminar in theology at Columbia University –, South Dakota, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin, still a stronghold of American Progressivism. As de Man did 
during his stay, Philip repeatedly took low-paid jobs to get acquainted with the 
members of the working class.381 His analysis of scientific management, laid down in 
Le problème ouvrier aux Etats Unis, released in 1927, is remarkably similar to de 
Man’s Au Pays du Taylorisme, although Philip’s misgivings about the expansions of the 
American model of industrial relations to Europe reflected the much more conservative 
atmosphere in which the book was written. ‘American capitalism holds that an 
omnipotent employer, by following exclusively his interest (in seeking the optimal 
exploitation of the worker), can at the same time achieve the happiness of the workers 
and the social progress’, Philip observed, and he acknowledged that ‘undoubtedly 
scientific management had accomplished an excellent organisation of the workshops; 
thanks to it, the United States had reached their extraordinary prosperity.’382 Yet he also 
pointed out that, under Taylor’s principles, ‘the worker is absorbed in a mechanical gear 
which he has to endure without seeking to understand it; this leads to a degradation of 
the worker’s function within the industrial life of the country, to a diminution of the 
personality which can become of extreme gravity.’383 American trade unions, therefore, 
were supposed to fulfil three tasks: ‘1° Work with the bosses to attain the maximum 
production; 2° Fight against the bosses to obtain a fair share of the wealth created; 3° 
Preserve the intellectual and moral autonomy of their members and oppose to the 
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bourgeois conception of the world an original philosophy.’384 In the long run, Philip 
predicted, American capitalism could either override trade unionism due to the poor 
organisation of the latter, bringing about ‘the most perfect example of a stabilisation of 
capitalism through the dictatorship of the employers’; establish an enduring cooperation 
with the union by ‘integrating the labour movement within the capitalist economic 
system’; or collapse due to an unpredicted crisis caused by external factors.385 It is 
noteworthy that Philip, no less than de Man, continued to show interest in the United 
States throughout the Thirties, as his unsuccessful attempt to return to the US as an 
envoy for the International Labour Office in 1931 and his 1935 analysis of the New 
Deal demonstrate.386  
Back in France, having been appointed professor of political economy in Lyon, 
Philip decided, together with his colleague Bernard Lavergne, to popularise de Man’s 
ideas in 1928 by publishing a selection of the most significant passages of Zur 
Psychologie.387 By then, Philip had already labelled de Man ‘the Luther’ of the socialist 
tradition, had met him and the two were in friendly terms.388 In his introductory essay, 
Philip claimed that a ‘crisis of growth’ was plaguing socialism, and only a radical 
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revision of its theoretical foundations would prevent it from becoming ‘a doctrine 
without practice coupled with a practice without doctrine.’389 Changes in the capitalist 
mode of production, by offering employees the prospects of higher living standards in 
exchange for more efficiency, posed at least a threefold threat to the working class: 
corporatism – the increased tendency of skilled labour to take the side of the employers 
–, nationalism – the temptation of raising barriers to protect domestic markets –, and 
conservatism – the danger that increased prosperity would induce workers to abandon 
the pursuit of higher moral ideals.  In order to meet those challenges, Philip held that 
socialists, ‘instead of fighting rationalisation’, had to ‘direct and control it, making in all 
concrete cases the necessary distinction between the ‘science of production’ and its use 
by capitalism.’390  But, even more important, they had to debunk the myth of a 
permanent correlation of aims between the socialist idea and the immediate interest of 
the working class: ‘the socialist task’ was ‘an endeavour of emancipation’ on political 
and moral grounds, rather than a simple redistribution of resources.391 To Philip, de 
Man’s approach was key to ‘bring the class struggle from an economic to an ethical 
plan’, and foster a ‘spiritual realism’ (réalisme spiritualiste) through which socialism 
could recover ‘its revolutionary strength and old energy’ by replacing the ‘acquisitive 
motive’ with the ‘absolute moral ideal of Christianity.’392 A few years later, Philip 
would be at the forefront of the campaign for a French Labour Plan.393 
*** 
 Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus is not an easy book to assess. Kautsky, as well 
as other reviewers, pointed to alleged misunderstandings and misconceptions in de 
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Man’s analysis of Marx’s thought – as if the Belgian had failed to grasp all the nuances 
of the Marxian system.394 This line of argument, however, missed a key element in de 
Man’s critique: the fact that it was consciously aimed not at Marx but at Marxism, the 
set of core beliefs underpinning European social democracy in its age of expansion. As 
de Man adamantly put it in its German preface: ‘By Marxism I mean the elements of 
Marxist teaching which live on in the labour movement, in the form of emotional 
valuations, social volitions, methods of action, principles, and programmes. Our 
concern is, not with the dead Marx, but with living socialism.’395 
 From that angle, de Man’s case was much more compelling. And even if one, 
with the benefit of hindsight, could argue that his perception of British socialism, and 
the role that intellectuals played in it, was highly idealised, serving almost as a 
counterpoint to the ossified SPD, his examination of the flaws of social democratic 
Continental organisations was certainly powerful, and touched a sour spot.396 Still, there 
were at least two evident blind spots in his work. One was economics. In rejecting 
materialism, de Man had remained silent on crucial issues, such as what was the most 
adequate economic framework for a socialist society, including the balance between the 
public and the private sector. Because of that, his argument appeared more abstract than 
it was – and failed to persuade other socialist thinkers who had rejected a deterministic 
reading of Marx.397 The second was the lack of a pars construens in the book – no clear, 
detailed programme for action to energise the decaying social democratic movement 
was offered. Yet, while this was certainly a limitation from a theoretical viewpoint, it 
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probably had positive practical implications. In the words of Dan S. White, de Man 
‘broke the ice’ by bringing ‘issues which had been submerged to the surface. His 
audacity encouraged others who shared his experience and outlook to join in widening 
the peripheries of the critical space he had opened.’ 398 Zur Psychologie provided above 
all a thrilling stimulus.   
 Retrospectively, de Man seemed to appreciate this. ‘Apparently a certain number 
of people within and outside the socialist movement have found in my book an echo of 
their preoccupations strong enough to get comfort and answers to their own 
perplexities’, he observed in his memoirs.399 The fact that a ‘demanism’ in the narrow 
sense of the word did not emerge at this stage – being, if anything, a vague orientation, 
a sensibility fuelled by a common frustration with mainstream social democratic politics 
– allowed de Man to become a reference point for a wide and heterogeneous group of 
figures in the late 1920s, such as Brugmans, Rosselli, and Philip. Even though these 
heretics failed to take the lead in their respective countries, they could nonetheless 
cooperate across borders, enhancing the circulation of de Man’s writings and feed 
debates that otherwise would have remained clustered within national boundaries. When 
de Man returned to public life, his credibility as a leader was strongly enhanced by his 
intellectual reputation. And many of those who bought his argument about the 
importance of going beyond Marxism were finally ready, in the turbulent climate of the 
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Hendrik de Man and the Genesis of the Plan 
 
If […] it is not possible to bring about 
a restoration of Capitalism, or not 
worth while to attempt it, then it is the 
duty of the world to get down at once 
to the fundamental task of changing 
the basis of its economic system. 
  
G.D.H. Cole, 1932400 
 
Plan and order are latent in all modern 
industrial processes […]. What is still 
lacking is the transference of these 
techniques from industry to the social 
order at large. 
 
Lewis Mumford, 1934401 
 
  By 1928, Hendrik de Man was known as ‘the man who killed Karl Marx’, as 
one of his detractors put it: an ambitious, perhaps too ambitious, social theorist who had 
stunned both the German-speaking and the French-speaking world by declaring the 
necessity of replacing Marxism as the underlying framework of socialism and yet had 
no positive ideology to offer as a substitute.402 In the early 1930s, however, he seemed 
increasingly prone to move beyond the realm of ideas and draw a more practical set of 
policy proposals from his writings. This reflected an evolving attitude towards public 
life. Jef Rens, then one of his students, reported that de Man informed him in 1932 that 
his forthcoming book, Die Sozialistische Idee, would be ‘the culmination’ of his studies, 
and pledged that, after its release, he would restart ‘the practical militant action within 
                                                          
400
 G.D.H. Cole, The Intelligent Man’s Guide through World Chaos, Gollancz, London 1932, 650. 
401
 L. Mumford, Technics and Civilization, New York, Harcourt Brace 1934, 417.  
402
 C. Rappoport, ‘La doctrine et l’histoire: De Man, l’homme qui assassina… Karl Marx’, L’Humanité, 
5.2.1928. Rappaport, then a communist, charged de Man of ‘treason’ and claimed his views could thrive 
only within a party ‘without doctrine, or programme.’ [ibidem] 
133 
 
the labour movement in order to try to turn my ideas into reality.’403 In May of that year, 
de Man expressed the same intention to Vandervelde, resuming the project of 
establishing a ‘laboratory of ideas’ devoted to economic planning within the Belgian 
Labour Party.404 Just a few months later, Vandervelde contributed to award de Man a 
prize for his accomplishments in social science; in turn, de Man proposed to use the 
money he had received to fund a POB-related research centre.405 In December, during 
an informal meeting in Brussels, the Bureau d’études sociales (BES) was finally set up, 
with de Man as director and Emile Vandervelde, Louis de Brouckère, and Arthur 
Wauters as members of the scientific committee. The executive committee was meant to 
be open to delegates from trade unions, cooperatives, and other socialist associations, in 
addition to POB members.406 In April 1933, de Man finally moved back to Belgium, 
soon resuming his full-time party membership as well as taking up a teaching position 
at the University of Brussels.407 
 There is little doubt that Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, and the subsequent 
suppression of academic freedom, had made de Man’s departure from Frankfurt 
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inevitable.408 What is perhaps more surprising is de Man’s ability to assume the part of 
the POB ideologue shortly after his return to his home country: the once-estranged, 
insubordinate radical was to play a pivotal role in the renovation of his party’s platform 
with the blessing of Vandervelde, the leader he had criticised for his unsteady leadership 
and had clashed with over the enduring relevance of Marxism.409  
 At structural level, the realignment between de Man and the POB was made 
possible by the increasingly unstable political environment of the first half of the 
decade, during which the European order, domestically and internationally, began to 
unravel.410 In that context, de Man had something appealing to offer to his Belgian 
comrades: an original analysis of the rise of right-wing nationalism based on his 
experience as a first-hand witness of the demise of the Weimar Republic. That analysis 
combined elements drawn from his criticism of Marxism with fresh insights about the 
economic crisis and its implications for social democracy. It also contained, at an 
embryonic stage, a strategy to counter the advance of fascism – an issue that the Nazis’ 
seizure of power pushed to the forefront of left-wing debates even in countries with a 
long-standing commitment to democratic rule, such as France or Belgium –.411 By 
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coming up with the proposal for a Plan to curb unemployment, reform democratic 
institutions, and take a substantial step forward in overhauling laissez-faire capitalism, 
de Man was well equipped to return to politics from a position of strength, no longer as 
someone on the fringes but as a credible and well-regarded advocate of policies that 
could address the anxieties of the party’s mainstream. 
 Unlike the next chapter – which will deal with de Man’s endeavours to produce 
a Plan for Belgium and sell it to public, and will thus be more empirical – this chapter 
traces the emergence of the idea of the Plan in de Man’s writings between 1930 and 
1934, and has a theoretical focus. First, it investigates de Man’s understanding of the 
German crisis. Second, it delves into de Man’s use of three key concepts – patriotism, 
économie dirigée, and corporatism – to sketch out a vision by which socialists could 
overcome the impasse in which they had trapped themselves. Finally, it evaluates the 
strengths and weaknesses of de Man’s analysis and prescriptions. 
It is worth stressing that de Man’s outlook developed under the pressure of 
events, and it was not, therefore, free from minor contradictions or changes over time. 
This lack of systematisation was also due to the fact that de Man never produced a full 
monograph on fascism or on the Great Depression – with the partial exception of Die 
Sozialistische Idee, which nevertheless had higher philosophical ambitions and in which 
references to recent events were confined to the final chapter.412 For this reason, his 
grand design can be reconstructed only a posteriori, by examining a variety of 
apparently minor sources, such as speeches, newspaper articles, and other occasional 
contributions aimed at reaching French-speaking, German-speaking, and sometimes 
even Dutch-speaking audiences. This does not mean, however, that de Man failed to 
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arrange his ideas in a coherent whole. In many ways, the Belgian Labour Plan, officially 
launched in December 1933, encapsulated the essence of his conceptual effort. By the 
same token, studying the emergence of the idea of the Plan sheds light on how 
theoretical issues and practical concerns were already entangled in de Man’s mind at 
least three years before his decision to take up prominent positions within the POB. 
*** 
 At the moment when Hitler was invited to form a government by the President 
of the Republic Paul von Hindenburg, Germany was in deep turmoil. At the low point 
of the Depression, in 1932, industrial production had fallen to 61% of its 1929 level and 
more than 30% of the workforce was unemployed, a far worse situation than the one 
faced by Britain or France. Due to a interplay of factors, including an ossified banking 
system, a massive foreign debt, a demographically-inspired expansion of the labour 
pool, higher productivity in industry, and a political system that had failed to 
successfully accommodate different interest groups, mass unemployment became a 
highly critical issue, and resulted in a radicalisation of the electorate between 1930 and 
1932, of which the Nazis and the Communists were the main beneficiaries.413 
In many ways, de Man argued, the combination of forces undermining 
democracy in Germany was unique. Economically, cooperation between employers and 
trade unions was hampered by the drastic budget cuts imposed by the Young Plan, 
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which resulted in high inflation and fewer jobs.414 Attempts to restore a balance of 
payment surplus paved the way to protectionism in agriculture, benefiting big 
landowners but hurting the rest of the population, and to wage cuts in industry, 
triggering strikes and fuelling widespread unrest.415 Long-term causes, however, were at 
least equally important. Socially, the top-down industrialisation pursued under 
Bismarck had boosted living standards but, in contrast to what happened in other 
countries, including France, a bourgeois class in favour of individual freedom and 
representative government failed to emerge.416 The concentration of capital in few 
hands, under the protection of state bureaucracy, was the hallmark of a system de Man 
referred to as ‘authoritarian capitalism’, under which, at least until World I’ ‘the 
relations between directors, foremen, and workers’ were the civilian equivalent to those 
‘between officers, sub-officers, and soldiers’.417 Even though substantial progress was 
made after 1918, Germany was affected by wider global trends pushing capitalism 
towards higher levels of rationalisation and monopoly that ended up crushing small 
owners to a degree unknown in Britain, France, or America.418 The ‘new anti-
capitalism’ embraced by rentiers, pensioners, artisans, and farmers developed in 
reaction to the dominance of big business, whose economic status seemed less and less 
justifiable, and to the international isolation of the country, feeding ‘a remarkable 
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combination of national and social resentment.’419 National socialism successfully 
emerged as the most extreme, ‘plebeian’ variant of right-wing nationalism, spurred by 
‘the impotence of bourgeois pacifism’ preached by Walter Rathenau and Gustav 
Stresemann in their vain attempt to rebuild Germany as a great power within the 
boundaries of ‘European solidarity.’420  
Some of the features of National Socialism, however, had a more general 
character, and were not limited to the German setting, de Man contended.421 Middle 
classes leaning towards the Nazis suffered from a sense of economic and psychological 
dependence upon ‘anonymous capitalist forces’ (anonymen kapitalistischen Macht) that 
made their existence uncertain and precarious.422 Despite their falling living standards, 
they strongly resisted the prospect of joining, or making common cause with, the 
industrial workforce: fascism profited from this instinctive revulsion by allowing a 
‘diversion’ (Ablenkung) of socio-economic resentment from economic to non-economic 
phenomena, channeling people’s anger towards other races or nations.423 The fact that 
fascism grew out of a ‘false consciousness’, in Marxian terms, and exploited a ‘lack of 
intellectual qualities’, de Man insisted, did not make it less dangerous: rather, it 
increased its appeal among the disenfranchised.424 Modern capitalism had ‘inhibited’ 
workers’ ‘collective self-esteem’ by exacerbating class divisions; socialism, however, 
seemed no longer able to provide a strong sense of psychological fulfillment to its 
supporters, leaving the field open to fascists, who excelled in exploiting ‘the 
compensatory effect of national pride’ (die kompensatorische Wirkung des 
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Nationalstolzes).425 Building on his previous critique of Marxism, de Man pointed to the 
necessity of a ‘true radicalisation’ (Wahre Radikalisierung) in socialist thought and 
action, by which ‘the reformist function’ and the ‘radical motivation’ could be finally 
reconciled, so as not to stifle the ‘driving force’ (Stoßkraft) towards social justice and 
democracy which, throughout history, had been the fundamental source of strength of 
the socialist movement.426 
De Man’s insistence on radicalisation reflected a bitter disappointment with the 
decisions taken by the SPD in the final years of the Weimar Republic, when the party 
lent support to the Brüning cabinet, under the assumption that deflation was a 
reasonable price to pay to restore political and monetary stability.427 In 1935, de Man 
would openly decry German social democrats for their ‘fatalism’ in coping with the 
economic crisis; a refusal to act justified through a ‘theory of passivity and forced 
inactivity’ according to which it was in the best interest of the working class to let the 
economic cycle play out and wait for the subsequent recovery.428 The thrust of the 
argument, however, was already present in some of his articles written in early 1933, 
which bore striking resemblance to some charges levelled in the same period by the 
Austro-Marxist Otto Bauer. Both de Man and Bauer held that an overconfidence in 
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parliamentary action and in discredited economic theories prevented social democrats 
from matching the dynamism of fascist movement.429 Nevertheless, Bauer proposed a 
united front based on close coordination between the Socialist and the Communist 
International whereas de Man – who was initially open to the idea of strengthening the 
ties with the Communists – was soon to express greater ambitions.430 In his view, rather 
than aggregating existing anti-fascist parties, social democrats had better chances of 
success by rallying different classes around a grandiose, path-breaking project.  
 ***  
Defeating right-wing nationalism in an age of economic distress, de Man 
suggested, required a multifaceted strategy. In a nutshell, de Man’s approach consisted 
of turning some notions that fascists were keen to exploit against them. This is different 
from arguing that de Man was then succumbing to the appeal of fascism, or 
contaminating socialism with fascist tenets.431 Rather, de Man attempted to recover 
concepts that had already been part of the socialist intellectual arsenal well before 
fascism seized on them and employ them to reinvigorate democratic socialism.  
The first concept was patriotism – although de Man made a limited use of that 
term –, namely the idea that socialists were not to feel ashamed for being emotionally 
attached to their own country and that internationalism was not supposed to be in 
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contrast with the recognition of different national identities. This argument could be 
traced back at least to Jean Jaurès, as de Man himself acknowledged.432 Rather 
ingeniously, de Man distinguished between two kinds of nationalism, the first based on 
an ‘aggressive mindset’ (aggressiven Staatsgesinnung) leading to militarism and 
expansionism, and the second imbued with ‘love for the Fatherland’ (Vaterlandsliebe), 
a manifestation of ‘cultural affinity’ (kulturellen Verbundenheit) with a people or a 
language.433 According to him, nationalism and socialism were both legitimate heirs of 
the industrial revolution, and both stemmed from an understandable desire for collective 
recognition and self-determination. Furthermore, nationalism had a libertarian bent 
every time minorities rose up to fight against other nations oppressing them, and could 
therefore be, within certain limits, commendable.434 Socialism, however, was ‘more 
total and more radical’ for it strove for the freedom of all peoples, and acknowledged 
that the ‘states’ lust for power, through armaments, economic protectionism, claims of 
unfettered sovereignty, and even through the very existence of borders, is the scourge of 
Europe and the cause of degradation of our present society.’435 De Man expressed 
admiration for the intellectual-turned-politician Thomas Masaryk, whose defence of 
Czech identity and willingness to fight for national independence was balanced by an 
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equally firm commitment to social reform, humanitarianism, and peace.436 In the long 
run, he added, only an international federation aimed at ensuring ‘the autonomy of the 
peoples’ would settle the issue of minorities once and for all, abandoning the principle 
of absolute sovereignty and establishing an international framework through which 
disarmament could be finally achieved.437 In envisaging European unity as a long-term 
solution to international instability, de Man was probably influenced by the Briand Plan, 
well received by Belgian socialists and sponsored by other Belgian-led groups, such as 
the movement Union Jeune Europe, to which de Man was loosely connected during the 
Thirties.438  
The second concept was économie dirigée – an expression we may roughly 
translate into ‘planning’ or Planwirtschaft, encapsulating the belief that the economic 
system could be successfully managed in the interest of the working class as well as of 
the entire nation.439 Without buying into a deterministic interpretation of the rise of 
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nationalism, de Man was conscious that the economic downturn exacerbated pre-
existing tensions within capitalist countries, making the success of nationalism only 
more likely.440 De Man understood the 1929 crisis as a structural rather than cyclical 
event, caused by at least five distinct but interconnected factors: high levels of 
unemployment due to the ongoing rationalisation – i.e., increased efficiency – of 
industry; a lack of new international markets to export those goods that producers were 
unable to sell domestically; low levels of productivity in agriculture; the rise of 
monopolies and trusts, which made prices less flexible and slower to adjust; and the 
politicisation of foreign trade. The crucial phenomenon underlying all these trends, de 
Man maintained, was underconsumption: advanced capitalism was marked by a 
‘growing disparity’ between supply and demand, the latter being unable to meet the 
former.441 De Man’s reference to Marx is less surprising than one might think at a 
glance: despite his methodological objections to historical materialism, de Man had 
never questioned the soundness of some of Marx’s insights about the long-term 
unsustainability of capitalism. Moreover, in his account of the Great Depression, de 
Man – an avid reader without a proper training in economics – in all probability drew 
heavily from the works of other scholars, including heterodox liberals and Marxists.442 
An author who may have left an enduring mark on him was Otto Maschl, better known 
as Lucien Laurat. The two men met for the first time in April 1933.443 An Austrian-born 
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economist based in Paris and former card-carrying communist, Laurat had a first-hand 
knowledge of the Soviet New Economic Policy, having lived in Russia between 1923 
and 1927. Moreover, despite his steadfast anti-Stalinist feelings shared by his friend and 
colleague Boris Souvarine, he still considered himself a Marxist, and used a Marxist 
framework of analysis to account for the functioning of the Soviet system.444 In addition 
to a glowing reputation as commentator on economic affairs, Laurat had good ties with 
the POB. Independently from de Man, he had come to the conclusion that Belgian 
socialists would benefit from deepening the study of nationalisations and encouraged 
his friend Jef Rens to set up a research bureau for that purpose.445 His works 
L’accumulation du capital d’après Rosa Luxembourg (1930) – an abridged edition of 
Luxembourg’s main work for the French public, followed by Laurat’s case for the 
relevance of her thought in the light of subsequent developments in Marxist theory –, 
Bilans: cent années d’économie mondiale (1931), and even more importantly, Un 
système qui sombre (1932), may well have been the most important sources in shaping 
de Man’s understanding of the Great Depression.446 Some even argued that Laurat 
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mooted the idea of a Labour Plan in the first place, as demonstrated by his Economie 
planée contre économie enchainée, released in May 1932 by Georges Valois in Paris.447 
De Man and Laurat agreed on a crucial issue: both men did not think that a 
generic increase of state intervention and regulation of the economy would suffice to 
address the crisis. For this reason, while playing with the notion of économie dirigée, de 
Man also expressed misgivings about it. His attitude can be better explained against the 
backdrop of the 1931 World Social Economic Planning Congress held in Amsterdam, 
where distinguished experts, businessmen, and academics from all around the globe 
discussed different schemes aimed at introducing planned production and 
consumption.448 During his 1918 trip to the United States, de Man had already 
developed mixed feelings towards scientific management: he appreciated the emphasis 
on efficiency, productivity, and higher wages but despised Taylor’s tendency to treat 
labour as a mere commodity.449 Times, however, were changing. A new breed of 
advocates of planning, such as the managing director of the Taylor Society, Harlow S. 
Person and Lewis L. Lorwin, then a fellow of the Brookings Institution, were 
advocating a much more enlightened vision of planning, called ‘social’, by which 
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managers would promote the general welfare instead of serving business interests. In 
the words of Person, ‘individualistic industry’ was no longer able to meet the dynamism 
of the overall economic system: ‘we have come to the conclusion that a regulating 
mechanism must be added to it – social economic planning – and that economic 
integration represented in social economic planning must precede any effective political 
cooperation.’450  A progressive undertone was especially evident in Lorwin’s speech, in 
which he suggested social planning would ‘provide a basis for cooperative action which 
would make possible a peaceful exploitation of the world’s resources in the common 
interests of all groups and nations’ as well as ‘work out a national policy which 
promised a higher development for all’, bringing people together ‘on the basis of what 
is technically and objectively best for the community as a whole.’451 Arguments like 
these did not leave de Man indifferent: he too believed that experts were to play a major 
role in addressing economic imbalances, building an ‘alliance between labour and 
science’ to redress the imbalances generated by unfettered capitalism.452 Nor did he 
miss the significance of American intellectuals denouncing laissez-faire: the United 
States was undergoing a ‘truly spiritual revolution’, as the thriving of the technocratic 
movement demonstrated, showing the extent to which ordinary people could become 
passionate about social engineering even in countries where capitalism had deep 
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roots.453 However, de Man found the dominant view of planning expressed by most 
speakers at the Congress unrealistic. ‘There is something utopian in all the plans for a 
managed economy (économie dirigée) discussed in Amsterdam’ he wrote in 1932, for 
they lacked ‘the sovereign power that could enforce them upon reluctant powers going 
in the opposite direction.’454 Although de Man was referring here to a plan for 
international cooperation, the caveat applied to national plans too. As he pointed out in 
evaluating the contribution of the Russian delegation to the conference, ‘in one thing, 
the managed economy of the Soviets is enormously superior to all the other “plans”: it 
exists and it works.’455 By no means had he become an admirer of Stalin’s policies – as 
his critical remarks in the text prove – ; still, he intended to underscore the key political 
preconditions of successful planning: namely, that socialists had to gain a position of 
strength to use planning to make bold changes, instead of marginal improvements, to 
the social order. In the end, planning could serve too many purposes – including a short-
term, capitalist self-reform to provide temporary relief – to be uncritically accepted. As 
de Man summed up his perplexities: ‘Economie dirigée, that sounds very well. The 
expression suits men’s desire, inseparable from human intelligence, to steer their own 
fate away from the action of blind, uncontrollable, and irresponsible forces.  But it 
remains dangerously vague and chaotic unless one says towards what it is directed 
(dirigée).’456 However essential as a tool, planning alone gave no sense of direction. 
According to de Man, two elements were missing: a leader and a Plan.  
The need for strong leadership informed de Man’s understanding of the New 
Deal, born out of ‘the conjunction between a governing will matched with executive 
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power and a public opinion dominated by a general threat.457 It was Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, de Man argued, who kicked off the transition of the United States towards 
state capitalism but the rationale of that transformation had already been laid out by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research and other advisory boards set up by his 
predecessor, Herbert Hoover.458 According to de Man, leadership, in order to be 
effective, had to be transformative. In Massen und Führer, published in 1932, he 
lamented that socialist leaders too easily turned themselves into bureaucrats, especially 
when the masses, as in the case of social democratic militants, were already inclined 
towards self-discipline and lukewarm about abrupt changes – somewhat restating the 
charges he had made in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus –.459 Yet this time he also set 
out a different theory of leadership. In a paragraph entitled Die Kommende Aristokratie, 
de Man predicted that future leaders would give up the will to compromise at any cost 
and focus on the task of building deep, emotional connections with their followers. ‘The 
psychological secret behind the authority of a leader’, he held ‘is also the secret of the 
tamer. That sympathy that makes us penetrate into a foreign soul and gives us the 
opportunity to exercise dominion over all the living creatures is possible only for who is 
not afraid and, by bestowing confidence, receives confidence in return.’460 De Man 
carefully stressed that, by drawing attention to the importance of irrational feelings, he 
was not lurching towards fascism. His conception of leadership implied mutual trust and 
reciprocity: leader and masses would strengthen, support, and energise each other, in a 
circular way, whereas authoritarian leaders believed that ‘masses must be subjugated to 
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the will of the ruling elites’ – a vision at odds with his emancipatory conception of 
politics.461 Fascists and communists alike saw masses as ‘an object’, consistent with 
their loathing for the ‘democratic freedom of expression.’462 Authoritarian rule 
maintained the divide between those exerting political power and those exposed to it, 
hence failing to deliver the socialist promise: ‘an ascension, an ennoblement, an 
improvement, an act of creation, a process of liberation’ to be experienced by every 
single individual.463 
The Plan, however, was the real cornerstone of de Man’s strategy. The term was, 
of course, widely employed at the time – the first Soviet five-year plan was issued in 
1928 – and de Man is likely to have been inspired by a wide range of sources in 
choosing it. Arguably, an important document was the WTB Plan, named after its three 
proponents: the economists Wladimir Woytinsky, Fritz Tarnow, and Fritz Baade. The 
WTB Plan, launched in Germany in December 1931, outlined a programme of public 
works and credit expansion to create one million new jobs, and gained considerable 
support among trade unionists. As a set of interventionist measures, it sparked a fiery 
debate: the SPD firmly opposed it, fearing that, if implemented, the Plan would unleash 
inflation, and the unions begrudgingly discarded it.464 But the WTB Plan, however 
unsuccessful, was also a beacon of hope: it demonstrated that heterodox ideas, such as 
Woytinksy’s energetic defense of an ‘active economic policy’ (aktive 
Wirtschaftspolitik) to overcome the recession, could get an enthusiastic response from 
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the workers and their representatives, putting the party establishment under severe 
strain.465  
In one respect, however, de Man’s notion of ‘Plan’ was deeply original: rather 
than encompassing a wide-ranging set of measures that could be implemented or not, 
depending on varying circumstances, with no detailed schedule and no clear priority, the 
Plan was meant to be binding and immediately applicable: in de Man’s terminology, it 
was a ‘Plan for action (Aktionsplan).’466 Conceptually, the Plan would involve the 
‘overcoming’ (Aufhebung) of the distinction between the ‘minimalist practical 
programme’ (praktischen Minimalprogramm) and the ‘maximalist theoretical 
programme’ (grundsätzlichen Maximalprogramm), hence transcending both the 
reformist and the revolutionary interpretation of socialism.467 In practice, this was 
tantamount to saying that planism would seek to bridge the divide between social 
democracy and communism in the name of ‘constructive socialism’ (konstruktiver 
Sozialismus).468  
In ordinary times, de Man explained, socialists in power used their position to 
reallocate wealth and improve the material condition of the working class by passing 
‘redistributive reforms’ (réformes de répartition); the crisis, however, was so deep that 
‘structural reforms’ (réformes de structure) had to be prioritised, in order to change the 
underlying capitalist framework under which wealth was created; structural reforms 
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were the only ones through which production and consumption could be expanded.469 
The Plan would therefore include measures aimed at nationalising key industries and, 
even more importantly, the banking sector. Again, de Man was keen to distance himself 
from those reformists loosely committed to a soft version of économie dirigée: he 
deemed ‘chimeric’ any effort to manage the whole economy unless credit, energy 
production, and raw materials were seized immediately and turned into ‘a socialist 
state’s monopoly.’470 On the other hand, he denied that the Plan was bound to suppress 
the private sector. Hinting at the bureaucratisation and despotism of the Soviet system, 
de Man pointed out that ‘European socialism, in its first phase of the socialising 
process, must preserve the free competitive sector as much as possible, and even expand 
it.’471 Such a stance would make it easier for socialists to win support among small 
businessmen and farmers fearful of expropriation but, de Man insisted, his point was not 
just tactical; rather, a dynamic private sector was consistent with his ‘personalist and 
pluralist view of socialisation’, according to which economic power had to be dispersed 
and made accountable, rather than simply transferred to the state.472  
In essence, de Man was calling for the establishment of a mixed economy, based 
on the coexistence of a public and a private sector: the socialisation of the latter would 
ensue only in the far-off future. The argument resembles the economic case for a New 
Socialism made in his 1919 book, The Remaking of a Mind.473 At least one big 
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difference, however, must be flagged up: in 1932-33, de Man no longer believed – 
unlike Bernstein, Thomas, and other reformists– that a smooth and ordered transition 
from laissez-faire to collectivism, driven by the inherent trend towards an ever more 
rationalised and increasingly concentrated private sector, was on the cards. On the 
contrary, a radical break was needed and the Plan would mark that turning point. ‘From 
now on, the state must be able to command the banks, instead of being commanded by 
them. For sure, that implies a transformation of the existing regime as profound as a 
revolution’ he told a cheering Belgian audience in June 1934. ‘I do not use that world 
vulgarly, in the sense of an insurrectional action, but in its true meaning: the overturning 
of an existent balance of power and the radical transformation of a regime. This is not 
about triggering riots (créer des désordres); rather, and very simply, it is about ending 
an existing disorder by establishing a true order (ordre véritable).’474 De Man was 
adamant in stating that the planist revolution was to be carried out within, not against, 
the democratic system, accepting majority rule and parliamentary constraints, even 
though the inherent logic of the Plan pointed to the establishment of a strong state and a 
more powerful executive authority.475 The democratic character of planism, however, 
presupposed a firm political will: by creating a ‘dynamic unity’ between structural 
reforms and countercyclical measures, planism wished to combine ‘the objectives of 
Lenin with those of Roosevelt’ and was therefore expected to overhaul conventional 
social democratic practices based on negotiations, compromises, and concessions.476  
The third concept that de Man used to buttress his proposals is corporatism, i.e. a 
way of reorganising the state to prevent the newly established mixed economy from 
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slipping into statism. It is noteworthy that the term was conspicuously absent from de 
Man’s early writings on the economic crisis and made its appearance only in summer 
1934, in a series of articles published by the Belgian socialist newspaper Le Peuple. His 
choice of words was hazardous and driven, to a certain extent, by contingency. De Man 
was by then involved in the campaign for the Labour Plan, and by using the term 
‘corporatism’ he probably tried to reach out to Belgian Catholics, who – under the 
influence of the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, issued in 1931 – were exploring new 
ways to reconcile capital and labour.477 Yet de Man must have known that the concept 
would upset many on the Left, as – unlike patriotism or économie dirigée – it brought to 
mind Italian fascism and its Carta del Lavoro as well as Spain and Portugal’s 
authoritarian regimes.478 Fascists themselves were keen to capitalise on that ambiguity. 
The fact that, in 1935, a relatively well-known Italian intellectual, Ugo Spirito, could 
claim that de Man’s trajectory proved that socialism was bound to dissolve into 
corporatism may have led some socialists to think that de Man’s language was grist for 
the fascists’ mill.479  
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Truth be told, de Man dismissed fascist corporatism as a false and perverted 
version of a much nobler set of principles, a ‘camouflage of the capitalist world’s 
reaction against democracy.’480 Even more importantly, he referred to Belgian and 
British authors – de Paepe, Vandervelde, Tawney, and Cole – to underscore that an 
ancient and venerable strand of socialist thought had favoured the creation of 
intermediate bodies with the purpose of allowing the self-organisation of the working 
class well before Mussolini built his own corporate state.481 A mixed economy, de Man 
held, would work better if ‘placed under the sign of the autonomous organisation of 
professional interests’ so to reconcile class and professional solidarity.482 Furthermore, 
under socialist corporatism, the state would impose a ‘legal statute’ upon certain 
institutions and enforce ‘a property regime’ upon capital in order to safeguard the public 
interest; it would not, however, be directly in charge of managing the public sector, a 
task to be left to technicians and workers’ associations.483 In many ways, de Man – 
whose version of corporatism enshrined the right to strike and the full recognition of 
free trade unions – was still faithful to some teachings of Guild Socialism, which he had 
praised in Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, as his mention of Cole and Tawney 
demonstrates.484 Some institutions already in place and experiences across Europe 
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might have inspired him too. He greatly admired, for instance, the Reich Economic 
Council (Reichswirtschaftsrat) of Germany, created in 1920, which was supposed to 
promote cooperation between employers and workers but could also advance labour 
legislation before Parliament.485 And he was certainly aware of the early reforms 
undertaken by Swedish social democrats after the 1932 election, inspired by the concept 
of Folkhemmet (People’s home) as developed by socialist leaders Ernst Johannes 
Wigforss and Albin Hansson: both were long-time admirers of Guild Socialism and 
leaned towards left-wing corporatist solutions.486 In other words, de Man was trying to 
reclaim a term which he believed had been unjustly appropriated by the Right.487 
It remained to be seen at what level the transformation of the economy would be 
undertaken. On that point, de Man was crystal clear: the Plan would be enforced 
through the institutional machinery of the nation state. That was less a choice than a 
necessity, he pointed out, due to the inability of the Labour and Socialist International 
(LSI) to articulate a consistent and coordinated strategy among socialist parties to 
oppose the rise of fascism and to the lack of executive power of international 
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organisations such as the International Labour Office (ILO) or the League of Nations.488 
In all likelihood, de Man’s scepticism towards the LSI, and international socialist 
organisations in general, stemmed from his own personal experience in the summer of 
1914.489 Furthermore, the LSI conference held in Paris in August 1933 had left little 
hope that socialist parties could be prevented from going down different national paths, 
due to the lack of consensus about the causes of fascism and the best strategy to fight 
back.490  ‘Every working class, every people’ de Man wrote in December 1933 ‘instead 
of waiting for salvation from an international power which the capitalist world had 
proved unable to create, must seek their own salvation in the only arena in which they 
have means to achieve it.’491 A national action, however, differed from a nationalist one. 
Throughout the Thirties, de Man – consistent with his conception of patriotism – 
staunchly opposed protectionism, which he felt was creating ‘a truly latent state of 
economic war’ among European countries.492 To his mind, economic barriers, quotas, 
and other measures undercutting international trade were a symptom, rather than a 
cause, of the crumbling of laissez-faire, to which socialist economic planning offered 
the only long-term solution as well as the best hope for the establishment of peaceful 
relations between nations: ‘a national economic plan is the precondition of international 
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conventions. If national economies are not managed through a plan and if private 
interests, within each country or through the action of international groupings, can do 
what they want, the chances for economic agreements abroad are minimal.’493 National 
plans, therefore, could be instrumental to peace, and one day be harmonised into wider 
international economic plans – in accordance to his multifaceted internationalism, based 
on the recognition of different national cultures.494 
*** 
 De Man’s ideas between 1930 and 1934 must be evaluated in comparison with 
contributions from other authors released in the same period. His economics was 
undoubtedly rudimentary but the same applies to many socialist writers who had little or 
no familiarity at all with non-Marxist political economy.495 Only after the publication of 
Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936 did the categories 
of modern macroeconomics begin to permeate left-wing discourses on the economic 
crisis as the theory of underconsumption, and institutional economics more generally, 
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lost ground.496 His case for patriotism was elegantly made but added little to his 
previous works, and his densest speech on that mater had also a relatively narrow focus 
as it addressed the issue of language equality between the Flemish and Walloons in 
Belgium.  Calling for a social democratic variant of corporatism was a risky move, and 
it is unfortunate that de Man’s articles were overshadowed by the almost contemporary 
publication of Mihail Manoilescu’s Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du 
corporatisme intégral et pure, imbued with sympathy for the new system, as well as by 
Louis Rosenstock-Franck’s L’économie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait, 
which denounced Mussolini’s experiment as a propaganda myth. Manoilescu and 
Franck’s books contributed to turn left-wing anti-fascists based in the French-speaking 
world against corporatism in general, hence crippling de Man’s efforts to strive a 
middle course between an outright rejection and a full acceptance of the corporatist 
tradition. De Man’s fight for salvaging the term was lost a few months after he had 
launched the first assault.497 On the contrary, however, his analysis of the downfall of 
the Weimar Republic – within the limits of the empirical evidence then available – was 
remarkably insightful and anticipated many of the subsequent findings of the 
historiography, especially with regard to the strategic blunders of the SPD in 1930-
1932.498 Finally, his view of the Plan is highly imaginative, because of its shrewd 
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combination of an economic and a political message. Instead of fleshing out a purely 
technocratic tool to reverse the material consequences of the Depression – as did most 
plans sketched out during the Thirties –, de Man understood the potential of planning as 
a method to address the weakness of parliamentary rule and allow democratic socialists 
to take the offensive. Without denying experts a key role under the mixed economy, de 
Man wished to make the Plan a rallying point for ordinary people – a multi-class 
political platform to broaden the appeal of social democratic parties and gain a majority 
by which existing institutions, both political and economic, could be thoroughly 
reformed. Having returned to Belgium, de Man did not wait long before putting his own 
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Fire and Ashes: 
The Fight for the Labour Plan in Belgium 
 
It does not seem a very big thing to ask that the 
energies of a nation might be concentrated on 
the achievement of some such limited plan for 
the well-being of that nation […]. Admittedly, 
however, even this modest aim has never been 
attained except perhaps when, in war, 
practically a whole people becomes united on 
the destruction of another people. For any 
peaceful end such union has never been 
experienced. 
 
Barbara Wottoon, 1934499 
 
All that is fine but they are images d’Epinal. 
 
Raymond Aron, 1934 ca500 
 
 
Around 1935, Bertrand de Jouvenel, then a French journalist in his thirties, 
sketched out the ideal types of the figures dominating the politics of his age. At the top 
of the list, there was the ‘Great Parliamentarian’, whose talent lay in hammering out 
backdoor agreements and broad alliances to outflank his opponents.501 A master of 
seduction no less than a skilful tactician, he was often able to disarm his critics through 
charm and good humour. Old-fashioned dealmakers, however, were losing ground to 
other types of leaders. The first were the fascists, allegedly superhuman beings who 
stood out due to their red-blooded, manly attitude towards their supporters: the ‘hard 
love’ that bound the leader and his followers was far different from the ‘familiarity’ and 
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‘affection’ linking the Great Parliamentarian to his supporters.502 Personal charisma, not 
ideological consistency, explained the appeal of fascism. The fascist leader, de Jouvenel 
observed, always tended to turn his own life into a ‘legend’, concealing or manipulating 
facts about his past to stir up emotions, and eventually beguile the masses. In that sense, 
fascism too relied on seduction.503 Of another temper were the men epitomising the 
third tendency, a group categorised as ‘the planists’ (les planistes): Hendrik de Man in 
Belgium, Rexford Tugwell in the United States, and G.D.H. Cole in Britain.504 ‘It is a 
lesser known species, but very important’, de Jouvenel argued. Unlike the 
parliamentarian – a ‘handler of men (manieur d’hommes)’ – or the fascist – ‘a handler 
of crowds (manieur de foules)’ –, the planist excelled as a ‘handler of things (manieur 
de choses).’505 He cared about production, labour, and the good functioning of the 
whole society. Instead of pursuing dominance, or indulging in pipe dreams, he stayed 
focused on the essentials: ‘secure everyone’s livelihood and organise abundance.’506  
Being convinced that, with the rise of planists, ‘a new phase’ of history had begun, de 
Jouvenel speculated whether some synthesis between these figures would soon emerge, 
combining the shrewdness of the great parliamentarian, the ability to thrill ordinary 
people displayed by the fascist, and the cult of competence shown by the planist.507 His 
hypotheses about the future, however, are less interesting in this context than his 
assessment of the contemporary situation. Quite remarkably, de Jouvenel understood 
planism as a broad transnational phenomenon, encompassing the American New Deal, a 
movement that could effectively compete with, and possibly defeat, fascism. Of this 
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orientation, de Man was seen as the natural standard bearer, the most articulate 
spokesperson. In October 1936, de Jouvenel interviewed de Man, then a Belgian 
Minister, and introduced him as ‘the prototype of the «leader of the future»’ («chef de 
l’avenir»), a ‘kind of social engineer’ who was relentlessly fighting to disentangle 
democracy from vested interests and protect it from nefarious pressure groups.508 His 
admiration was genuine, almost palpable: de Jouvenel gave the impression of having 
met someone with the potential to change the course of history.509 
 De Jouvenel’s remarks, however overblown, are revealing about de Man’s new 
status, and the public perception of him outside Belgium, in 1935-36. By then he was 
associated with a doctrine, planism, which he had not only laid down but was also 
embodying while in office. As a matter of fact, planism cannot be assessed in a vacuum: 
at least from mid-1933, it underpinned a specific political project, the Labour Plan, also 
known as Plan du Travail or Plan van de Arbeid, which de Man launched in and for 
Belgium. This chapter sets out to explain how de Man managed to turn his insights 
about the economic crisis into a platform to which his party agreed to commit but also 
why the Labour Plan was not implemented when he had the opportunity to serve in 
government. First, it underscores how the Belgian socio-economic and political context 
provided de Man with a window of opportunity to convert the POB to his ideas. Second, 
it investigates how unforeseen difficulties and existing constraints led de Man to break 
the key pledge behind the Plan – its complete enactment as soon as the POB went into 
power – and to serve as Minister of Public Works in Paul Van Zeeland’s first National 
Government (1935-1936). Finally, it evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the 
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planist offensive, casting some light on de Man’s failure, which contributed to push him 
towards the infamous call for collaboration with Nazi Germany after the military defeat 
of 1940. Tragically, instead of blocking fascism, as de Jouvenel predicted, the most 
distinguished planist ended up yielding to it, tarnishing not only his name but also the 
principles he had stood for. 
*** 
 Summer 1933 marked a turning point in de Man’s life. Having spelled out large 
parts of his creed, and being no longer based in Germany, he became increasingly 
involved in Belgian politics. After the dissolution of the SPD, the POB could claim the 
title of second biggest socialist party in Europe, with 600,000 card-carrying members 
out of an overall population of 8 million.510 Yet the moment was critical, as the party 
seemed unable to topple the conservative coalition that had been running Belgium since 
1927, despite widespread popular discontent. The Prime Minister, 74-year old Charles 
de Broqueville, was determined not to abandon the gold standard and repeatedly cut 
public spending in an effort to balance the budget. In May, the House and the Senate 
granted the government full powers (pleins pouvoirs) to pass the most severe and 
unpopular measures on the agenda, including entitlement reforms. Meanwhile, the 
collapse of international trade was having a profound impact on Belgian society: 
between 1929 and 1932, exports fell by 26%, industrial output declined by nearly one-
third; wages were cut, unemployment soared up to 20%. Spontaneous strikes, often 
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involving clashes with the police, erupted in various regions, including the Borinage, 
where miners had been long-time supporters of the socialist movement.511 Political 
stability and democratic rule, the founder of the POB Louis Bertrand warned, could no 
longer be taken for granted.512 
In July, the BES that de Man directed, still at an embryonic stage, received full 
support from the socialist trade unions Commission Syndicale (CS), was expanded, and 
put in charge of assessing pieces of legislation to protect small savers, then was invited 
to prepare a broader study on the overall economic situation of the country.513  De Man 
seized that opportunity to recruit young experts: faculty members and students from 
Belgian academia were invited to the sessions of a seminar in economic and financial 
studies, held at the BES headquarters from September 1933 until March 1934. 
Participants discussed and critically evaluated different technical solutions to address 
the economic crisis. Some of the attendees would become de Man’s closest aides in the 
following years: the economists Max Buset, Robert J. Lemoine, and Albert Halasi; Jef 
Rens, representing the CS; the activists Alice Pels and Herman Vos; Georges Truffaut, a 
contributor to the magazine Plan; and the sociologist Léo Moulin.514. It was de Man, 
however, who made the decisive move towards the Belgian Plan by addressing the CS 
Economic Council on October 10th, 1933: in his speech he called for ‘a programme for 
immediate execution’ (un programme d’exécution immédiate), which involves a 
detailed and precise plan, and a complete identification between the propaganda 
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platform and the governmental programme.’515 On October 24th, the Council agreed 
with de Man’s guidelines and set up a commission to develop them in full. Three days 
later, the POB General Council – which had asked de Man for clarifications about his 
‘action plan’ (plan d’action) on October 19th, receiving a detailed memorandum in 
response – endorsed his work, and appointed six new members to the commission: 
François Van Belle, Désiré Bouchery, Louis de Brouckère, Arthur Jauniaux, Arthur 
Wauters, Max Buset, and Paul-Henri Spaak. Victor Servy was selected as fifteenth and 
final member, on behalf of the cooperative movement. Following a series of unrecorded 
meetings, a first version of the Plan, by then known as the Labour Plan (Plan du Travail 
or Plan van de Arbeid), was presented, discussed, and approved by a joint session of the 
CS National Committee and the POB General Council on November 15th, 1933.516  
In all probability, the contribution by POB politicians to the final draft of the 
Belgian Labour Plan was very limited – de Man, Buset, and perhaps Jauniaux are those 
who did the hard work.517 The significance of the creation of a joint commission, 
however, lies in the fact that a number of socialist heavyweights agreed to step in. 
Especially relevant was the appointment of Spaak, a 35-year old lawyer and member of 
Parliament from Brussels, then the rising star of Action socialiste, the most radical 
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faction of the POB. At that time, Spaak did little to conceal his Soviet sympathies and 
had a reputation as a troublemaker because of his contempt for party discipline. Even 
some members of Action socialiste regarded him as unreliable because of his extremism 
and bad temper.518 In many respects, Spaak epitomised that left-wing mixture of 
defiance and discontent which – de Man claimed – only a Plan could successfully 
address.519 De Man won his bet: by October 1933 Spaak was yearning for a ‘realist 
revolution’ to save Belgium from a constitutional crisis similar to the one that had 
wrecked the Weimar Republic.520 Having concluded that the country was at the 
crossroads between fascism and socialism, he finally argued that the Plan would at least 
mark ‘a sharp break’ with reformism and lay ground for a ‘Labour Front’ (Front du 
Travail) behind which all workers could rally.521 It is unclear whether Spaak’s new 
attitude stemmed from a genuine ideological evolution or from some unwritten 
agreement between him and de Man about the necessity of softening internal dissent.522 
Whatever the reasons, the fact that de Man was able to restrain the enfant terrible of 
Belgian socialism may have persuaded even those who vehemently disliked the Plan, 
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such as the mentor of the POB establishment Louis de Brouckère, to go along with it. 
At least, the Plan would put an end to intra-party conflict.523 
 The perception that the Plan could restore unity could also explain 
Vandervelde’s pivotal role in the POB’s alignment with the Plan. De Man claimed in 
his memoirs that Le Patron, soon before the so-called Christmas Congress, offered him 
the vice-presidency as well as the effective direction of the party, while maintaining the 
control of the parliamentary group for himself: this is inaccurate.524 And yet it remains 
true that Vandervelde gave his consent to that solution.525 Moreover, Vandervelde and 
de Man coordinated their efforts in preparation for the Congress, with the elderly leader 
giving de Man a free hand to develop his Plan.526 Was Vandervelde – then 67-year old, 
deaf, and often attacked by younger militants for being out-of-touch – looking for an 
heir who could reinvigorate the party? Did he think that the ambitious and energetic de 
Man could fit that role? That cannot be excluded.527 To be sure, the well-known critic of 
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Marxism and the white-bearded leader who boasted about running the most thoroughly 
Marxist party of Western Europe were strange bedfellows.  But in late 1933, the sense 
of urgency fuelled by the German crisis, Belgium’s shrinking economy, and the fear 
that the party base would be tempted by insurrectionism provided them with strong 
incentives to set differences aside – at least for a while.528 At the 48th POB Congress, 
held on December 24-25th, 1933, de Man and Vandervelde worked in concert. While the 
first heralded the Plan as ‘this thing without precedents in the history of our movement, 
but made necessary by the nature of [the party’s] new task’, Vandervelde reassured the 
old guard that the POB’s official programme or fundamental principles would not be 
dismantled: the Plan was ‘a fragment of the programme’ that the party pledged to 
enforce as soon as it could count on a majority in Parliament.529 Following a largely 
formal and self-congratulatory discussion, the Plan was approved with 567,451 votes in 
favour and 8,500 abstentions. Vandervelde and de Man were sworn in as President and 
Vice-President unanimously.530  
 Even at a cursory glance, it is clear the Belgian Labour Plan incorporated all the 
fundamental ideas that de Man expressed between 1930 and 1933: in that sense, it was 
unquestionably his brainchild. The Plan called for ‘a profound transformation of the 
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country’s economic structure’ aimed at the ‘diminution (résorption) of unemployment’ 
by increasing the purchasing power of the population up to the level of the productive 
capacity of the economic system.531 The Plan identified ‘the private monopoly of credit, 
which subordinates economic activity to the pursuit of individual profit’ as the main 
obstacle to prosperity, and argued for its nationalisation, ‘in order to give everyone a 
useful and remunerative job and increase the general welfare.532 The measures 
envisaged by the Plan involved the creation of a state-owned ‘Credit Institute’ 
subjecting banks’ operations, financial institutions already under state control, the 
National Bank, and insurance companies to the Plan’s directives, as well as the 
establishment of a ‘Financial Commissariat directly under the legislative authority and 
responsible for the general direction of credit, the monetary regime, and the current 
account balance.’533 Legislation would be passed to transform ‘the main raw materials 
and motive power monopolies’ into public services and run them as consortia placed 
under a Commissariat, and a similar body would manage public transport.534 Within the 
private sector, ‘no change will be made to the property regime’: savings would be 
protected and free competition promoted; an inheritance tax would prevent ‘the 
reconstitution of a hereditary financial oligarchy’ while some restrictions would be 
enforced upon foreign capital, but only to safeguard ‘national prosperity and the defence 
of national heritage against any sabotage’ from the capitalist class.535 A consultative 
‘Economic council’ would be set up, supervising the operations of the Commissariats of 
Industry and Transport, and allowed to submit legislation to Parliament.536 Following 
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these structural reforms, the Plan would introduce a second set of measures in the field 
of investment, credit, price, labour, monetary, commercial, fiscal, and social policy: 
prices would be stabilised and speculation discouraged; credit favoured and made more 
easily accessible; working hours reduced and collective bargaining recognised; foreign 
trade boosted and protection reduced to a minimum; taxes and levies cut due to the 
increased revenues generated by the economic recovery, and so on.537 Overall, these 
measures were expected to improve mass nutrition, social hygiene, housing, 
infrastructures, education and, more generally, the quality of leisure. The Plan hinted at 
the possibility of ordering these steps in a five-year plan (a plan within the Plan, so to 
speak) with the purpose of doubling the purchasing power of the internal market.538 Last 
but not least, the Plan outlined a ‘political reform’ to strengthen the democratic features 
of the Belgian political system: all institutions would gain legitimacy from universal 
suffrage; constitutional liberties would be fully granted to every citizen; the 
independence and the authority of the state as well as of the other public institutions 
would be protected from the interference of organised money; the legislative power 
would be exercised by a single chamber, to be assisted by consultative councils 
providing technical expertise and by agencies in charge of the implementation of 
economic policy so to ensure rapidity, accountability, and efficiency, ‘so to avoid the 
pitfalls of statism.’539 
 If the Plan mirrored de Man’s key tenets, its execution would demand further 
study and deeper analyses – a task that de Man himself described as a collective 
enterprise in which party members could have a say.540 Throughout 1934, under the 
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supervision of the BES, twenty-two commissions featuring almost one hundred people 
– about one third from the POB parliamentary group – hammered out the proposals of 
legislation aimed at giving substance to the various headings of the Plan. The proposed 
bills were approved by a Commission Générale du Plan, appointed by the POB. General 
Council, in January 1935 and published in a 444-page volume shortly after.541  
In the meantime, an extraordinary campaign was launched to circulate the Plan 
and gather the working class around it. Planist propaganda was issued by the Bureau 
d’action pour le Plan (BAP), headed by Buset, who happened to be a de Man loyalist as 
well as a socialist member of parliament. Both the BAP and its journal, Plan, were 
funded through a combination of voluntary subscriptions and compulsory contributions 
from the party, the unions, and the cooperatives.542 Planist propaganda – Buset 
explained in a handbook written for the activists involved in the campaign – had to 
satisfy four main conditions: first, it had to reach out to non-socialist sections of the 
electorate, impressing public opinion ‘by the abundance, the variety, and the novelty of 
its means of penetration’, including the ability to use a language intelligible to people 
unfamiliar with socialist ideas; second, it had to adjust itself to the needs and 
sensibilities of a wide range of professional and social groups; third, it had to appeal 
less to reason and more ‘to instincts, to sentiments, to emotions’; fourth it had to be 
‘infiltrating and obsessive at the same time.’543 To a large extent the planist campaign 
met these standards. More than 2 million copies of the Plan had been printed and 
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circulated by March 1934.544 In addition to traditional demonstrations, rallies, and 
conferences, new kinds of gatherings were tested, such as bike parades.545 Gender issues 
were addressed in ad-hoc meetings.546 Manifestos targeting constituencies traditionally 
hostile to the POB were released, including a wide range of booklets courting Christian 
workers.547 Comic stripes and cartoons were used to convey a straightforward 
message.548 Speeches were delivered through radio broadcast, a March for the Plan was 
composed, and even a ‘catéchisme’ was distributed.549 
 Events in Belgium put de Man at the forefront of international socialist politics. 
The Christmas Congress had given him the visibility he needed to speak out and be 
heard: by early 1934, a significant number of left-wing, non-communist intellectuals 
had turned their minds to Belgium. Lucien Laurat came out as a staunch supporter of 
the POB’s new course, and so did an economist close to Albert Thomas and the CGT, 
Francis Delaisi.550 A group of young socialists in Paris estranged from the mainstream 
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socialist ideology who had established the circle Révolution Constructive in 1932, 
publishing a book under the same title, finally found a cause worth fighting for: planism 
became their credo.551 Reverberations of the Labour Plan were especially strong in, but 
not limited to, France.552 Austrian journalist Oscar Pollak summarised the Plan and 
heralded it as a breakthrough for socialists across Europe, as did the leading journal of 
German social-democrats in exile.553 Dutch socialists were also enthusiastic and praised 
it as a leap forward.554 Swedish philosopher Alf Ahlberg was pleased to find similarities 
between de Man’s Plan and the economic programme of Swedish social democrats.555 
Italian antifascists associated with Giustizia e Libertà, founded by Carlo Rosselli, 
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published and applauded the Plan in their journal.556 Even more important, some trade 
unions and parties proved willing to embrace planism officially. In June 1934, the Swiss 
Federation of Public Employees (SFPE), led by an admirer of de Man, Hans Oprecht, 
launched a Swiss Plan which, despite the reservations of other union branches, was 
incorporated in the programme of the Swiss Socialist Party in January 1935.557 In the 
Netherlands, Meyer Sluyser – a contributor to the social-democratic newspaper Het 
Plan – began championing a Dutch Labour Plan in January 1934, with de Man’s 
blessing.558 The Dutch Labour Party would finally release its own Plan the following 
year, in November.559  
 Perhaps the best indicator of de Man’s popularity is not the enthusiasm of his 
followers but the fury of his detractors, including the most prominent of them, the 
distinguished Soviet economist Eugen Varga. By June 1934 Varga – a key advisor to 
Stalin and director or the Moscow Institute of World Economy and World Politics – 
was well aware of the diffusion of planism throughout social-democratic parties.560. He 
thus proceeded to denounce the Belgian Labour Plan as deceptive, a machination to 
delay the insurrection of the working class; de Man – Varga claimed – was a ‘“Marxist” 
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Gandhi’, welcomed ‘as one of their own’ by the German bourgeoisie, tolerated by the 
Nazi regime, on the payroll of the Belgian National Bank for his contributions to its 
‘aristocratic organ’, the Bulletin.561 Personal attacks aside, Varga emphatically argued 
that the Plan would change neither the basic structures of the capitalist system nor the 
main features of the bourgeois state; the means of production would remain in the 
possession of the capitalist class; property rights would be respected; inequalities of 
income would not be addressed: ‘To place the “mixed economy” planned by de Man 
alongside the economy of the Soviet Union is the most brazen fraud imaginable!’562 If 
anything, the Labour Plan would clear the way to the enemies of the working class by 
establishing a strong state: the campaign of the POB was ‘waged in the fascist spirit, 
and serves the cause of preparing the advent of fascism to power in Belgium.’563 
Varga’s assault was so vicious and partisan that planists could dismiss it as a symptom 
of Moscow’s growing irritation with their path-breaking strategy: as de Man boasted, 
‘the communists, who can no longer claim a role at the upfront of the labour movement, 
are now the rear-guard, in a position the movement itself is going to evacuate.’564 
The interest raised by the Plan led de Man to take further steps in the 
development of a transnational planist network of his own making, through which 
socialists abroad could deepen their knowledge of his ideas and possibly embrace them. 
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The first International Plan Conference, supported by the BES and the SFPE, was held 
on September 14-16th, 1934 at the Abbey of Pontigny, where a French professor, Paul 
Desjardins, used to organise cultural seminars – the so-called Décades.565 De Man was 
accompanied by almost his entire staff: Vos and Halasi for the BES, Buset as editor of 
Plan, Rens on behalf of the CS; Isabelle Blume, Arthur Gailly, Paul Finet, Leo Collard, 
Paul Lambert, and Marc Somerhausen as propagandists associated with the BAP. 
Jauniaux, Spaak, Truffaut, Isi Delvigne, Eduard Anseele, and Maurice de Moor were 
also part of the Belgian delegation. The French contingent was almost as big as the 
Belgian, featuring trade unionists (René Belin, Robert Bothereau, Robert Lacoste, 
Achille Dauphin-Meunier), academics (Georges Gurvitch, Edouard Dolléans), and 
public intellectuals (Bertrand de Jouvenel, Lucien Laurat). Swiss trade unionists and 
politicians (Oprecht, Otto Graf, Willy Spühler, Ernst Reinhard) were pivotal in 
conducting the discussion; the leader of Giustizia e Libertà Rosselli, former communist 
Angelo Tasca, and the author of the WTB Plan Woytinsky stood out among the exiles 
who attended.566 No common decision was supposed to be taken at the end of the 
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conference; sessions were informative and rather dry in their content.  In addition to the 
Belgian Plan – duly presented by Buset – Dutch, Swiss, Czech, and French plans were 
laid out; German social democrat Walter Pahl, then based in London, introduced the 
works of Stafford Cripps and G.D.H. Cole as the main theoretical contributions to the 
Plan of the left-wing pressure group Socialist League – which, technically, did not exist 
as a single document.567  
But the most remarkable moment of the conference was de Man’s keynote 
speech in which, for the first time, he enunciated planism as a coherent ideology by 
laying out thirteen points, soon known as les thèses de Pontigny. Unlike the Labour 
Plan, which was moulded on the specific necessities of Belgium, the thirteen statements 
were meant to be universally true and applicable to every industrialised country. 
Empirically, the theses emphasised the structural nature of the crisis (n. 1) and the 
exhaustion of reformism (n. 2); from a normative viewpoint, they argued for the 
necessity of abandoning a passive attitude towards the business cycle (n. 3); acting at 
national level through a reorganisation of the internal market (n. 4); building a majority 
around the economic measures that were deemed essential to address the crisis (n 5); 
establishing a  transitional mixed economy in which consumption could rise and meet 
the productive capacity of the system (n. 6-7); pursuing nationalisations so to ensure 
public management – not necessarily public ownership – of key industries (n. 8); setting 
up a corporatist framework for the new polity (n. 9); forming anti-capitalist alliances 
with the middle classes against monopoly and finance capitalism (n.10-11); resorting to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ABWP/AMSAB. The only French plan discussed at Pontigny was the CGT Plan. Pahl, who spoke in 
German and was referred to as ‘Mr. X’ in the Swiss proceedings, told the audience he had been contacted 
last-minute and was not speaking on behalf of the Socialist League. [see Konferenz zur Besprechung, 29] 
Pahl was indicated with his real name on the French record: see the special issue of L’Information 
sociale, 17, 13.12.1934. De Man had previously wished to host G.D.H. Cole, Richard Tawney, or 
Stafford Cripps. [letter from H. de Man to M. Déat, 25.1.1934, ABSO/AMSAB/82] On the Socialist 
League and the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan in Britain see chapter VII. 
567
 See Konferenz zur Besprechung, 10-38. 
178 
 
legal and constitutional means, wherever democracy was in place, to gain political 
power (n. 12); replacing old programmes with a limited but binding Plan to be 
immediately introduced by planists once in power (n. 13).568 Less than two months 
later, giving a speech at the Sorbonne, de Man added a fourteenth thesis: planist parties 
would not participate in any coalition government that refused to enforce the Plan; by 
the same token, they would be willing to cooperate with any group or party that 
accepted such enforcement.569 In embracing the motto ‘Rien que le Plan, tout le Plan’ 
de Man was ruling out the possibility of backroom deals that could give socialists 
access to power in absence of a planist government.570 These were the tenets 
underpinning a new ideological paradigm which he brazenly presented as the third 
phase in the history of socialism: after insurrectionism and reformism, the age of 
planism had been ushered in.571 Or so he thought. 
*** 
 1934 marked the high tide of de Man’s popularity but also brought about new 
challenges. A major difficulty lay in reconciling his national and international personas. 
Whereas his international reputation was clearly built on his domestic successes – the 
intellectual who successfully climbs to the top of a major political organisation –, it 
soon became clear that his domestic position could suffer from his entanglements 
abroad. Despite his role as vice-president of the party, de Man continued to speak his 
mind on national and international affairs – a conduct that annoyed even some of his 
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allies within the POB.572 Furthermore, by developing planism as a fully-fledged 
ideology, he lost the favour of Vandervelde who was as preoccupied as ever with 
ideological conformity. In 1934, the POB Council agreed, upon a request from le 
Patron, to forbid Belgian socialists to publicly meet foreign socialists whose party was 
not affiliated to the LSI.573 De Man’s transnational network, however, did not meet such 
strict requirements. On December 12, 1934, Vandervelde berated de Man for allowing 
‘some former combatants, with the plan of February 9th, a number of people who are at 
the frontier between the radical socialists and the French socialists, and even individuals 
who say that old socialism is outmoded, paralysed, and the future belongs to planism’ to 
attend his talk at the Sorbonne. According to Vandervelde, who had done his best to 
graft the Plan onto the POB programme and whose support for it remained within the 
boundaries set by the ‘principles of Marxist socialism’, de Man had crossed a line.574 As 
he stated repeatedly, both privately and publicly, the Belgian Plan was one thing. 
Planism was another.575 
 Philosophical frictions, however, were not the only source of animosity between 
the two. One major issue began to surface during the campaign for the Plan: how 
independent from the party was the BES supposed to be? In July, during a session of the 
POB Council, de Man claimed that, in conformity with the motto Le Plan du Travail au 
Pouvoir, the parliamentary group was expected to strictly comply with the policy 
                                                          
572
 In the words of Joseph Van Roosbroeck: ‘even if he [de Man] signs his articles, public opinion and the 
rival press cite and interpret these ides as if they were those of our party.’ [‘Séance du Conseil Général du 
25 mai 1934’, ABWP/AMSAB]. 
573
 That included the members of the neosocialist Parti Socialiste de France. See ‘Séance du Bureau du 
Conseil Général du 16 avril 1934’, ABWP/AMSAB. De Man was well aware of Vandervelde’s 
preoccupations: see letter from H. de Man to M. Déat, 10.1.1934, ABSO/AMSAB/82. On French 
neosocialism, see chapter VI. 
574
 ‘Séance du Conseil général du 12 décembre 1934’, ABWP/AMSAB. Vandervelde was hinting at the 
Plan du 9 Juillet. On this Plan, see chapter VI. 
575
 See letter from E. Vandervelde to G. Lefranc, 14.1.1935, in G. Lefranc, ‘Les conférences 
internationales des plans et la commission internationale des plans’, Revue européenne des sciences 
sociales, 195-196; E. Vandervelde, ‘Retour à Marx et analyses marxistes’, Le Peuple, 17.1.1935. 
180 
 
proposals formulated by the twenty-two commissions supervised by the BES. 
Vandervelde strongly objected to that ‘schoolteacher’s attitude’ and maintained that the 
parliamentary group had to retain a significant degree of autonomy: ‘It feels that it is in 
the best position to judge what it has to do’. In contrast, the BES was ‘an administrative 
body.’576 In December, with the work of the commissions coming to a close, 
Vandervelde clarified that the POB parliamentary group expected to receive the detailed 
proposals of legislation in due course while de Man insisted that socialist 
representatives were to be handed the final drafts only at the moment of implementing 
the Plan. The row revolved around a hypothetical scenario – the POB was still in 
opposition – but the episode is revealing about the mistrust between the party 
establishment and the extra-parliamentary (or partly extra-parliamentary, as in the case 
of the B.E.S. commissions) groups involved in the planist campaign.577 To be sure, de 
Man was disappointed by the lacklustre support of the official socialist press for the 
Plan, lamented that the propaganda effort had been thwarted by the crisis of the Banque 
belge du Travail (BBT), which diverted energy and resources from the planist cause, 
and became convinced that Vandervelde would keep paying lip service to the Plan but 
had no intention of putting it into practice.578  
 De Man’s tensions with the POB were heightened by the setbacks that the 
campaign for the Plan was suffering throughout the country. Unsurprisingly, the Plan 
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was badly received by the liberal and conservative press, which deemed it ineffective, 
impractical, and highly dangerous: establishing control over the private sector would, in 
their view, lay foundation for a communist dictatorship.579 Some observers who were 
not aprioristically hostile to the socialists tended to look at the Plan as an imaginative 
piece of propaganda but not as a feasible set of proposals.580 Even those who took it 
more seriously, such as the writer Robert Poulet, warned that a State as strong as the 
one envisaged by de Man would be more likely to oppress the workers than defend their 
interests.581 Poulet’s remarks were echoed by Christian trade unions who opposed the 
Plan from the very outset: already in January 1934, the Catholic priest and trade 
unionist Louis Colens denounced it as a smokescreen created by socialists to pursue 
their ‘anti-social and anti-religious programmes’, and the Confédération des Syndicats 
Chrétiens (CSC),  Fédération des Cercles Catholiques (FCC) as well as the Ligue 
Nationale des Travailleurs Chrétiens (LNTC) rejected it on similar grounds a few 
months later.582  
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The hostility of the LNTC was not without consequences. The kernel of de 
Man’s strategy was that Christian blue-collar workers could be won over, hence forcing 
the Catholic Union either to surrender to the Plan in order to bring those voters back 
into the fold or lose the next election. However inconclusive, the evidence suggests that 
this grassroots approach failed, largely due to the stalwart resistance of Catholic trade 
unionists, who distrusted the socialists and were much keener to praise corporatism than 
any socialist project.583 It is true that a few Catholic intellectuals – such as Elie 
Boussart, editor of Terre Wallonie, and Raymond de Becker, who led a faction of 
dissident young Catholics based at the University of Leuven – did express support for 
the Plan but that was a far cry from the Labour Front that planists had dreamed of.584 As 
a consequence, between 1933 and early 1935, the liberal-catholic coalition remained 
steadily in power, even surviving the downfall of the de Broqueville cabinet in 
November 1934. With no general election scheduled for the future, no leverage to 
pressure other parties to accept the Plan, no clear sign of an upcoming economic 
recovery, and no confidence in the party machine, de Man realised that planists had 
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painted themselves into a corner. For him, the conclusion was straightforward: a 
majority for the Plan had to be found in the existing Parliament; a majority that could 
enforce, if not the entire Plan, at least significant parts of it.585 
  Two important factors must be taken into account to understand the reversal of 
the fourteenth thesis of planism. First, by the end of May 1934 de Man had publicly 
come out as a steadfast supporter of devaluation.586 By taking this stance he once again 
found himself at odds with Vandervelde and the old guard of the POB, who still 
recalled the 1926 devaluation of the Belgian franc as harmful for the working class.587 
Devaluation was neither included nor excluded by the Plan but de Man realised that, 
economic reasons aside, the centre-right majority was divided between ‘deflationists’ 
and ‘devaluationists’, and socialists could oust the Theunis government by cutting a 
deal with the latter.588 Furthermore, by putting parts of the Plan on hold, the POB could 
get credit for the new monetary policy, which was likely to boost exports and create 
new jobs.589  
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Second, in the spring of 1934 de Man became acquainted with Paul Van 
Zeeland, a widely respected civil servant and good friend of the planist Robert J. 
Lemoine.590 In the following months, Van Zeeland, then Vice-Governor of the Belgian 
National Bank, would serve briefly as Minister without portfolio under de Broqueville 
but resign due to the government’s commitment to a strong currency.591 Without being a 
socialist, Van Zeeland had no qualms about saying that the crisis had buried dogmatic 
laissez-faire: ‘à temps nouveaux, remèdes nouveaux’, he wrote in a book devoted to the 
Russian five-year Plan.592 Moreover, he used to criticise big business for meddling with 
politics as well as Continental parliamentary systems for having a weak executive 
branch – two arguments that resonated with de Man.593 Truth be told, Van Zeeland was 
less a supporter of planning that of ‘limited and measured’ government intervention594 – 
but his reputation as an effective and open-minded technocrat, as well as the high 
esteem in which Catholics and Liberals held him, may have persuaded de Man that he 
was the best partner in power he could reasonably get.595  
The promise of a planist revolution was finally broken in the name of realpolitik 
on March 26th, 1935. After weeks of financial convulsions, the conservative Theunis 
government resigned; Van Zeeland became Prime Minister, de Man was appointed 
Minister of Public Works. Vandervelde, Soudan, Delattre, and Spaak were also sworn 
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in as cabinet members.596 It must be observed, however, that the POB’s rise to power 
was taken less a symptom of strength than of weakness: the party moved from 
opposition to power without a sweeping electoral victory but by brokering a backroom 
deal that few celebrated as a virtuous compromise and many tolerated as the lesser 
evil.597 Furthermore, although Van Zeeland’s programme for national renovation 
incorporated some proposals taken from the Labour Plan, it was clear from the very 
beginning that the Prime Minister would have a firm grip on economic policy.598 Much 
to the shock of his collaborators, de Man had jettisoned some of his principles and taken 
a shortcut to power. This time, his critics could easily call him a sheer opportunist.599 
 Truth be told, de Man and his followers contended that the deterioration of the 
economy had made the formation of a new government inevitable, and planists would 
use the opportunity to clear the ground for the Labour Plan: in their view, the 
establishment of a planned economic system would follow in due course.600 A key 
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driver of their strategy was the newly-created Office de Rédressement Économique 
(OREC), directed by de Man, which was put in charge of a number of infrastructural 
projects. De Man and its general secretary, Lemoine, envisioned the OREC as a 
potential Brain Trust, which would gradually overtake functions from the Ministers and 
monitor the public as well as the private sector. 601 De Man was equally adamant about 
the need to complement extensive public works with other policies, including debt 
consolidation and cheap credit, aimed at ensuring full employment in the long run.602 
Yet, whilst public works were widely accepted as a temporary tool to kick-off a 
recovery, his coalition partners resisted any attempt to move the country into a socialist 
direction, let alone to allow the OREC to reshape the basic institutional framework of 
the Belgian state. The strongest opponent within the Van Zeeland cabinet turned out to 
be Max-Léo Gérard, a civil servant of liberal convictions appointed Minister of Finance 
who had denounced the Labour Plan as unfeasible and reckless. Between April 1935 
and May 1936, Gérard was pivotal in preventing the OREC from having an autonomous 
budget, getting more appropriations to expand its scope, and being involved in the 
oversight of banks, a field in which not only de Man’s but also Van Zeeland’s initial 
proposals were substantially watered down by Gérard.603 A skilful negotiator with 
excellent connections in the financial sector, Gérard could count not only on the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
propagande pour le Plan du Travail’, Compte-rendu du 52° Congrès – Bruxelles, les 16 et 17 novembre 
1935, Brussels, l’Eglantine 1935, 11-27. 
601
 See ‘Rapport au Roi. Projet d'arrêté royal délibéré en conseil des ministres créant un Office du 
Redressement Economique’, ARJL/IEVI.D; M. Somerhausen, ‘L’Office du redressement économique’, 
Le mouvement syndical belge, 3, 20.3.1935, 50-51. 
602
 See e.g. ‘Discours d’Henri de Man au Congres du P.O.B. des 16 et 17 – XI – 35’, 
AHDM/AMSAB/367; ‘Exposé de M. Henri de Man, Ministre des travaux publics et de la résorption du 
chômage, sur le budget extraordinaire pour 1936’, Les travaux publics et la résorption du chômage, 
Brussels, Ministre des travaux publics et de la résorption du chômage 1936, 5-38. 
603
 See e.g. the memoranda in ARJL/IEV/I.B.3. For an overview, see G. Vanthemsche, ‘De Mislukking 
van de vernieuwde economische politiek in België voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog: de OREC (Office de 
Redressement Economique) van 1935 tot 1938’, Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, 2-3, 
1982, 339-389; G. Kurgan-van Hentenryk, Max-Léo Gérard: un ingénieur dans la cité (1879-1955), 
Brussels, Éditons de l’Université de Bruxelles 2010, 162-169. 
187 
 
sympathies of Van Zeeland but also on occasional support from Vandervelde, who 
feared the OREC would encroach upon governmental departments.604 As a consequence 
of these divergences, the OREC was never given the amount of resources de Man asked 
for, and therefore its impact remained limited. 605 Much more successful was the 
devaluation of the Belgian franc, which – contrary to what critics had predicted – 
boosted exports without causing a general increase of prices. 606 Yet, by being the key 
factor in curbing unemployment – which dropped by roughly 6% in twelve months –, it 
reduced the urgency to pass bolder interventionist measures, hence weakening the 
argument in favour of nationalisations and other structural reforms.607  
In theory, the legislative election of April 1936 could still provide the POB with 
a strong mandate to introduce the Labour Plan, which was placed at the centre of its 
propaganda, and pull the government to the left.608 Yet the party had become too closely 
associated with Van Zeeland to be a credible anti-establishment alternative. Tens of 
thousands of workers cast their ballot for the Communists for the first time while an 
even higher number of middle-class voters opposing the national union backed the 
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fascist movement Rex. As a consequence, the POB lost three seats and 5% of the vote, 
and only bigger losses suffered by the Catholic Union allowed it to become the biggest 
party in Parliament.609 
Although de Man’s political career survived the election – he went on to serve in 
the subsequent two national governments, one led again by Van Zeeland (1936-1937) 
and one by Paul-Émile Janson (1937-1938) – the Labour Plan did not. Being no longer 
in opposition, the POB slipped into the kind of middle-of-the-road position that de Man 
had once disparaged, scoring some substantial victories – e.g. a tighter regulation of the 
banking sector, the reduction of the working week, the first minimum wage in Belgian 
history – but abandoning the prospect of a rapid transformation of the economy.610 
From 1936 onwards, de Man acquiesced to the new course as he did nothing to prevent 
the Labour Plan from lapsing into oblivion.611 In fact, he even sought to bend planism 
and turn it into the ideology underpinning the convergence between Socialists, 
Catholics, and Liberals. In February 1937, when his ally Spaak urged the POB to fully 
embrace some kind of ‘national socialism’ (socialisme national) to justify their 
entanglement with Van Zeeland, de Man questioned Spaak’s misleading terminology: 
‘Being «national» does not mean to be «nationalist». I want to be a good European, and 
a good citizen of the world, as much as a good Belgian. I hate economic nationalism, 
which leads people to isolate themselves and impoverish themselves in autarchy; I hate 
political nationalism, which provokes wars; I hate racial and cultural nationalism that 
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denies the superior values of a purely human civilisation.’612 Furthermore, he held that 
his original planism outlined at Pontigny – claiming that socialism ought to stand for 
‘the common good’ rather than for ‘the economic interest of a single class’, reject ‘an 
integral and simplistic collectivism’, protect the middle class from ‘proletarisation’, 
build a Labour Front ‘against the big financial and industrial monopolies’, and resort to 
legal means to advance his agenda – was still the most suitable ideology for the POB.613 
He also added, quite controversially, that planism was ipso facto ‘a governmental 
socialism’ (socialisme de gouvernement).614 Somewhat awkwardly, de Man was 
conforming to the new environment, in which cooperation had replaced cut-throat 
competition between the three major parties.615 
Unfortunately for him, by choosing participation over a full implementation of 
the Plan, de Man lost many of his radical supporters, especially among the youth, 
without gaining much credit elsewhere.616 In their final controversy with Vandervelde, 
Spaak and de Man saw socialisme national overwhelming rejected by the POB.617 Nor 
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did de Man’s popularity grow much outside his party. When, in October 1937, Van 
Zeeland resigned, de Man’s bid for premiership was stopped by the Liberals on the 
ground that his statist and corporatist views would be harmful to the economy.618 
Increasingly isolated, de Man chose to focus on two issues he deeply cared about: the 
reform of the state and the prevention of a new war. Persuaded that only a powerful 
executive authority would be capable of pursuing thoroughgoing economic reforms, he 
championed the abolition of the senate, a higher degree of ministerial control over the 
bureaucracy, popular referenda, and increased transparency in the relationship between 
deputies and pressure groups, hinting at the possibility of a directly-elected Prime 
Minister.619 On foreign affairs, he advocated a policy of strict neutrality, hoping that 
abandoning collective security would suffice to keep Belgium out of another major 
conflict.620 The intellectual origins of de Man’s call for collaboration with Nazi 
Germany should be traced to his ardent pacifism and to his frustration with the Belgian 
parliamentary regime, not to an alleged conversion to fascism.621 Moreover, his stance 
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probably also reflected a sincere, albeit misguided, desire to help the King protect 
Belgian sovereignty under the occupation, a task he saw as less and less compatible 
with factionalism and the morass of party politics into which he had been dragged.622 
  *** 
 The campaign for the Labour Plan and its disappointing outcome raise crucial 
questions not only about de Man’s personality but also, and more importantly, about the 
chances of a successful ideological renewal in the turbulent context of the early Thirties. 
It is plausible that de Man’s stubbornness, lack of empathy, and indifference to the 
technicalities of government weakened his position, and perhaps doomed the campaign 
from the very beginning.623 Yet some of these traits were already apparent in 1933 and 
they did not prevent the author of Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus from climbing to the 
top of the biggest legal socialist party left on the European Continent. Although de Man 
failed to meet the highly ambitious targets he had set, the fight for the Labour Plan 
demonstrates that there was some space for a new paradigm, as planism did have a 
tangible impact on party structures, policy-making, and public opinion in general. 
 Still, how big really was that space? In retrospect, the rise and fall of the Labour 
Plan happened so quickly as to raise doubts about the possibility of reshaping the 
identity, as well as the public image, of a mass party in such a short period of time. For 
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sure, de Man realised that only an establishment in disarray would hand him a blank 
cheque to rewrite the POB platform – and he eagerly seized this opportunity in 1933. 
Yet he underestimated the hidden costs of being coopted, including the difficulties in 
managing a heavily bureaucratised party machine that did not share his enthusiasm for 
the new agenda. In 1934-35, to de Man’s bewilderment, the planist tail proved unable to 
wag the socialist dog.624  Similarly, de Man is likely to have miscalculated about the 
readiness of the general public, as well as of the rank-and-file, to appreciate the 
thorough ideological reorientation he was proposing. Although the propaganda for the 
Labour Plan was far from sterile, it could hardly dispel the mistrust that non-socialist 
voters still felt for a self-declared revolutionary party.625 Nor could socialist militants be 
expected to be immediately receptive to de Man’s new gospel. The legacy of the 
traditional political culture of the POB, duly nurtured by Vandervelde, de Brouckère, 
and their acolytes for nearly four decades, could not be cancelled with the stroke of a 
pen.626   
 The latter element is particularly relevant. In March 1935, the sacrifice of the 
Labour Plan cleared the way for a centrist experiment that would soon be celebrated as 
a ground-breaking attempt to reconcile democracy, economic interventionism, and 
economic growth: within a year, foreign observers began comparing Van Zeeland with 
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Roosevelt, and spoke about a Belgian New Deal.627 Progressive Catholics were keen to 
praise Van Zeeland and, to an extent, de Man for having forcefully tackled the 
economic crisis.628 On the socialist side, the perception was different. De Man appeared 
less an enlightened reformer than a clever trimmer, and the myth of the Popular Front – 
which triumphed at the 1936 French elections, three weeks before the mediocre 
electoral performance of the POB – was powerful enough to undermine the prestige of 
the Plan, at home and abroad.629 
 To conclude, it seems fair to say that planism scored important points in the 
battle of ideas against orthodox Marxism but failed to take root and be properly 
assimilated within the socialist camp. The slow absorption of a new creed was 
incompatible with the chaotic conjuncture of 1933-36, during which most social 
democrats still felt torn between reformism and revolution, and the resilience of 
widespread practices and intellectual habits inherited from the previous generations 
proved too difficult to overcome. The problem of opposition, both top-down and 
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bottom-up, to the ideological innovation epitomised by planism will be further clarified 
in the next two chapters, in which the reception of the Labour Plan in France and Britain 























The Belgian Labour Plan in France 
 
Between the present capitalist chaos and the 
future socialist organisation of the world, there 
will be the work and the struggles of at least 
one generation of human beings, tirelessly 
busy transforming and reorganising the 
economy, while keeping it moving […].  
  
Lucien Laurat, 1934630 
 
Planism is, within the crisis of Europe, within 
our internal crisis, the conception that perfectly 
suits France. 
 
Marcel Déat, 1935631 
 
 
Among the various countries through which the Labour Plan resonated France 
deserves special consideration. Thanks to the commonality of language and the strong 
historical connections between the French and the Belgian labour movement, the 
document was widely read and painstakingly debated by a wide range of individuals 
and organisations immediately after its release. Between December 1933 and early 
February 1934 the Belgian Labour Plan was the single, most controversial topic for the 
French Left – forcing leaders to declare if they were for or against it, prompting 
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discussions on whether and to what extent it could be applicable within the French 
context, and inspiring a wave of imitators. As one critic of planism beseeched in the 
midst of the storm, ‘Not thirty-six «plans», just one.’632 
Instead of charting all the different associations, circles, and parties who 
launched a “Plan” of some sort, this chapter focuses on the three main groups who 
openly referred to de Man as a source of inspiration and called for a French Labour Plan 
similar to the one approved by the POB: the neo-socialists, the SFIO planists, and the 
CGT planists.633 Their attitude was often less cooperative than competitive: each group 
claimed to be the most faithful to de Man’s teachings, and questioned the credentials of 
the others. Yet their history – as well as their fate – is so closely entangled that it would 
be impossible to study them separately. For this reason, the structure of the chapter is 
chronological. The first section explores the historical setting in which the discussions 
around the Belgian Labour Plan took place and follows the trajectory of the 
abovementioned groups until early February 1934. The second section deals with their 
reaction to the events of February 6th, when riots in Paris led many socialists to believe 
that a fascist coup was a real danger, and the difficulties that planists met until the 
formation of the Popular Front. The last section evaluates the sources of weaknesses in 
French planism. 
*** 
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 The backdrop against which French planism emerged was a recession that 
unfolded much more slowly than in Belgium but, by mid-1932, had already caused a 
moderate growth of unemployment and falling wages and prices, particularly in the 
agricultural sector.634 Although his last budget included important measures aimed at 
stimulating the economy, the incumbent Prime Minister André Tardieu was backed by a 
centre-right coalition which stuck to the principles of fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, 
e.g. a balanced budget and the defence of the gold standard. An admirer of the United 
States, Tardieu ran as a reformer but, all in all, his interventionism bore more 
resemblance to Hoover’s technocratic brand of conservatism than to Roosevelt’s New 
Deal.635 In the 1932 legislative elections, the main French socialist party, the SFIO, 
gained 32 new seats, becoming the second largest group in Parliament. Thanks to 
Tardieu’s poor performance, the Socialists were now in a position to form a majority 
with the Radicals. Yet the SFIO was deeply divided on the issue of governmental 
participation, with vociferous minorities making opposite arguments. 
 By all standards, this had been a torn in the flesh of French socialists since the 
Millerand case.636 The party’s ideology – an eclectic combination of Jauresian idealism, 
republicanism, and Marxist materialism – did not help solve the issue.637 Back in 1926, 
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the SFIO parliamentary leader, Léon Blum, had outlined the prerequisites for accepting 
governmental responsibility: this was a significant step away from the party’s official 
stance, inspired to the 1904 resolution adopted by the LSI Amsterdam Congress, which 
banned all forms of participation. Blum’s subtle distinction between the ‘seizure of 
power’ – i.e., a socialist revolution – and the ‘exercise of power’ – namely, a socialist 
government under capitalism –, however, could not obscure the fact that the 
preconditions he laid out were intentionally harsh and amounted to the establishment of 
a SFIO-dominated cabinet in which the party would keep firm control over the agenda. 
Considering the strength of the Radicals at that time, Blum was admitting the possibility 
of a centre-left coalition in theory while undermining it in practice.638 In May 1932, 
negotiations between Radicals and Socialists collapsed because of the latter’s 
intransigence over the new government’s programme.639 
Blum’s line of conduct irritated some supporters of participation, such as Pierre 
Renaudel, Adéodat Compère-Morel, and Paul Ramadier, and a new breed of 
parliamentarians increasingly tired of self-inflicted isolation: the mayor of Bordeaux 
Adrien Marquet, the deputy from Seine Barthélemy Montagnon, and the former 
secretary of the Chamber’s SFIO group Marcel Déat. Never a deep or profoundly 
original thinker, Déat was nonetheless a relatively charismatic figure with a penchant 
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for political theorising.640 A protégé of Albert Thomas641, in Perspectives socialistes, 
published in 1930, he urged socialists to forge an alliance between anti-capitalist forces 
with the aim of establishing a managed economy, in which the State would steer 
interclass cooperation by supervising a set of newly formed cartels. Déat occasionally 
quoted de Man in accounting for the inadequacy of orthodox Marxism; his book, 
though, was less a harbinger of planism than a search for common ground with the so-
called Young Turks, a group of Radicals enthralled by the notion of économie dirigée 
who also supported the formation of a centre-left majority.642 Déat’s ambition and 
revisionist views, labeled ‘neo-socialist’ by one of his adversaries, soured his 
relationship with Blum.643 
In 1933, the gulf between the socialist parliamentary group, who voted twice for 
the government’s budget, and the rest of the party widened significantly. At the Paris 
Congress, held in July, Blum, Paul Faure and other opponents of participation 
lambasted the neo-socialists for their disregard of party discipline. But Déat and his 
followers used the podium to address a broader topic: the SFIO’s long-term strategy in 
the light of Hitler’s seizure of power. ‘You will block the road to fascism only to the 
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extent that you will get rid of the causes […] that allowed it to grow’, Déat warned.644 
The therapy he envisaged included the establishment of a strong State, equipped with 
wide-ranging powers to regulate most sectors of the economy, including the banking 
system; attempts by the party to reach out to middle class elements hurt by the 
economic crisis, and a more dynamic parliamentary action. Perhaps echoing de Man, 
the neo-socialists stressed the necessity of ‘a programme for immediate action’ (une 
programme d’action immédiate) to mobilise voters but, in practice, struggled to produce 
an inspiring platform.645 To Blum, however, neosocialism amounted to a deviation 
which, with the purpose of halting the rise of fascism, was in danger of contaminating 
socialism with authoritarian ideas.646 In presenting Déat as the trailblazer of fascism, 
Blum was not alone: the term “fascist” was regularly employed by Communists and 
left-wing Socialists to assail reformists and other non-revolutionary elements of the 
Left.647 In November 1933, after having been first censored then expelled from the 
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SFIO, the neo-socialists formed their own party, the Parti Socialiste de France – Union 
Jean Jaurès (PSdF) – but only 28 deputies and 7 senators joined the new group.648  
It was de Man’s Labour Plan that provided Déat, Renaudel, and their associates 
with a platform that they could sell to the public. Neo-socialists, however, were less 
thrilled about the Plan as a set of policy prescriptions than as a symbol. 649 First, by 
comparison, it allowed them to expose the SFIO’s attentisme and lack of a 
comprehensive economic programme. Second, they realised that, despite being wrapped 
up in a revolutionary language, the Plan could offer a rationale for governmental 
participation and therefore create an aura of legitimacy around their new party. 
Renaudel’s journal La Vie Socialiste proved instrumental to that effort. In November 
1933, recent articles published by de Man in Le Peuple were reprinted under the 
heading Pour un socialisme renouvelé. In introducing them, Robert Bobin complained 
that French socialists who were making similar arguments ‘let themselves to be treated 
as simple fascists.’650 The practical impossibility of passing measures aimed at seizing 
all the means of production, Bobin insisted, was acknowledged by de Man and 
vindicated the neo-socialists’ prescient insight.651 As soon as the Belgian Labour Plan 
was launched, bolder attempts were made to establish a link between the newly formed 
PSdF and the Belgian experience. ‘All the principles that have presided over the birth of 
our movement have been subsequently invoked by Henri de Man’ Déat boasted.652 ‘We 
alone in the Socialist Party in France have favourably received the ideas of Henri de 
Man, which corresponded to our own reflections’ Renaudel argued, presenting planism 
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as a straightforward result of de Man’s earlier repudiation of Marxism.653 The party’s 
Executive Bureau passed a resolution praising the ‘realistic principles for action’ 
(formules d’action réalistes) underpinning the Belgian Labour Plan and wishing that 
other parties affiliated with the LSI would do the same, so not to ‘leave to the enemies 
of the working class the construction of «intermediate regimes»’.654 According to the 
neo-socialists, planism – with its emphasis on the importance of acting at national level 
and win over the youth – was the most effective antidote to France slipping into right-
wing authoritarian rule.655  
Jumping on de Man’s bandwagon was a shrewd gambit but hardly one that 
could win over sceptics who questioned Déat’s good faith. Addressing both the Belgian 
and the French public, Vandervelde highlighted a major difference between de Man and 
Déat when he pointed out that, whereas the Belgian Labour Plan broadened the appeal 
of the existing socialist party, the neo-socialists exploited de Man’s project to vindicate 
their split, hence exacerbating divisions within the working class.656 It was, however, 
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Léon Blum who reacted most forcefully against what he regarded as an undue 
appropriation.657 Devoting ten editorials to the Belgian Labour Plan in January 1934, he 
pinpointed the differences between it and the neo-socialist programme. The first, 
according to Blum, entailed the rejection of ministerial participation within a non-
socialist majority658; the emphasis on class conflict659; the search for party unity660; the 
commitment to the nationalisation of property661; and, more generally, the creation of a 
rassemblement aimed at speeding up the transition to socialism. Contrary to the image 
that Déat and Renaudel were trying to convey, Blum insisted that de Man was no 
moderate and his name could not be invoked to justify a shameless pursuit of ministerial 
portfolios.662  
Having set the record straight about the Belgian Labour Plan, Blum spelled out 
the strong reservations he had about it. To begin with, the Plan could generate 
unintended consequences, for – by bringing heavy industries and credit under public 
control while at the same time expanding domestic consumption – it could eventually 
delay, rather than accelerate, the downfall of the capitalist system. Even worse, the 
‘coexistence’ between a public and a private sector was likely to trigger a stabilisation 
in which ‘the socialised sector, instead of growing little by little until absorbing 
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everything, is circumscribed in advance, isolated.’ 663 Yet those misgivings should not 
obscure the important concessions Blum was making to the sympathisers of the Labour 
Plan. For the first time, he was prone to recognise its usefulness, ‘as a plan of combat, 
as an offensive plan exercising the maximum action on the Belgian working class and 
the popular masses’, ‘as an instrument for the seizure of power.’664 Besides, he 
implicitly admitted that a planist orientation was compatible with genuine socialist 
tenets, describing the work of the deputy Vincent Auriol as the closest to de Man’s 
original approach.665 
 Blum’s remarks, though, had less a theoretical than a tactical value. His aversion 
to planism notwithstanding, the leader was making clear he could get along with planist 
fringes as long as they operated within the SFIO rather than outside or against it. Short-
term calculations might have played a role in this inclusive attitude. By mid-January, he 
was certainly aware that the Belgian Labour Plan was gaining admirers well beyond the 
PSdF and a tiny but vocal group of planists loyal to the SFIO – the SFIO planists – 
would make their voices heard during the forthcoming Lille congress, scheduled for 
February 10-11th. The pivotal figure of this group was Lucien Laurat, who, while being 
involved in the Belgian campaign for the Plan, was based in Paris and published 
regularly on the French press.666 In 1933, having broken with Monde for the pro-Soviet 
line imposed by the editor Henri Barbusse, Laurat helped launch Le Combat marxiste, a 
monthly aimed at steering a new course between what he regarded as the three dominant 
strands of the French Left: ‘traditional reformism’ advocated by the neo-socialists, 
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imbued with nationalism and pre-Marxian utopianism; ‘the traditional Left’ of Blum 
and Faure, whose ‘abstract propaganda’ had become a ‘source of inertia’, and the 
‘bolshevism’ dominating the French Communist Party.667 For Laurat, only planism 
could reinvigorate the SFIO. In December, Le Combat marxiste threw its support 
behind de the Belgian Labour Plan, praising both its ‘political dynamism’ and its 
‘economic realism’, and emphasizing the similarities between de Man’s and Laurat’s 
ideas as expressed in two recent pamphlets.668 By then, Laurat’s writings had caught the 
eye of Jean Zyromski, the leader of the left-wing faction Bataille Socialiste and Blum’s 
most powerful opponent within the party.669 ‘Laurat convincingly demonstrates this: the 
breadth and depth of the crisis of the capitalist economy is as such that socialist parties 
can no longer be satisfied, within their propaganda effort, with social policy, narrowly 
defined’, Zyromski held.670 ‘The socialist party, the party of the working class, must 
have a clear conception of its economic policy. That economic policy is the policy of 
socialisation.’671 The latter meant, in Zyromski’s thoroughly Marxist understanding, the 
seizure of the economic surplus and its use in the interest of the collectivity. By 
bridging the gap between utopia and reality – moving from ‘the phase of critical theory 
to that of constructive practice’– Zyromski presented the Plan as an essentially 
revolutionary tool which would ensure a relatively smooth transition from capitalism to 
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socialism.672 By winning Zyromski’s approval, Laurat – and planism indirectly – 
managed to gain credit from a well-established faction already active within the SFIO. 
Suddenly, a broad coalition for a French Plan took form.  
It is perhaps no accident that, after that endorsement, SFIO planists seemed increasingly 
willing to set their differences aside. The evolving attitude towards the intellectual circle 
Révolution Constructive, one of the first to express admiration for de Man, are revealing 
in that regard. In 1932-33, the book after which the group was named, authored by the 
three of the founders – Pierre Boivin, Georges Lefranc, and Maurice Deixonne – had 
raised eyebrows within the SFIO Left for suggesting that a socialist system might be 
built without a genuine revolutionary break.673 However, once the neo-socialists had 
been expelled and de Man himself authorised Révolution Constructive to publish his 
preliminary articles about the Labour Plan674, reservations dropped away and the group 
started receiving favourable coverage not only from Bataille Socialiste but also from Le 
Combat Marxiste and L’Étudiant Socialiste, a monthly aimed at socialist students from 
France, Belgium, and Switzerland.675 Intellectual affinity soon turned into a more 
tangible convergence. In January 1934, Wolf Epstein and Marcelle Pommera for 
Combat Marxiste, Georges Lefranc and Jean Itard for Révolution Constructive joined 
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forces with elements of Bataille Socialiste to present a single motion, “Pour l’offensive 
socialiste”, before the Seine Congress.676 Under the same title, Itard and Lefranc made 
their case for a French Plan in Le Populaire, where Zyromski – who co-edited the 
newspaper – managed to secure them some editorial space.677 Intellectual and political 
mobilisation often overlapped: André Philip, by then a socialist deputy as well as an 
ardent planist, contributed to an issue of Esprit, a non-conformist review, which 
appeared on February 1st, largely devoted to the Belgian Plan. SFIO planists were 
clearly trying to reach out to a more diversified audience, young Catholics included.678  
SFIO planists secured other substantial victories outside Paris. Jules Moch, then 
a deputy from the Drôme, hammered out a declaration supporting a French Plan that 
won the unanimous approval of his federation.679 On February 4th, in Aube, the 
‘programme of action’ sketched out by Lefranc, Itard, and Laurat received an equally 
unanimous support while planist resolutions were passed with strong majorities in 
Hérault and Morbihan.680 Somewhat awkwardly, whilst Déat was exploiting the Labour 
Plan to substantiate the neo-socialists’ defense of participation, Laurat and Zyromski 
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were using it as a buzzword to galvanise young socialists hungry for bold economic 
ideas and disgruntled with the party leadership.681 
 In the meantime, a third group of planists came to the fore. On January 14th, 
1933, the CGT secretary Léon Jouhaux launched an anti-crisis campaign from the 
Belgian city of Charleroi. The day after he headed a trade union delegation to the 
French Présidence du Conseil asking for a set of short-term measures, including the 
forty-hour week, new infrastructures, and the nationalisation of all monopolies, 
including the credit sector. Some of Jouhaux’s requests were hardly a novelty, having 
been part of the CGT platform since 1931.682 On that very day, however, his vice-
secretary René Belin submitted a draft for a French Plan moulded on the Belgian one to 
CGT’s federations and department branches, and visited the Maison du Peuple in 
Brussels. Jouhaux was soon to appoint a brain trust in order to further discuss and 
expand Belin’s document.683 Jouhaux was a lifelong reformist and his sudden 
conversion to planism may have been somewhat self-interested. On the other hand, 
some of his collaborators – such as Belin and Robert Lacoste, editor-in-chief of La 
Tribune des Fonctionnaires – were true believers, and their efforts to assimilate de 
Man’s thinking stemmed from a genuine fascination for the Belgian experience.684 
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 By late January, therefore, three different planist groups existed in France. All of 
them opposed the deflationary policies of the incumbent government, led by the Radical 
Camille Chautemps. All aimed at establishing an économie dirigée to curb 
unemployment and return to economic growth. All agreed about the necessity of 
nationalising monopolies – although the neo-socialists less enthusiastically than the 
others –. Their strategies, however, differed greatly. The neo-socialists envisaged a 
piecemeal transition towards economic planning in agreement with the Radicals (or at 
least with their progressive wing). The SFIO planists wished to take control of their 
party and run on a planist platform without seeking alliances, or participating in 
Radical-led cabinets. The CGT planists hoped to get a Labour Plan approved by 
mobilising workers and pressuring the government. This prevented the formation of a 
single planist front but, for the same reason, it allowed planism to resonate more widely. 
Blum’s fear that planism could shake the ideological foundations of the SFIO was not 
irrational. The events of February 1934, however, reshaped the political scene to such 
an extent that planists’ hopes, and Blum’s apprehensions, were dashed in a few months.  
*** 
On February 6th, several far-right groups rallied against the new Daladier 
government for its decision to dismiss the police prefect Jean Chiappe. The Paris 
demonstrations degenerated into riots that caused seventeen casualties. Within the Left, 
the unrest was seen as a conscious attempt to overthrow the Constitution –possibly the 
first salvo of an upcoming coup d’état. As Blum put it in a dramatic address to the 
Chamber, ‘the parties of reaction, defeated two years ago, and those who have sought 
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their revenge alternatively through financial or moral panic, are trying today a coup de 
force.’685  
 The first immediate consequence of February 6th was the decision to postpone 
the SFIO congress which had been scheduled to be held less than a week later, freezing 
the debate at a time when planist ideas were gaining momentum.686 The second was an 
almost instinctive search for unity among the forces that saw la République under 
threat, including the Parti Communiste Français (PCF), which had previously ruled out 
any convergence with the SFIO. On February 12th, during a strike called by the CGT, 
thousands of Socialists and Communists marched together under the same banner. 
L’Humanité celebrated the ‘magnificent proletarian response to fascism’, and its editor, 
Marcel Cachin, caught the new mood by claiming that ‘the struggle between fascism 
and the working class and peasantry […] dominates everything!’687 The fact that, the 
same week, a civil war broke out in Vienna, allowing Chancellor Dollfuss to crush the 
Austrian social democrats, fuelled a sense of encirclement by all the self-proclaimed 
anti-fascist parties.688 
 Neither neo-socialists nor SFIO planists were taken aback by the prospect of a 
right-wing putsch. If anything, they agreed that the chronic inability of centre-right 
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cabinets to address the economic crisis was only making such prospect more likely. ‘We 
shall tirelessly repeat that the hour has come for a true revolution, in conformity with 
our principles as much as to the demands of the historical moment’, Déat boasted.689 
His message, however, was not one of uncritical support for the parliamentary system. 
No longer burdened by their association with the SFIO, neo-socialists – Déat speculated 
– could succeed in channelling ‘contradictory and tumultuous currents, which have not 
yet found their direction, to the benefit of the socialist and democratic revolution.’690 
Shortly after, this conviction drove him and other neo-socialists to cross paths with 
fringes which rejected liberal economics and leaned towards a variety of corporatist 
arrangements. In that spirit, Déat, Louis Vallon, Roditi and Marion all backed the Plan 
du 9 Juillet, released in 1934. This plan aimed at rallying young people all across the 
political spectrum around a set of constitutional reforms to strengthen the executive and 
introduce economic planning. Signatories included notable intellectuals – de Jouvenel, 
Jules Romains, Alfred-Fabre Luce –; technocrats – Jacques Branger, Jacques Coutrot, 
Pierre Laroque – as well as individual members of the Croix du Feu and the Jeunesses 
Patriotes.691 In January 1935, Montagnon echoed them calling for ‘a strong state’ (un 
État fort) and ‘a national mystique’ by which the neo-socialists could get a foothold 
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among young voters.692  Resentment against the establishment was one feeling that neo-
socialists were eager to capitalise on, even at the price of mingling with the far Right.693 
Déat’s project of a planist rassemblement, however, collided with the reality of 
his beleaguered party. On February 9th, the neo-socialist Adrien Marquet agreed to serve 
as Minister of Labour in a cabinet of national unity (in fact, a centre-right one) headed 
by Gaston Doumergue, alongside unabashed conservatives such as Tardieu, Pierre-
Étienne Flandin, and Louis Marin. Evidence suggests that, in doing so, Marquet 
consciously ignored the most recent PSdF resolution, a carefully drafted statement 
contemplating parliamentary support, not participation, to ‘a government of public 
safety and détente.’694 His impulsiveness and opportunism put neo-socialists under 
severe strain for they could neither capitulate nor alienate the powerful Gironde 
federation, on which Marquet held a firm grip.695 To be sure, his conduct infuriated 
Renaudel.696 After three stormy meetings, facing the danger of losing the party’s only 
stronghold, the PSdF executive bureau begrudgingly authorised Marquet to serve on a 
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personal basis.697 In the aftermath, two deputies resigned in protest and neo-socialists 
were accused by SFIO backbenchers of siding with the murderers of Jaurès.698 Déat 
needed ‘much flexibility, mental agility, and almost the gift of ubiquity’ to sell his 
party’s official line to the public.699  
For his part, soon after his appointment Marquet came up with a plan of public 
works, approved by the government in March, which seemed to vindicate the decision 
to give credit to Doumergue.700 In fact, the Marquet Plan – which aimed at lending 
social security savings to promote local infrastructure projects – could hardly match the 
appeal of the Belgian Labour Plan or other schemes for planned economy due to its 
narrow objectives and unemotional language. Moreover, as Déat pointed out, it was 
underfunded and restrained by the deflationary budget crafted by the Ministry of the 
Economy.701 Instead of ushering a French New Deal, it replicated the “grands travaux” 
that fiscally conservative Prime Ministers had sponsored in the past. Because of that, the 
Plan Marquet backfired: Blum dismissed it as a bluff, and even the Radicals condemned 
it during their October congress.702  
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Nevertheless, despite new spending cuts, Marquet refused to resign.703 In early 
June 1934 an increasingly frustrated Déat tried to cause the downfall of Doumergue so 
to put Marquet out of office but his machination failed miserably.704 In July, a number 
of PSdF members – including heavyweights as Vallon and Paul Marion – denounced 
the party’s association with an unpopular government as a serious liability.705 A 
resentful Marquet got back by threatening to defect.706 After months of skirmishes and 
tensions, on November 3rd, Marquet cut the Gordian knot by resigning from the PSdF. 
He also set up his own Parti néo-socialiste de France, active only at local level, which 
allowed him to get re-elected mayor of Bordeaux in 1935, this time within a centre-right 
coalition.707 By then, however, neo-socialists were too discredited and splintered to 
attract new followers. Even Déat seemed completely off-track: he backed the CGT Plan 
– to be discussed later in this chapter – but also developed a revised version of it, named 
Plan Français, which included some protectionist measures and control over foreign 
trade through a small think tank of his own making, the Comité du Plan. 
Unsurprisingly, the Plan Français gained no traction.708 Plagued by financial troubles 
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and a falling membership, the PSdF finally dissolved into the Union Socialiste 
Républicaine (USR), which assembled minor forces gravitating towards the Radicals.709 
Neosocialism ended not with a bang but with a whimper: in the 1936 legislative 
elections, despite running under the Popular Front banner, Déat was defeated alongside 
many former PSdF affiliates, and the entire USR won merely 29 seats.710 The gulf 
between rhetoric and reality, for a party attacking the status quo while staying in power, 
had proven too wide to bridge.711 
February 6th was equally fatal to SFIO planists who suffered a crushing setback 
in Toulouse, where socialists gathered in May 1934. The party establishment strongly 
objected to the key arguments in favour of a French Labour Plan, questioning its 
feasibility and minimising its merits. Paul Faure, the general secretary, suggested that, 
‘before any plan’, socialists had to focus on ‘the seizure of power’, without which 
planning would be pointless.712 Similarly, Jean-Baptiste Severac, the party ideologue, 
warned against any detailed blueprint for action that might stifle the creativity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Comité rallied minor socialist parties, a few independent radicals, and various associations of ex-
combattants: see ‘Contre la misère, la faillite et le chômage – Comité du Plan’, La vie socialiste, 409, 
15.1.1935, 3-4; ‘Présentation du Plan’, Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français, 1, 4, 30.11.1935, 4; M. 
Déat, ‘Vers l’expérience française’, Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français, 1, 8, 28.12.1935, 1-2. 
709
 See ‘Au Congrès du Parti Socialiste de France’, Le Front: socialiste, républicain, français, 1, 2, 
16.11.1935, 1, 4. The architect of the operation was Joseph Paul-Boncour, a moderate center-left deputy 
and former Prime minister who had been deeply suspicious of the neo-socialists’ lurching towards extra-
parliamentary forces: see J. Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: souvenirs sur la IIIe République. Vol. II: 
Les lendemains de la victoire, 1919-1934, Paris, Plon 1945, 322-323. 
710
 Bertrand de Jouvenel, who campaigned as a self-appointed neo-socialist, was among those who 
unsuccessfully ran for parliament: see B. de Jouvenel, ‘Pourquoi j’ai été battu’, Vu, 16.5.1936, 44-46. 
711
 The contradiction was evident from the very beginning of the neo-socialist insurgence. As a perceptive 
observer, Angelo Tasca, noted during the Paris Congress of 1933, ‘participation is a defensive and 
conservative reflex [...]. Participating to keep the majority of May 8 and 15, 1932, and waging popular 
masses to socialism, even a national one, here are two political operations that seem irreconcilable to me.’ 
[A. Rossi, ‘La scission socialiste au Congrès du Paris’, Monde: hebdomadaire internationale, 268, 
22.7.1933, 4] Anti-parliamentary elements within the PSdF were the most disgruntled by the new 
alliance: ‘The Socialist Party of France’, Roditi lamented, has increasingly moved away from its original 
socialism and “fascism”, it has gradually become one of those independent socialist parties which it is 
now merging with.’ [G. Roditi, ‘Mort ou naissance du néo-socialisme?’, L’homme nouveau, special issue, 
1.9.1935, unpaged] On similar grounds, Marion and de Jouvenel later switched to Jacques Doriot’s Parti 
Populaire Français.  
712
 XXXIe Congrès, 22. 
216 
 
socialist movement: ‘I believe that the more we leave the terms of the Plan 
indeterminate, in case the Congress decides to have one, the less likely we are to be 
deceived.’713 Jean Lebas, the Mayor of Roubaix and leader of the North Federation, 
even challenged the assumption that planism had anything original to offer, asking 
‘Comrades, what are you proposing to do, in sum? To put it simply: to continue the 
work of the founders of French socialism.’714 SFIO planists had a hard time in fending 
off these attacks, perhaps due to poor coordination. At times they pledged their 
allegiance to the socialist tradition, as Salomon Grumbach did; in other cases, they 
proudly postured as non-conformists, like Boivin, who simultaneously condemned the 
‘generalised negativism’ of its party and the ‘damaging mistake’ of uncritically 
supporting the parliamentary system.715 As a consequence, their message appeared even 
more contradictory than usual.  
Moreover, planists suffered from Blum’s unparalleled ability to damp down 
internal dissent. Unlike a year before, when he had fiercely confronted the neo-
socialists, Blum chose to play the role of the unifier. He therefore credited the young 
generation for having ‘questioned ideas that we had been taken for granted. We must 
consider that, in doing so, they have rendered a service to us, and we must accept it for 
what it is. It is our duty to welcome their criticism, and also to show there is a living 
link (lien vivant) between the generations.’716 Then he quickly moved on to dismiss the 
clash between planists and anti-planists as a fight originated by ‘practical difficulties’ 
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rather than ‘theoretical ones.’717 Planists, Blum argued, had come to acknowledge that 
‘plan must be amendable and revocable, and it is necessary to lay down its guidelines, 
not its details.’718 This was an overstatement – only Moch had outlined an instrumental 
conception of the plan, presenting it as a mere device to ensure the consistency of 
economic policy.719 For his part, Blum praised the plan as a propaganda tool but, in an 
effort to identify the ‘key ideas’ of the socialist movement, he also resisted the claim 
that the plan, and the plan alone, could lead to victory: ‘It is not a plan, in my view, that 
the public needs most [...]. What the public wants is the assertion that we will keep our 
commitments, that there will be no resolution from which we will retreat, no sacrifice 
on which we will back down, in order to keep the engagement we have taken.’720 In 
practice, Blum ensured that some measures advocated by SFIO planists (i.e., extensive 
public works, nationalisation of credit, insurance companies, and monopolies) were 
incorporated in the party programme without laying down a proper Labour Plan. As 
stated in the final resolution, the Congress agreed that ‘the party, once in power, being 
dominated by the feeling of its revolutionary mission, could not be chained or limited 
by any plan or programme’ and that ‘public opinion begins to feel disoriented by the 
abundance of plans, too often drafted to facilitate vain adhesions, that are followed by 
no action.’721 
 The document – drafted by a special commission including also Moch, Boivin, 
Itard, and André Philip – won the nearly unanimous support of the delegates, showing 
that, in the aftermath of February 6th, the quest for party unity trumped ideological 
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differentiations.722 Tellingly, some of the staunchest opponents of planism were already 
intrigued by the prospect of a united front with the Communists, and even Zyromski, 
after February 6th, regarded working class unity as more desirable, at least in the short 
run, than a thorough ideological revision.723 In practice, the capitulation of the SFIO 
planists meant that planist ideas would continue to be tolerated within the limits set by 
the party leaders, Blum and Faure.724 
 The CGT was the only major organisation in which planism gained full 
acceptance. If trade unionists discovered planism, it is equally true that neo-socialists 
and SFIO planists discovered the virtues of trade unionism.725 Under many respect, the 
CGT was better positioned than the PSdF and the SFIO to outline a French Labour Plan. 
To begin with, the very nature of the CGT allowed planists of all stripes and 
orientations to work together, regardless of their age, role, or party affiliation. The 
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Bureau d’études économiques that the CGT, following the Belgian example, set up in 
March 1934 stood out for its pluralism. In addition to the ubiquitous Lefranc and 
Laurat, the ‘brain trust’ included academics in their fifties or sixties who had been close 
to Albert Thomas – Francis Delaisi, François Simiand, Paul Mantoux –, young trade 
union cadres – Jean Duret, Achille Dauphin-Meunier –, economists – Etienne Antonelli, 
Robert Marjolin – and engineers from Déat’s inner circle –Vallon, Claude Bonnier.726 
Secondly, thanks to its international standing and financial resources, the CGT could 
facilitate relations with planists based abroad. It is noteworthy that, following the events 
of February 6th, the CGT managed to swiftly change the location of a one-week 
conference from Geneva to Brussels in order to host de Man as a keynote speaker and 
allow Buset to lecture French trade unionists on how to prevent the rise of fascism.727 
Finally, the CGT offered educational structures through which planism could be taught 
and spread. By mid-1934 until the war, the Institut supérieur ouvrier (ISO) and the 
Centre confédéral d’éducation ouvrière (CCEO), both run by Georges Lefranc with the 
help of a young professor of mechanics, Ludovic Zoretti, became the seedbeds of 
French planism.728 Amidst a wide range of courses, Lefranc frequently addressed topics 
related to planning, such as the Bolshevik revolution or Roosevelt’s New Deal; Laurat 
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taught classes on contemporary social and economic thought.729 When the CGT Plan 
was finally published, in October 1934, the CGT organised a series of fifteen 
conferences to advertise it and even launched a monthly, L’Atelier pour le Plan, that 
emulated Plan, the flagship publication of the Belgian campaign.730 This was much 
more than anything the SFIO could, or intended to, offer for a propaganda effort.  
 But the association with the CGT came at a high price, namely the loss of the 
properly political dimension of planism.731 A key promise of the Belgian Labour Plan 
was indeed that, by winning support from the middle class, the Plan would enable 
socialists to achieve a parliamentary majority and pass far-reaching measures, including 
the nationalisation of credit.732 As de Man reminded his audience at the Sorbonne in 
December 1934, ‘Today it is necessary […] either to give up making the revolution or 
to gain power first’, meaning that a genuine revolution had to be carried out through the 
parliament and the state.733 Yet the CGT was not supposed to control political power: at 
best, it exerted some degree of influence over those holding it. For this reason, the CGT 
Plan looked less a consistent, detailed, blueprint for action than a set of distinct and 
negotiable measures – the creation of an economic council to supersede economic 
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planning, the nationalisation of credit and heavy industries, the launch of public works, 
the introduction of collective bargaining and reforms in the agricultural sector, etc. –, 
which a centre-left government might or might not implement, at its discretion.734 That 
was not what Belgian planists were advocating in late 1934.  The crucial distinction 
between ‘programme’ and ‘plan’, on which de Man insisted, was lost due to the 
inherent nature of the CGT, the latter being not a political party but an interest group. 
 The combined failure of the neo-socialists as well as of the SFIO planists had 
thus major consequences for the French Left. While the CGT managed to get its plan 
approved first by the National Confederal Committee, in October 1934, then by the 
unitary Congress held in March 1936, planists had virtually no say in the most delicate 
decisions taken by the SFIO in the same period: the creation of the Popular Front, 
followed by the drafting of its programme.735 Blum, never convinced of the virtues of 
planism, preferred securing a broad intra-party alliance based on a minimalist agenda, 
and even more so after March 1935, when de Man’s decision to join the first Van 
Zeeland government left him puzzled.736 Belgian developments pleased what was left of 
the neo-socialists but stunned many other planists, including Zyromski, to whom 
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participation was anathema.737 By then, however, tactical calculations were prevailing 
over efforts to work out a homogeneous and consistent platform: a vocal anti-planist 
like Lebas urged the SFIO to back the CGT Plan but only in order to negotiate with the 
PCF from a position of strength.738 Congressional pledges were equally ephemeral: a 
resolution drafted by Auriol, which committed the SFIO to develop its own action 
programme in accordance with the CGT Plan, presumably passed to placate the trade 
unions, remained a dead letter.739 Popular Front politics required flexibility, not a 
doctrinaire approach. 
 If antagonism from within the SFIO seriously damaged the planist cause, 
Communist opposition was the final nail in the coffin for all planists. In line with 
Varga’s condemnation of the Belgian Labour Plan and early attacks from other 
Communist parties740, French Communists denounced ‘the disease of the «plan»’ and 
the pernicious influence of its advocates: ‘The objective role of the «planners» (faiseurs 
du plan), especially the socialist ones, is to divert workers from the only way of acting 
that corresponds to their interests – a revolutionary struggle for the overthrowing of the 
capitalist regime.’741 In December 1934, the general secretary Maurice Thorez clarified 
that the PCF would never join an alliance based on a French Labour Plan of any kind: 
‘The proposals for nationalization and socialization of credit are not peculiar to the 
                                                          
737
 See M. Déat, ‘De Bruxelles à Paris’, La vie socialiste, 409, 15.1.1935, 1-3; L. Vallon, ‘Le Plan du 9 
Juillet et l’expérience belge’, L’homme nouveau, 16, 1.5.1935, unpaged; J. Zyromski, ‘De Belgique… en 
France’, Le Populaire, 17.4.1935.  
738
 See J. Lebas, ‘Ou va le Parti Socialiste?’, Le Populaire, 24.6.1935. 
739
 See Congrès national tenu à Mulhouse le 9, 10,11 et 12 juin 1935 – compte rendu sténographique, 
Paris, Libraire Populaire 1936, 569-577. 
740
 Bilan, a review linked to Italian Communist exiles published in French, was among the first to 
condemn the Plan as a fascist device: see ‘Le Plan de Man’, Bilan, 4, 1934, 122-132 and ‘Le Plan de 
Man: suite et fine’, Bilan, 5, 1934, 166-179. On Varga’s criticism see, chapter IV of this dissertation. 
741
 L. Constant, ‘La Crise du Parti Socialiste – I. A la veille du Congrès de Toulouse’, Cahiers du 
bolchévisme, 10, 15.5.1934, 592-593. See also L. Constant, ‘Les réformistes et la crise – III. L’économie 
dirigée et la C.G.T.’, Cahiers du bolchévisme, 7, 1.4.1934, 412-422, for a critique of the early steps 
towards the CGT Plan. For L’Humanité, both de Man and his French followers could be qualified as 
social-fascists: see e.g. ‘Le plan social-fasciste d’Henri de Man – Tous d’accord!’, L’Humanité, 8.1.1934. 
223 
 
Socialist Party. They are in the plan of the CGT, as the motion adopted by the Socialist 
Congress of Toulouse points out. We cannot approve the CGT Plan, which we claim 
being in contrast with the interest of the workers. We cannot accept the articles of a 
programme that can be found in the de Man Plan, as well as in the programme of the 
neo-socialists.’742 The SFIO’s reservations and the PCF’s opposition, coupled with a 
climate of opinion dominated by the search for a united front against fascism, resulted 
in the rejection of planism as a cement for the French Left. Consequently, the 
programme of the Popular Front turned into ‘a rallying point of different political 
parties whose intentions were sometimes really opposite’743. Planists lamented its lack 
of clear priorities – no structural reforms, in de Man’s terminology, were outlined in the 
text744 – and when the first Blum government fell in June 1937, some of them mourned 
that only a French Labour Plan would have been able to prevent disagreements and curb 
tensions related to economic policy.745 
*** 
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 There is no doubt that the reception of the Belgian Labour Plan sparked, 
between 1933 and 1936, a spirited debate within the French Left. It is equally clear that 
the endeavours of neo-socialists, SFIO planists, and CGT planists ended all in failure. 
To an extent, each group did not succeed for quite specific reasons. Lack of party 
discipline, opportunism, and ideological fluctuations crippled the PSdF from the outset. 
Like de Man, Déat was an inspiring young leader with intellectual credentials, even if 
Perspectives socialistes was a pale shadow of Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, both in 
terms of quality and impact. In retrospect, his resolve to establish a centre-left majority 
after the 1932 election seems not unreasonable yet he was probably wrong in thinking 
that economic planning would be an easy pill to swallow by most Radicals.746 On the 
other hand, his disastrous handling of the Marquet affair and his clumsy efforts to court 
the far Right speak volumes about his limitations as a leader. Furthermore, the fact that 
the PSdF never managed to evolve into a credible, mass-based party suggests that 
planism could have hardly thrived if propagated only by minor, centrist parliamentary 
formations. 
 Assessing the record of SFIO planists is a more difficult task. One of them, 
Georges Lefranc – who turned into a highly respected historian of the French labour 
movement – maintained that, without the Paris riots of February 6th, SFIO planists 
would have gained the upper hand in the 1934 Lille Congress.747 He also held that, 
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without the vigorous campaign waged by Révolution Constructive, many more militants 
attracted by planism would have defected to the PSdF.748 Lefranc’s views on the matter 
must be taken with a grain of salt.  However real and mounting, the intellectual ferment 
of planist circles did not equate with political strength. SFIO planists were, in most 
cases, intellectuals with little or no experience of intra-party fights, no territorial 
constituency, and no recognisable spearhead capable of facing down Blum or Faure – 
all things that they conceded at the time.749 Nor there is compelling evidence of the 
base’s alleged willingness to follow the neo-socialists before the SFIO planists made 
their bid.750 Surely Blum might have further softened his opposition to a French Labour 
Plan, had the planist mobilisation continued to grow steadily. But it is hard to imagine 
the entire socialist apparatus succumbing to a handful of enthusiasts.751 
 The third group, the CGT planists, were perhaps the least unsuccessful but only 
because they were also the most willing to accommodate their message to the evolving 
circumstances. It is true that, being used as a propaganda tool after June 1936, the CGT 
Plan strengthened the hand of Jouhaux when confronting the centre-left in power.752 Yet 
some of its measures were used as bargaining chips rather than as precondition for 
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cooperation: many of the most ambitious prescriptions, such as nationalisations, were to 
remain unfulfilled. 
 From a wider perspective, French planism as whole suffered from more general 
weaknesses, the first of which was its divisive character. In Belgium, de Man’s Labour 
Plan was seen by many, including some of its socialist critics, as instrumental to party 
unity, and therefore welcomed or at least tolerated.753 In France, on the other hand, the 
reception of the Belgian Labour Plan took place when the split between the neo-
socialists and the SFIO was well under way. Déat, Renaudel, and others exploited de 
Man’s ideas to attack their former colleagues whereas anti-planists within the SFIO 
retaliated by hardening their opposition to planism. Because of that, SFIO planists were 
daunted by the memory of a recent split and faced stronger objections from anti-
planists. Secondly, French planism did not find its own de Man: a clearly identifiable 
leader, a unifying figure having the final say on theoretical as well as strategic disputes. 
Consequently, each planist group often claimed to be the only one faithful to the spirit 
underpinning the original Labour Plan, a habit that caused a permanent cacophony 
within the planist camp.754 Thirdly, French planism could not benefit from a friendly 
relationship between the main socialist party and the trade union movement. Unlike the 
Belgian CS, which was organically linked to the POB, the CGT had often clashed with 
the SFIO during the previous decades, and had jealously defended its independence. 755 
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This explains why the acceptance of planism by the former did not result in a more 
favourable attitude by the latter. 
 The final, but perhaps most important, drawback of French planism was the 
determination of the incumbent leaders, Léon Blum and Paul Faure, to crush it. 
Vandervelde too was dubious and, from late 1934, resisted de Man’s attempt to steer the 
POB far away from the orthodoxy. Nevertheless, his initial stance was more cooperative 
than confrontational: without Vandervelde, de Man would have not obtained the vice-
presidency of the party, and the campaign for the Plan would not have been launched.756 
Blum and Faure, on the contrary, refused to commit the SFIO to a Labour Plan; at best, 
they made minor and sporadic concessions to the SFIO planists and did not hesitate to 
scrap them after February 1934, giving priority to the building of a Popular Front whose 
economic programme stood out only for its timidity. 
Due to the poor state of his private papers and his often contradictory 
statements, no conclusive answer can be given to the question as to why Blum – the 
most intellectually sophisticated of the two – remained convinced for so long that 
establishing a mixed economy would not be in the best interest of France, and would in 
fact laid the groundwork for fascism.757 Of course, thinking about the trajectory of 
several planists who ended up supporting the Vichy regime, it may be tempting to 
conclude that he was at least half-right.758  Yet, even in the case of Déat – perhaps the 
most willing to connect his break with ‘the sclerotic orthodoxy of old socialism’ to his 
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decision to collaborate with the Germans 759 – the equation between planism and 
fascism does not stand up to scrutiny.760 To begin with, a significant cohort of admirers 
of the Belgian Labour Plan – Philip, Moch, Lacoste, Vallon, Ramadier, Marjolin, 
Laroque, Pierre Drefyus, Henry Hauck, and Pierre Brossolette, among many others – 
joined the Resistance. Secondly, it is plausible that other factors – such as neutralism761 
and political marginalisation during the second half of the 1930s762 – were much more 
important in fuelling a widespread sense of estrangement towards the institutions of the 
Third Republic, hence pulling some planists towards Pétain.763  
  If this is true, Blum must not be credited for having presciently detected the 
seeds of fascism within his party; if anything, he should be blamed for having 
stubbornly delayed an ideological revision that would have provided socialists with 
better conceptual tools to address the economic crisis, and, by the same token, renewed 
their faith in democratic rule.764 After all, planning was neither relegated to the dustbin 
of history nor permanently associated with the dark years 1940-1944: it resurfaced 
strongly after the Second World War as a crucial tool of the French recovery.765 The 
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alleged affinities between original planism and this new variant of it will be discussed in 
































The Belgian Labour Plan in Britain 
 
It is the paradox of our time that, while 
the Labour Party is every day making 
fresh converts, and making them on 
the basis of an avowed Socialist faith, 
the nature of that faith is in danger of 
growing less and less clearly defined. 
  
G.D.H. Cole, 1929766 
 
It is not the intention of the Labour 
Party to attempt merely to tinker with 
the Capitalist system, for we are 
convinced that within Capitalism there 
can be no solution of our problems. 
 
Stafford Cripps, 1933767 
 
 
 The Belgian Labour Plan drew much less attention in Britain than in France, and 
its reception has not been thoroughly studied yet. This gap in the historiography is 
symptomatic of a more general tendency to marginalise Britain in surveys of the 
European Left during the interwar years, an attitude that may have drawn strength from 
scholarly interpretations emphasising the alleged exceptionalism of the British Labour 
movement.768 It is indicative that neither Gerd Rainer Horn nor Gilles Vergnon gave 
much space to the United Kingdom in their analyses of the strategies articulated by 
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social democratic parties in reaction to the rise of fascism, despite the transnational and 
comparative focus of their research.769 In a similar fashion, historians who authored 
extensive works on de Man’s thinking barely mentioned its impact on British politics, 
or lack of thereof.770 As a consequence, Belgian planism and British socialism have 
often been depicted as two separate worlds despite having similar concerns and sharing, 
to a certain extent, the same vocabulary.771 
 Truth be told, a few spare references to the Belgian Labour Plan can be found in 
the literature on the British Labour Party (LP), all pointing to the debt that the British 
social theorist and Labour activist G.D.H. Cole supposedly owed to de Man. Geoffrey 
Foote contended that Cole, ‘more than most British thinkers, was extremely sensitive to 
developments in foreign socialist thought, and seized on the Plan du Travail […] as a 
prototype of the Labour Plan’ that British socialists were expected to launch before the 
next general election.772 Similarly, Elizabeth Durbin claimed that Cole ‘was greatly 
influenced by Henri de Man, a Belgian socialist, who drew up a comprehensive “Plan 
du Travail” for the Belgian Labour party. Cole translated the plan, and persuaded the 
NFRB [New Fabian Research Bureau] to publish it with his introductory explanation in 
1935.’773 
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Although containing a factual truth – Cole did translate the Belgian Labour Plan 
into English774 –, Foot’s and Durbin’s statements are not entirely accurate. Cole was 
undoubtedly sympathetic to de Man and paid tribute to his Plan even after de Man 
agreed to compromise with Van Zeeland in March 1935.775 What is less known, on the 
other hand, is de Man’s ongoing interest in Cole’s work, which may have resulted in a 
significant influence by Cole upon him. This chapter will show that de Man was in 
close touch with Cole as early as July 1933, around six months before drafting the 
Belgian Labour Plan. However, considering that Cole’s conception of socialist planning 
was much more sweeping than de Man’s, it would be a mistake to conclude that de Man 
built his Plan around Cole’s ideas: constructive exchanges may have led both men to 
clarify their views without reaching full agreement. A second element to flag up is that 
Cole was not the only British socialist familiar with de Man’s thought: at least one other 
prominent Labour MP, the later Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Cripps, had 
closer ties with Belgian planism than scholars have noticed so far.776 Finally, it is 
plausible that de Man’s ideas gained some currency in Britain before Cole’s translation 
of the Labour Plan became available. Indeed, contrary to what Foote and Durbin 
assumed, the first reception of de Man’s thinking in Britain can be traced back to June 
1934. Altogether, these elements suggest that the most radical fringe of British 
democratic socialists was more interested, and entangled in, Continental socialist 
developments than historians have hitherto supposed. 
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Having said that, the ultimate aim of this chapter is not to overstate the impact of 
the Belgian Labour Plan on British socialists but rather to explore the reasons why it 
failed to appeal to a wider range of individuals. Consequently, the layout of this chapter 
is as follows. First, it briefly illustrates how the traumatic demise of the second Labour 
Government provided breeding ground for radical ideas in Britain. Second, it evaluates 
Cole’s and Cripps’ relationship with de Man and the transnational connections between 
Belgian and British planism. Finally, it investigates the key reasons why the Belgian 
Labour Plan did not resonate well across the Channel. 
  *** 
 In summer 1931, for the second time in history, a Labour minority government 
was in power in Britain. The socialist Prime Minister, James Ramsay MacDonald, had 
won the 1929 general election on a platform promising greater redistribution of wealth 
but was now grappling with an unprecedented economic crisis during which Britain’s 
financial position had seriously deteriorated. MacDonald was not insensitive to the 
social consequences of deflation, and certainly resisted pressure from the Treasury, the 
press, and the opposition to slash public spending at an earlier stage.777 Yet he was also 
extremely reluctant to challenge the prevailing view according to which only a strict 
fiscal discipline could restore confidence by investors and consumers. A man in his 
sixties, MacDonald had spent his entire political career trying to turn the LP into a 
credible force so to displace the Liberals as the official opposition. This quest for 
respectability had led him to constantly walk the tightrope between a formal 
commitment to socialism and prudent tactics aimed at showing Labour’s sense of 
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responsibility and self-restraint, especially with regard to budget deficits.778  Nor was he 
encouraged to enter uncharted territory by his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Philip 
Snowden, whose hostility to increased government borrowing, based on the assumption 
that taxing unearned income would provide enough resources to improve the condition 
of the poor, was well known.779 Rather ironically, in the fluid situation of 1931, 
MacDonald and Snowden positioned themselves to the right of the Liberals who, 
spurred by a resurgent David Lloyd George, had begun advocating bold economic 
interventionism.780 In August, facing the danger of a liquidity crisis and a collapse of 
the pound, MacDonald proposed to cut unemployment benefits by 10%. The cabinet 
split on the issue and he resigned. The day after, upon an invitation from King George 
V, he agreed to lead a National Government supported by Conservatives, Liberals, and a 
group of Labour loyalists. Shocked by his turnabout, his party refused to follow him. In 
a snap election held in November, however, the LP suffered a historic humiliation, 
losing about four fifth of its seats.781 
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From that moment on, MacDonald occupied an unparalleled position in Labour 
demonology for his “Great Betrayal”.782 But the Prime Minister’s conduct could not be 
explained in terms of viciousness or unscrupulous personal ambition. As Robert 
Skidelsky convincingly argued, the downfall of the second Labour Government ‘was 
not just a failure of individuals but the failure of a Party and a doctrine’.783 Regardless 
of the limitations of the ministers and their tendency to trust the judgment of 
departmental civil servants too much, the Labour movement struggled to ‘bring together 
socialism on the one hand with economic and parliamentary democracy on the other’: 
having no ‘adequate theory of the transition’ towards a collectivist society, its leaders 
begrudgingly surrendered to the dogmas of laissez-faire, as if there were ‘nothing to do 
but govern without conviction a system it did not believe in but saw no real prospect of 
changing.’784 
It is against that passivity and resignation that Labour intellectuals forcefully 
reacted. Following early talks in summer 1930 between Cole, his wife Margaret, and 
other socialists already frustrated with MacDonald’s lacklustre tenure, two distinct 
bodies were founded between January and March 1931: the New Fabian Research 
Bureau (NFRB) and the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP).785 The 
first was meant to refresh Fabian thinking, which had made little headway in the 1920s, 
with the blessing of the LP: Clement Attlee, then MP from Limehouse, served as 
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director of its Executive Committee until 1933, when another MP, Christopher Addison, 
took over. Under the firm supervision of Cole, who served as honorary secretary, the 
NFRB focused mainly on three areas of research: domestic politics, international affairs, 
and economics. The economic section, run by two young economists, Evan Durbin and 
Hugh Gaitskell, was perhaps the most successful in producing detailed memoranda on 
economic planning and socialisation which were well received in academia and 
thoroughly debated in conferences and workshops. By mid-1933, the LP was 
increasingly willing to rely on the NFRB’s technical expertise in drafting policy 
proposals.786 The second group had stronger ties with the trade union movement, having 
drafted Ernest Bevin and Arthur Pugh, leaders of the Transport and General Workers 
Union and the British Iron, Steel, and Kindred Trades Association respectively, both 
outspoken critics of MacDonald.787 Unlike a relatively detached, research-oriented 
institution like the NFRB, the SSIP aimed at sketching out immediate measures that 
would allow the government, and the parliamentary LP in general, to tackle the most 
urgent issues of the time.788 The tumultuous events of 1931, however, were soon to 
change the goals, as well as the name, of the SSIP. When the Independent Labour Party 
(ILP), a small radical political formation which had been affiliated with the LP since 
1906, decided to go its own way, a composite but spirited group of intellectuals chose 
not to follow it, predicting, quite rightly, that the ILP would slip into irrelevance. 
Among them, there were Guild Socialists as William Mellor, former Liberals such as 
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Charles Trevelyan, civil servants such as Frank Wise, journalists such as Henry Noel 
Brailsford, barristers such as Gilbert Mitchison.789 After prolonged discussions and a 
split790, the SSIP dissolved and most of its members, including Cole, joined the former 
ILP members in a new society, the Socialist League (SL). In a few months, the SL 
established itself as the most vociferous organisation of the Labour Left as well as its 
most effective pressure group. 791 It is true that the SL never achieved a mass 
membership and had little strength outside Greater London.792 But thanks to the 
activism and eloquence of its spokespersons – first and foremost Stafford Cripps, the 
former Solicitor General under MacDonald and one of the few Labour MPs who had 
survived the 1931 election – the SL scored some important victories: at the 1932 
Leicester Party Conference, for instance, the LP National Council was forced to pledge 
that nationalisations would be carried out as soon as the party returned to office.793 
Furthermore, the SL set out to produce a massive amount of propaganda calling for the 
suppression of capitalism and the introduction of socialist economic planning, under the 
slogan ‘A Five-Year Plan’.794 A British version of planism, therefore, took root, even 
though its proponents did not use the term.795 In order to grasp the content of the SL’s 
agenda, however, it is necessary to delve into the ideas of its leading members, Cole and 
Cripps.  
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  *** 
Both the NFRB and the SL emerged out of a frustration with orthodox 
democratic socialism very similar to de Man’s.796 To Cole’s mind, the MacDonald 
experience encapsulated the dead end of gradualism, namely the illusion that ‘a slow 
infusion of Socialistic mechanisms and policies into the existing economic order’ would 
ensure ‘a gradual, unabrupt, painless transition’ to socialism.797 Although the 
introduction of ‘wedges of Socialism’ under capitalism was not necessarily futile, Cole 
maintained that these infusions had to be made in accordance with a broader 
programme: for this reason, ‘believers in Socialism’ were confronted with the task of 
preparing ‘plans for the socialisation of some at least of the vital industries and services 
of the country.’798 
The same convictions were expressed by numerous British socialist intellectuals 
in the same period.799 It was Cole, however, who made the biggest effort to articulate a 
coherent vision of socialist planning in two series of articles for the weekly The New 
Clarion, between June 1932 and June 1933. These short essays were subsequently 
                                                          
796
 As Cole observed, ‘the paradox of the situation in post-war Europe is that the Continental Social 
Democratic parties, for all their Marxian phrases and insistence on the class war, have certainly been in 
action no further to the left than the Fabian Socialists of Great Britain.’ [G.D.H. Cole, The Intelligent 
Man’s Guide through World Chaos, 610] 
797
 G.D.H. Cole, Some Essentials of Socialist Propaganda: A Tract for the Times, London, The Fabian 
Society 1932, 7. 
798
 G.D.H. Cole, ‘The Essentials of Socialisation’, The Political Quarterly, 3, 1931, 395, reprinted as 
G.D.H. Cole, The Essentials of Socialisation, London, New Fabian Research Bureau Tract 1932. An 
extended version appeared in G.D.H. Cole, Economic Tracts for the Times, London, Macmillan 1932, 
285-306. 
799
 See e.g. R. Tawney, The Choice before the Labour Party, London, The Socialist League, n.d., esp. 3-
6; J. Horabin, The Class Struggle, London, The Socialist League, n.d., 6-7; H. Morrison, ‘Reform or 
Revolution? The Labour Party Must Put Socialism First’, The New Clarion, 11, 20.8.1932, 241-242, 258; 
C. Trevelyan, ‘The New Offensive: How We Can Turn the Great Electoral Catastrophe into a Great 
Opportunity’, The New Clarion, 13, 3.9.1932, 301-302; S. Cripps, ‘The Future of the Labour Party’, New 
Statesman & Nation, 80, 3.9.1932, 255-256; J.T. Murphy, Preparing for Power: A Critical Study of the 
History of the British Working-Class Movement, London, Jonathan Cape 1934, 262-286. 
239 
 
issued as pamphlets800, and should be regarded as the first organic formulation of 
British planism.801 
Warning against the prospect of exercising power ‘without a definite plan of 
action already thought out’, Cole set the priorities of a future Labour government 
holding a majority in the House of Commons by outlining ‘a policy dealing with the 
essential, immediate steps for the effective establishment of socialist control’ that could 
be understood by ordinary militants.802 His recommendations differed from the policy 
of extension of social services that the LP had pursued in the past, as they envisaged a 
much more active role for the state, and for the public sector in general.803 By urging the 
LP to launch a ‘frontal attack’ on capitalism, Cole pointed out that only by socialising 
the Bank of England, the Joint Stock Banks, and all the financial institutions concerned 
with the supply of capital and credit socialists had a chance to succeed: ‘the 
socialisation of the productive industries, vitally important as it is, comes after these, 
because it will be done much more better and more easily if the financial and 
transporting organisation is already held firmly in Socialist hands.’804 According to 
Cole, no enduring compromise could be achieved between the City – which was 
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struggling to retain its status as a financial centre and was therefore unwilling to pay for 
further ameliorative measures for the working class – and the overwhelming majority of 
the British people: socialisation was therefore indispensable. Furthermore, only a 
‘transference at a blow to complete Socialist control’ would prevent private banks from 
obstructing Labour in power.805 A socialist government could then manage both the 
supply of credit and the deposits necessary to fund it, setting out to ‘raise prices to a 
level high enough to stimulate employment and reduce the burden of debts to tolerable 
proportions.’806  
In order to ensure an efficient allocation of financial resources, however, a 
comprehensive Economic Plan was required. This would involve the creation of new 
institutions – the machinery of planning, as Cole would call it elsewhere807 –. Socialist 
planning, unlike its capitalist variants, demanded the establishment of ‘a central 
authority with power to decide what is to be produced’ and ‘the control of distribution 
as well as of production.’808 Whilst capitalist planning preached rationalisation in 
industry in order to maintain some margin of profit, even at the cost of throwing people 
out of work, socialist planning was based on the principle of full employment: Cole 
urged Labour to ‘employ every available worker, either upon capital resources which 
are already in existence, and capable of producing goods we want, or upon new 
factories and other instruments of production which we decide to create.’809 Through a 
National Investing Board, the government would reorganise existing industries, 
                                                          
805
 Ibidem; G.D.H. Cole, A Plan, 8. 
806
 G.D.H. Cole, ‘Socialising the Banks’, The New Clarion, 3, 25.6.1932, 52; G.D.H. Cole, A Plan, 11. 
On controlling credit and production as the only way to suppress unemployment, see also G.D.H. Cole, 
‘Socialism and Unemployment’, 1, 13, 3.9.1932, 305; G.D.H. Cole, A Plan, 45-48. 
807
 See e.g. G.D.H. Cole, Socialist Control of Industry, 7-10; G.D.H. Cole, Principles of Economic 
Planning, London, Macmillan 1935, 293-324.   
808
 G.D.H. Cole, ‘A Socialist Economic Plan’, The New Clarion, 4, 2.7.1932, 77; G.D.H. Cole, A Plan, 
13. 
809
 Ibidem; G.D.H. Cole, A Plan, 15.   
241 
 
expanding some and scaling down others. Coal, steel, transport, and electricity would be 
nationalised.810 Further steps towards socialism would be taken by introducing ‘a really 
drastic limitation of inheritance’ and a system of licences aimed at controlling capital 
still in private hands and using it ‘for the development of industry in the public interest’: 
Cole expected these measures to stabilise investment without hurting small savers.811 In 
agriculture, after having socialised the land, food supply would be increased in order to 
raise the living standards of the entire population.812 By boosting domestic 
consumption, however, Britain would not seek economic self-sufficiency: Cole praised 
the international division of labour and professed himself ‘utterly against Economic 
Nationalism and in favour of the fullest development of international trade.’813 
Nonetheless, in a major departure from untrammelled free trade, imports and exports 
would be planned by publicly-owned Trade Corporations in relation to the needs of 
home production. By socialising foreign trade, the Labour government would thus be 
able to ‘promote increased exchanges of goods between country and country on 
organised and mutually beneficial lines.’814 Its foreign policy would simultaneously 
strive to ‘break down the absolute barriers between State and State’ with the purpose of 
reorganising the world ‘as a closely-knit federation of co-operating communities’, forge 
a close alliance with Soviet Russia, and promote world disarmament by mutual 
consent.815  
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Cole was conscious that his agenda would be strongly resisted by the 
Conservative Party and the House of Lords. In fact, he had little respect for the British 
parliamentary system, which he deemed ‘an admirable instrument for the preservation 
of Capitalism’ and ‘utterly unsuitable’ for the purpose of establishing economic 
planning.816 Because of that, he recommended socialists to pass ‘a drastic measure of 
emergency powers’ as soon as they got into office, creating a legal situation comparable 
to the one Britain had experienced during the Great War.817 Having speeded up 
parliamentary procedures, curtailed the powers of obstruction conferred to the 
opposition, and erased ‘a large part of the useless talk which at present goes upon the 
floor of the House of Commons’, the government would then be in the position to 
suppress the Upper Chamber for good.818 Cole expected these reforms to be carried out 
peacefully, provided that the capitalist class decided not to resort to unconstitutional 
means to stop them: in that case, a ‘violent revolution’ could not be ruled out.819 
 Cole’s planism was fully espoused and condensed in a plainly-written book by 
Stafford Cripps.820 A distinguished barrister, Cripps added further weight to Cole’s 
charges against Westminster in a tract entitled Can Socialism Come by Constitutional 
Methods?, based on a highly controversial speech he gave in January 1933.821 Truth be 
told, Cripps was not the only socialist who, in the aftermath of the ‘Great Betrayal’, had 
raised the same question.822 But he was the only one to explore the possibility of a 
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democratically elected Labour government deliberately throwing the country into a 
constitutional crisis to defend its right to pursue socialist policies, extending its life 
beyond the normal five years period, and even making itself ‘temporarily into a 
dictatorship’ to forestall a military coup orchestrated by the army.823 Cripps’ conjectures 
about a potential showdown with the establishment as well as his inflammatory rhetoric 
against the ‘saboteurs’ and the ‘machinations of the Capitalists’ caused an uproar, were 
severely condemned by the non-socialist press, and led the British Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) to reaffirm its unambiguous commitment to democratic rule.824 His 
tirades – including one denouncing Buckingham Palace on which he had to backtrack825 
– outraged several moderates826 but did not prevented him from replacing Wise as 
chairman of the SL in May 1933.827 In a few months, his aggressive style of leadership 
would also disappoint Cole, who, having become persuaded that under Cripps the SL 
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and the LP were bound to collide, decided to devote his whole energies to the NFRB.828 
These disagreements notwithstanding, Cole and Cripps were by far the most 
authoritative champions of British planism – the first being the intellectual leader, the 
second the political one – and their views can be regarded as representative of a broad 
spectrum of opinion within the British radical Left at the time.829  
To what extent was de Man influenced by them? In article published in Le 
Peuple in late November 1933, de Man held that the Belgian Labour Plan would ‘draw 
the practical conclusion from a doctrinal preparation’ whose origins could be traced 
back to the end of the Great War, and to a revision of the concept of socialisation 
undertaken, in the previous three or four years, ‘by our friends Ed. Heimann and Karl 
Landauer in Germany, Otto Bauer in Austria, Richard Sandler in Sweden, Cole and 
Stafford Cripps in England, etc.’830 At a glance, this may seem a cosmetic reference, 
although de Man had certainly assimilated Cole’s Guild Socialism in the 1920s.831 But a 
letter from de Man’s private papers demonstrates that his relationship with Cole was 
actually tighter and more personal. Writing to Norah James on August 8th 1933, de Man 
informed her that he had ‘visited’ his ‘friend G.D.H. Cole last month’ and had 
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‘discussed’ with him ‘the possibility of an American edition’ of Die Sozialistische 
Ideen.832 It is worth noticing that the last chapter of the book contained the essentials of 
de Man’s planism.833 Furthermore, considering that Cole ‘declared himself prepared’ to 
give Miss James ‘additional information’ about de Man’s ‘books in general’, there is 
room to argue that by July 1933 Cole and de Man were not only on friendly terms but 
had also good knowledge of each other’s work.834  
Regarding Cripps, the connection with de Man is less straightforward as no 
evidence of friendship can be found in their papers. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out 
that Cripps spoke at the Semaine d’Études de Liège held between July 25th and August 
2nd, 1934, on the very day de Man lectured students on the Labour Plan.835 Cripps’ 
intervention, devoted to the activities and programme of the SL, was expected to appear 
in a special issue of L’Etudiant socialiste entitled ‘Révolution Constructive’, alongside 
writings of distinguished planists such as Laurat, Vos, and de Man836; in the end, it was 
published as a self-standing contribution, like the other papers.837 Considering that the 
Semaine was organised by Belgian socialists, and Belgian planism was its topic, it is 
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reasonable to conclude that Cripps became familiar with the Belgian Labour Plan and 
Belgian planism in general no later than in July 1934.  
This is equally true for British socialists who read The Plebs, organ of the 
National Council of Labour Colleges, the leading British institution in the field of 
workers’ education.  In June 1934, excerpts from de Man’s Pour un Plan d’Action were 
published under the title ‘What Must We Do About Fascism?’838. The purpose was to 
provide trade unionists with food for thought. In July, as a follow-up, the Labour 
activist Fay Jackson and the German socialist Heinz Schlosser laid out the campaign for 
the Belgian Labour Plan as well as its repercussions abroad, and argued that, without 
denying ‘differences in outlook and circumstances’ between Britain and other countries, 
developing a sound knowledge of ‘Continental attempts’ to address issues such as ‘the 
winning of the support of the middle classes, the arousing of enthusiasm by a 
programme for immediate realisation, the working out of our future policy in detail, and 
the prevention of the stampeding of the electorate by bringing home to it what we really 
intend to do’ could be ‘of much use’ to the British Labour movement.839 The Plebs was 
a well-established monthly tied with Ruskin College, where Cole taught, and de Man’s 
key ideas may therefore have crept into the British socialist milieu in June 1934.840 
From an institutional viewpoint, it is noteworthy that the campaign for the 
Belgian Labour Plan was keen to establish formal links with the SL. The socialist 
publishing house l’Eglantine released a condensed summary of Cole’s thinking in 
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February 1934, and works by Cole and Cripps were included in a list of suggested 
readings for planist militants attached to the official handbook released by the 
campaign.841 Research assistants at the BES ordered and reviewed a rich selection of 
Cole’s writings between 1933 and 1935, including The Intelligent Man’s Guide through 
World Chaos, The Intelligent Man’s Review of Europe To-Day, What Everybody Wants 
to Know about Money, Studies in World Economics, What Marx Really Meant, Some 
Relations between Political and Economic Theory, and Studies and Capital in 
Investment, alongside a few other publications by members of the SL, such as 
Mitchison’s The First Workers’ Government.842 Following the Pontigny conference, 
where the activities of the SL were summarised by the German exile Walter Pahl843, 
Cole was invited to give a lecture in Brussels.844 By late 1933, Cole’s works were 
regularly cited by Herman Vos, one of de Man’s closest aides, and in August 1934 even 
Vandervelde lauded a collective book produced by the SL.845 
British socialists reciprocated through a more active involvement in the 
international planist network. In April 1936, a delegation of New Fabians and Leaguers 
attended the second International Plan conference held in Geneva.846 The delegation 
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included Cole, John Cripps (Stafford’s son), Mitchison, Gaitskell, Colin Clark, Richard 
W. B. Clark, George Wansbrough, and A. P. Leiner.847 Mitchison, Cripps, Wansbrough, 
and Colin Clark actively participated in discussions about agriculture under planning 
and the socialisation of the banking sector.848 A loose association remained in place 
even after the dismissal of the Belgian Labour Plan. For example, a memorandum on 
foreign trade and colonies prepared by the NFRB Secretary, Herbert D. Hughes, served 
as a basis for discussion during the third and final International Plan conference, in late 
October 1937.849 Two years later, de Man was invited to London by the NFRB, now 
amalgamated with the old Fabian Society, to give a talk on ‘The Decline of Capitalist 
Enterprise’ but the event was cancelled due to the crisis caused by the invasion of 
Poland.850 To sum up, it seems fair to conclude that a channel of communication existed 
between Belgian planists, the SL, and the NFRB, and a bilateral circulation of ideas 
occurred between July 1933, when de Man visited Cole, and October 1937, when the 
last international conference was arranged. 
It remains to be explained why, therefore, British socialists hesitated to give the 
Belgian Labour Plan a full endorsement, making it available in English only in late 
1935. Presumably, the main reason lies in theoretical disagreements. In terms of 
strategy, there were obvious similarities between de Man’s idea of a Plan for action as 
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presented in early 1933 and Cole’s ‘definite programme […] capable of being put 
forward as the basis of an election appeal and carried through by constitutional means 
with the aid of a Socialist majority in Parliament’, a programme which would indicate 
‘the steps by which the Labour Government will proceed’, even though Cole and 
Cripps, as seen above, were more willing to justify a suspension of the ordinary 
parliamentary procedure to get their programme approved.851 Besides, de Man, Cole, 
and Cripps agreed on the necessity of seizing control of the financial sector and rejected 
economic nationalism as incompatible with democratic socialism.852 Nevertheless, 
differences were more substantial. Above all, de Man was in favour of establishing a 
mixed economy that would last until the private sector was competitive and profitable – 
an argument that suggested a very slow transition to full socialism – whilst Cole 
opposed the creation of any ‘inherently self-contradictory system based on an 
unworkable compromise.’853 To him, it was ‘impossible to envisage the economic 
structure of a socialist society without at the same time envisaging an attempt at the 
distribution of all the available economic resources, or at least all resources of major 
economic importance, in accordance with a general economic plan.’854 Under socialism, 
in Cole’s view, the state would be in charge of producing a detailed inventory of the 
national resources available and assess the actual needs of the population, given that ‘a 
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Socialist Society […] is a Society in which what is to be produced, at what prices the 
products are to be distributed, what incomes the individual citizens are to have, how 
much of its income the community is to save and how much to spend on current 
consumption, are all matters to be collectively determined in accordance with the ends 
which the collective wisdom of the community sets up as the guiding principles of its 
economic policy.’855 This explains why he insisted on the benefits of a relatively swift 
nationalisation of most industries, not necessarily with compensation, whereas de Man 
stressed that small business and non-monopolistic enterprises would not be affected by 
the implementation of the Labour Plan, and their profits should be stabilised but not 
suppressed.856 
Their antidotes to bureaucratisation also differed. In order to give production a 
democratic character and prevent an excessive degree of centralisation, Cole advocated 
the creation of various councils, including local and regional branches, aimed at 
ensuring workers’ control over the entire process.857 In his view, ‘a widespread 
devolution of responsibility and power’ was essential, and ‘the safeguard of an ultimate 
political control over the technical autocrats of industry’ was unsatisfactory to an 
unrepentant Guild Socialist like him.858 Similarly, Cripps optimistically contended that 
‘technical efficiency’ would not be affected by giving directorates ‘permanent leave of 
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absence’ and replacing them with ‘workers of all grades.’859 By contrast, de Man – who 
had been sympathetic with Guild Socialists in the 1920s860 – seemed now to believe that 
‘the problem of control takes priority over that of ownership’ to the extent that the rise 
of civil servants and managers was making the physical seizure of the means of 
production increasingly less relevant for the socialist cause. 861  Technocrats, on the 
other hand, were to be held accountable before democratically-elected bodies, i.e. the 
Parliament and the Government, and hopefully embrace the values of socialism.862 On 
that issue, de Man’s arguments were much closer to those set forth by Herbert Morrison 
– who advocated the creation of public corporations and set up the London Passenger 
Transport Board in 1933 – than to thoroughgoing industrial democracy envisaged by the 
Leaguers, and somewhat anticipated some of Gaitskell’s revisionist views of the mid-
1950s.863  
Incidentally, one could note that Cole’s faith in an all-encompassing model of 
planning in which workers supposedly controlled production mirrored his admiration 
for the Soviet Union. Unlike de Man, who had come to understand the violence and 
fanaticism of the Bolsheviks during his trip to Russia in 1917864, Cole rallied behind the 
motto ‘Russia’s Cause is Ours’.865 Still faithful to a highly idealised view of Soviet 
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planning, he would confidently claim, as late as 1947, that the USSR was ‘a legitimate 
form of democracy’ under which workers could enjoy a different, but in some respects 
higher, degree of freedom than their Western counterparts.866 In contrast, de Man 
repeatedly denounced the ‘dangerous illusion’ of emulating the Soviets.867 
These differences of opinion were not unknown to Cole, who noted in February 
1934 that de Man’s politics were ‘essentially reformist, much more than practically 
socialist.’868 A close reading of his foreword to the NFRB edition of the Belgian Labour 
Plan reveals that he had grasped the not-so-radical character of de Man’s proposals, and 
most of his comments were actually aimed at showing why ‘the Belgian Plan du 
Travail will not, as it stands, meet British needs.’869 His key premise was indeed that 
British socialists had not to ‘imitate what the Belgian Socialists have done’ but rather 
‘consider how far its underlying notions can be of use to them in working out a policy 
and a strategy appropriate to British conditions.’870 Cole underscored that the Plan 
intended to ‘strengthen’ the ‘lesser forms of Capitalism, by extending credit to them 
more freely and taking measures for general economic recovery which will enlarge the 
market for their products.’871 This caution, according to Cole, stemmed from the 
peculiar social structure of Belgium, ‘one in which small-scale production and trade 
occupy a more important place’ than in Britain872 – a remark that de Man regarded as 
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empirically false.873 In addition to the different socio-economic impact of the economic 
crisis in Belgium and Britain, Cole observed that British socialists, operating under a 
two-party system, were not obliged to secure ‘the adhesion’ of the ‘middle groups’ 
without which a parliamentary majority was out of reach: ‘in Belgium, or in France, the 
“Plan” may involve government by coalition: in Great Britain there is no reason at all 
why it should.’874 What British socialists could learn from de Man, however, was the 
importance of delivering a clear, compelling message: ‘the British plan of action has 
been neither so logically and clearly set out as the Belgian, nor supported with so 
plainly formulated a rationale of action, nor so explicitly directed to securing the 
support of a majority of the electorate.’875 Cole strongly emphasised the necessity of 
setting out ‘a series of order measures, to be accomplished over a set period of time, and 
not merely a long list of aspirations, without order or set date for their achievement.’876 
He surely realised that the terminology of planning could be employed to revive, rather 
than replace, reformism: by February 1936, he feared that, despite ‘much talk’ within 
the LP, ‘a reversion to a policy of new-Liberalism’ was more likely than the 
development of ‘a planist sort of Socialism’.877 Cripps’ and Cole’s misgivings about the 
LP’s real intentions led them, from mid-1936, to recommend the creation of a broad 
working-class coalition – either a United Front with the Communists and the ILP, or a 
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 Letter from G.D.H. Cole to H. de Man, 22.2.1936, AHDM/IISG/227. Dalton’s big book in favour of 
planning, Practical Socialism for Britain, was indeed set against ‘our melodramatists of the Socialist 
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People’s Front open to all well-intentioned progressives – against fascism and war.878 
Assuming, perhaps with an eye to Belgian events879, that a Plan offered no effective 
guarantee of the LP’s sincere commitment to socialisation, the Leaguers no longer 
persisted in fighting for a programme of action, and focused instead on the launch of the 
pro-Communist Unity Campaign, in January 1937, which ended up with the 
disbandment of the SL after their members faced expulsion from the LP.880 By then, 
however, the Labour Plan had lost traction in Belgium and a planist strategy seemed 
outmoded. 
*** 
Cole’s theoretical reservations about the Belgian Labour Plan are therefore 
crucial to understand why British socialists paid scant attention to it. Nevertheless, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that this was the only reason. At least other four key 
factors must be cited: the socio-economic situation of the mid-1930s; the very limited 
impact of Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus in the 1920s; the lack of a deeply rooted, 
pre-existing Marxist tradition to battle against; the anti-intellectualism of British trade 
unionism. Each of them deserves a concise but separate discussion. 
 To begin with, although the Great Slump hit the country severely, the National 
Government – by abandoning the gold standard in September 1931 and embracing, 
albeit reluctantly, a policy of cheap money – was able to impose a mild version of 
austerity, without provoking the same degree of social unrest that affected Germany or 
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Belgium. Protective tariffs and social security benefits, however inadequate to meet 
actual needs, also contributed to soften the social impact of the crisis.881 By and large, 
the ‘undramatic’ way in which Britain went through the Depression pre-empted political 
radicalisation, both on the Left and on the Right.882 By the same token, with only 
marginal segments of the middle class fearful of losing its status and no serious 
domestic fascist threat within sight, the appeal of planism was substantially reduced.883 
Other circumstances within the socialist camp worked against de Man’s agenda. 
To begin with, it must be stressed that, in a number of countries, de Man’s early 
writings, and his extensive critique of Marxism in particular, had created a favourable 
disposition towards planism in young activists such as Max Buset, André Philip, and 
Carlo Rosselli.884 But they had no equivalent of them in Britain: when the English 
translation of Zur Psychologie was published in 1928, it passed almost unnoticed.885 
The only left-wing intellectual of some reputation to review it was the then 30-year old 
Kingsley Martin, who appreciated de Man’s ‘common sense and practical knowledge’ 
but was not thrilled by the book.886 An anonymous reviewer on the New Statesman 
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positively noticed de Man’s admiration for British socialism.887 Favourable remarks 
were made, a few years later, by Alfred Zimmern and Godfrey Elton in a public 
exchange on the future of the LP, showing that, at least within a tiny elite, de Man had 
been read and assimilated.888 In general, however, Zur Psychologie seems not to have 
impressed British intellectuals as much as their counterparts in Continental Europe, and 
did not spark any substantial debate within the Labour intelligentsia. As a consequence, 
de Man was still poorly known in the 1930s and British planism could not be bolstered 
by his climb to power in Belgium.  
This is arguably linked to a third factor, the weakness of Marxism in Britain. In 
Germany, France, and Belgium, Marx’s teachings had become the foundation of the 
dominant social democratic ideology. In Britain, on the contrary, Fabianism gained the 
upper hand.889 As a consequence, unlike Kautsky, Blum, or Vandervelde, Labour 
leaders in the mid-1920s were reluctant to pay lip service to Marxism, and often tended 
to downplay its relevance: even MacDonald, who did praise the author of Das Kapital 
for his charisma, held that ‘it is not Marxism that survives but Marx’, as an inspirational 
figure.890 Because of that, de Man’s critique of Marxism fell flat, and failed to strike a 
chord with the new generation yearning for fresh ideas. Ironically, in their struggle 
against conventional wisdom, planists like Cole contended that British socialists would 
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benefit from rediscovering certain aspects of Marx’s philosophy instead of dismissing 
them as decrepit.891 
 Last but least, the British trade unions’ unwillingness to endorse planism must 
be taken into account.892 In Belgium, the CS had been pivotal in pushing the POB to 
accept the Labour Plan.893 In France, the CGT had become the last gathering point for 
planists after they failed to seize control of the SFIO.894 In Britain, the TUC resisted 
attempts to move the LP to the left by sticking to the assumption that workers would be 
better off by choosing to cooperate with, instead of challenging, big business.895 This is 
not to say that British trade unions opposed economic planning as a technique: quite the 
contrary.896 Yet their main objective was the achievement of institutional recognition on 
an equal footing to business within the machinery of planning, a position – much to the 
dismay of the SL – that did not require a transition to socialism.897 Furthermore, 
consistently with a pattern that dated back to the late nineteenth-century, trade unionists 
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remained deeply suspicious of intellectuals as a class: the TUC General Secretary 
Walter Citrine refused to ‘waste’ his time by discussing ‘ultimate Socialist objectives of 
a theoretical character.’898 Highly indicative in this regard is the attitude of Bevin, in 
theory more open to Cole’s proposals.899 In 1932, Cole invited Bevin to join the SL 
Executive Council but Bevin, despite his previous association with the SSIP, refused, on 
the ground that he would find himself ‘in a difficulty – torn by two loyalties’, and 
lamented that the SL was likely to have ‘a bias against Trade Unionists.’900 Bevin also 
hinted at the fact that the SL might also turn into ‘a sort of ladder’ for ‘careerists’, i.e. 
members of radical fringes interested in taking over the LP.901 Bevin’s concerns about 
radicalisation emerge even more clearly from an exchange of letters he had with Cole in 
December 1935. The latter warned him that intellectuals could ‘develop an anti-Trade 
Union complex largely because they feel the Trade Unions have no use for them’ and 
wished that the two groups would rather ‘pull together’ and ‘work out […] a short and 
simple platform of immediate projects, including both ameliorative and socialistic 
measures.’902 Although he admitted the SL had failed to achieve that purpose, he 
declared that intellectuals and trade-unionists had a common interest in turning the LP 
‘into a really united and well-led party, capable both of getting a majority, and of using 
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it when it has been got’, overcoming the ‘present senseless, and largely meaningless, 
division between left and right.’903 But Bevin was unimpressed by Cole’s emotional 
appeal. Rather, he bluntly stated that ‘the difference between the intellectuals and the 
Trade Unions is this: you have no responsibility, you can fly off at a tangent as the wind 
takes you. We, however, must be consistent, and we have a great amount of 
responsibility. We cannot wake up in the morning and get a brain wave, when father 
says ‘turn’ and half a million people turn automatically.’904 Besides, he regretted that 
unions had tolerated, or even trusted, figures as Mosley and Cripps for too long. Finally, 
he expressed scepticism towards grand schemes: ‘I do not believe in the “great” man 
idea. My experience of life has been that if you can form your judgments as a result of 
the common contribution arising from the ordinary commonsense (sic) of people, you 
have a better chance of making progress.’905 In response, Cole sent him a copy of his 
translation of the Belgian Labour Plan as an example of virtuous cooperation between 
intellectuals and trade unions but nothing suggests that Bevin’s convictions were shaken 
by it.906 
 There were therefore many obstacles to a successful reception of the Belgian 
Labour Plan in Britain, but one is left wondering whether Cole and Cripps could have 
been more successful, had they supported a type of type planism closer to de Man’s. 
After all, with the defection of MacDonald, the electoral wipe-out suffered by his 
successor Arthur Henderson, and the benevolent encouragement that the new party 
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leader, George Lansbury, gave to the SL907, the old guard was undoubtedly on the 
defensive between 1931 and 1935, and a detailed programme aimed at creating a mixed 
economy may have been win over moderates and trade unionist alike. It is indeed highly 
plausible that the SL’s obsession with large-scale planning, let alone its anti-
parliamentary and pro-Communist drift, eventually backfired.908 In this light, it may be 
no accident that two of the most seminal English-language socialist books of the late 
1930s – Douglas Jay’s The Socialist Case and Evan Durbin’s The Politics of 
Democratic Socialism – refrained from celebrating the alleged virtues of economic 
planning as if they were distancing themselves from the belligerent talk of the Labour 
Left. According to Jay, a journalist at the Daily Herald, “planning” amounted to any 
interference with the price-mechanism. In his view, it had to be ‘intelligent, not 
comprehensive’, and could not be pursued ‘at the expense of the freedom of the 
consuming masses’, but it was barely mentioned in his lengthy tract.909 Durbin, a 
lecturer at the LSE and influential contributor to the NFRB, used the term to categorise 
‘the substation of monopoly control for competition in all the markets and industries 
that it touches’, often against the public interest.910 On a number of issues, Durbin was 
no moderate: he supported nationalisations, and had previously acknowledged that 
planning was to ‘play a part in the strategy of democratic socialism, or Social 
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Democracy.’911 Yet he was also keen to stress that ‘planning does not in the least imply 
the existence of a Plan […]. Planning does not, and should not, imply any dogmatism 
about the future.’912 This was a clear blow to the SL. 
It was only after gaining first-hand experience of the war economy that Jay 
dropped his reservations about state-led planning and Durbin set out more compelling 
arguments in its favour.913 By 1945, however, the political landscape had changed so 
spectacularly that many of the intellectual controversies of the Thirties had been 
overtaken by events. Forced to grapple with reconstruction and the necessity of a 
steadfast recovery, socialists in power were now ready to embrace planning, and even 
tentatively introduce it, but still without committing themselves to a detailed Plan. The 
long-term consequences of this enduring pragmatism will be discussed in the conclusion 
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Planning without Planism?  
Thoughts on Post-War Social Democracy 
 
While individualism and laissez-faire 
distinguished too rigidly between man as a 
producer and man as a citizen, do not let us 
rush wildly to the other extreme. Discipline 
and efficiency can be accepted in their limited 
application to the economic process of society 
without any corresponding regulation of the 
human spirit in its widest sense. 
 
Harold Macmillan, 1933914 
 
Nothing is more remarkable in the history of 
ideas than the speed and thoroughness with 
which the idea of planning the economic 
activity of human society has seized the 
imagination of European man. 
 
Richard Law, 1950915 
 
 This dissertation has followed Hendrik de Man’s trajectory between 1914 and 
1936 circa, explaining how its unusual personal and intellectual background allowed 
him to become a distinguished critic of Marxism in the 1920s and a key player in 
Belgian politics in the 1930s, and discussing how his planism was received in Belgium, 
France, and Britain.  
It initially investigated the paradox of Western European social democracy 
before 1914, arguing that the numerical strength of the movement obscured its inner 
ideological weaknesses, such as the difficulty of reconciling practical reformism with 
revolutionary verbalism and its anti-statist rhetoric, and its presumption that the 
proletariat had become an international unitary actor. 
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De Man’s evolving views from 1914 till 1919 were explored to examine why he 
lost faith in Marxism and came to appreciate liberal democratic values: this thesis has 
suggested that it was during the period of the First World War that the concluded it was 
possible to reform capitalism, largely due to his trips to Russia and to the United States. 
The thesis also explored de Man’s extensive critique of Marxism published in 1926, Zur 
Psychologie des Sozialismus, revealing the scale of the dispute that this book led to with 
his former masters, Karl Kautsky and Emile Vandervelde, but also how it inspired other 
young Western European socialist intellectuals, all yearning for an ideological 
regeneration of the Left. 
One of the key findings of this thesis is that de Man’s conception of planning 
developed out of his first-hand experience of the downfall of the Weimar Republic and 
the outbreak of the Great Depression, and this study has emphasised de Man’s rare 
ability to create an original intellectual synthesis to overcome the ongoing crisis of 
social democratic parties.  
The dissertation also investigated the rise and fall of the Belgian Labour Plan, de 
Man’s main attempt to put his ideas into practice, and argued that his endeavours to 
convert socialists to the ideology of planism, after a promising start, were resisted by 
wide sections of its own party, the Parti Ouvrier Belge, and that this heavily contributed 
to de Man’s failure as party leader and Minister. This dissertation also uncovered the 
extent to which the Belgian Labour Plan was influential in France, pointing out that 
various group drew inspiration from de Man – the neosocialists, the SFIO planists, and 
the CGT planists –: a key finding here is that the events of February 6th and Léon 
Blum’s hostility to the idea of a mixed economy eventually prevented the launch of a 
French Labour Plan. 
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 The reception of the Belgian Labour Plan in Britain has also been explored: this 
thesis argues that despite that, despite the institutional connections between the Belgian 
campaign for the Labour Plan, the Socialist League, and the New Fabian Research 
Bureau, some of the most consistent advocates of economic planning within the British 
Labour Party preferred to champion a more radical platform than de Man’s, and thus 
British socialists in general paid scant attention to his views. 
 Altogether, as this study shows, there is little doubt that de Man’s political 
career fell short of expectations, even before the infamous summer of 1940, when his 
frustration with Belgian democracy made him believe that the German occupation could 
at least be a deliverance from what he thought was a rigged parliamentary system 
incapable of self-reform. But what about his wider, more ambitious design to reinvent 
Western European socialism? Is it plausible to argue, as Mark Mazower did, that de 
Man’s ideas ‘bore fruit after the war’ as the Labour Plan ‘was in many ways the model 
for state planning in much of Western Europe after 1945’916? 
 On the one hand, de Man’s name was heavily discredited because of his 
collaboration with the Nazis, and former POB members contributed to fuel the myth 
that he had joined the party after returning from Germany ‘in much the same manner as 
a pirate boards a ship’, as if they had been innocent victims of his ruthless machinations 
during the 1930s.917 Furthermore, his looming shadow was enough to inhibit new 
revisionist temptations. When the new Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) was founded, in 
1945, on the ashes of the POB, the delegates decided to pledge allegiance to the original 
Charte de Quaregnon written in 1894 instead of emending it because, as de Brouckère 
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warned Herman Vos, ‘innocent novelties […] may lead to fascism.’918  The backlash 
against planism was huge. Pietro Nenni, an exile and leader of the clandestine Italian 
Socialist Party, following a close reading of Après Coup, commented in his diary on 
February 2nd, 1942 that de Man’s ‘neoreformism’ was still ‘a serious danger for the 
labour movement’, and had to be intellectually denounced.919 For their part, Communist 
intellectuals used de Man’s career as a cautionary tale, ‘a story that ought to make our 
eternal overtakers (nos éternels amateurs de dépassement), and all socialists who have 
been offered, are offered or will be offered new, non-Marxist socialist formulas, to 
reflect.’920 
 On the other hand, most of the weaknesses de Man had denounced in the 1920s 
continued to haunt the socialist movement twenty years later, and the remedies 
envisaged by his successors sometimes echoed his recommendations. Interestingly, the 
first manifesto issued by the PSB unambiguously stated that ‘the Party needs 
intellectuals’: doctors, nurses, teachers, professors, chemists, architects, and other 
professionals were warmly invited to join.921 This orientation became part of a broader 
strategy pursued in the following decade, during which the PSB gradually abandoned 
the Marxist jargon to woo the classes moyennes, and finally managed to expand its base 
well beyond traditional working class voters.922 The party’s economic agenda, centred 
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on the notion of économie dirigée, pointed to the need to spread private property instead 
of suppressing it, establish the ‘outline of an economic programme’ under which the 
‘private enterprise and individual efforts’ could ‘develop with the highest degree of 
freedom’ without damaging the ‘general interests’, and ‘prevent the formation of a 
financial oligarchy choking industries and small businesses by a more severe regulation 
of credit.923 Stripped of the fiery rhetoric of the 1930s, part of the language of the 
Labour Plan resonated in the PSB propaganda. 
 These affinities were indicative of a significant change of attitude: Belgian 
socialists as well as their counterparts elsewhere in Europe came to terms with the 
mixed economy, accepting that framework as entirely compatible with their values and 
long-term vision of a socialist society, and in that respect de Man’s key insight was 
vindicated. This was especially true for British socialists who, having achieved a 
resounding victory at the 1945 general election, nationalised the Bank of England, civil 
aviation, coal, communications, transport, electricity, gas, iron, and steel, built a 
universal health care system, established a national insurance, and reformed housing 
and education.924 In France, nationalisations were carried out, without much opposition, 
by a series of provisional, tripartite governments between 1944 and 1946, of which the 
SFIO was partner. A Commissariat Général au Plan was set up, under the direction of 
Jean Monnet, and given the task of rebuilding and modernising the national economy. 
Social security was also expanded in 1946-1947.925 Yet neither in these countries nor in 
Belgium socialists sold these measures to the public in purely socialist, let alone 
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Marxist, terms.926 Partly, this may be explained with the atmosphere of the early Cold 
War, as democratic socialists felt obliged to ideologically distance themselves from the 
Communists.927 But, from a wider perspective, this cautious approach reflected the 
growing awareness that, in the peculiar post-war context, capitalism could be tamed, 
full employment was not out of reach, and striking a fair balance between the public and 
the private sector was vital to ensure social stability, economic progress, and peace. As 
Kingsley Martin rhetorically asked in 1951, ‘if everybody were guaranteed a minimum 
standard of life, if the main features of political democracy were safeguarded, and, in 
addition to these rights of free speech and all the other civil rights won by the 
bourgeoisie, there were added the new guaranteed rights of social security, adequate 
leisure, and adequate employment, would it not be idiotic to denounce such as system as 
Keynesian, reformist, Kautskyist, or any other phrase from the vocabulary of Marxist 
controversy, and to demand, in order to produce something called Socialism, that we 
should fight class war to the bitter end with all that implies?’928 As other self-declared 
socialist intellectuals, Martin had radical instincts, and he firmly denied that the Labour 
in power had already accomplished those goals.929 Very few Western European 
socialists, however, would have answered “No” to his question. In practice, the 
accommodation with the Welfare State greatly contributed to the waning of 
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revolutionary fervour within the socialist camp. Books like Anthony Crosland’s The 
Future of Socialism, which emphasised the ‘diminishing area of controversy’ between 
Left and Right on economic issues, or André Philip’s Pour un socialisme humaniste, in 
which socialism was broadly defined as the ‘technique of realisation of democratic 
values’, set the tone for the new pragmatic era.930 
 Was all this consistent with de Man’ teachings? Only to a certain extent. Amidst 
the Depression, the call for “planning”, an elusive catchword in itself, was widespread 
and de Man’s followers could not retrospectively claim the monopoly over it.  
Furthermore, differences in scope and size of the planned sector matter. Robert Marjolin 
– who pursued a highly successful career as civil servant, after his early involvement in 
French left-wing politics during the 1930s – contended in his memoirs that pre-war 
planism and post-war planning should not be confused: after 1945, ‘the point was to 
allocate scarce resources – labour, raw materials, foreign exchange, equipment – for the 
uses that appeared the most important. To do that, it was necessary to draw up a set of 
priorities. And one could do so without being dirigiste, interventionist on principle, and 
a fortiori socialist’ whereas original planism ‘was an ideological construct. It aimed to 
replace the market forces at a time when these could still operate and would have 
yielded the results sought (economic expansion, reduction of employment) if only the 
necessary conditions were met.’931 Marjolin’s statement that pre-war planism wanted to 
fully replace the market is inaccurate, although he may have been misled by his own 
experience as member of Révolution Constructive, which in 1933-34 joined forces other 
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radical, thoroughly anti-capitalist fringes before the Lille Congress.932 Nevertheless, his 
remarks hint at an important difference: pre-war planning, and planism in general, often 
envisioned the micro-management of the economy by the state whereas post-war 
planning leaned towards macro-management, limiting direct interference.933 Moreover, 
the new Keynesian synthesis stressed the importance of international cooperation and of 
a sound coordination between fiscal and monetary policy: markets were meant to be 
embedded not only nationally but also internationally, through the Bretton Woods 
system.934 De Man did not ignore these dimensions: throughout his life, he repeatedly 
expressed sympathy for the vision of an economically integrated Europe935 while his 
support for devaluation in 1934 demonstrates that he had a sharper understanding of 
monetary affairs than most of the socialists of the time.936 Yet it remains the case that, 
during the Thirties, he overemphasised the ability of individual nation states to spend 
their way out of the Depression937, and the economics underpinning the Plan remained 
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rudimentary, almost homespun if compared to the macro-economic models produced 
during and after the Second World War. 
 Furthermore, unlike de Man, post-war democratic socialists did not feel the 
necessity of combining support for planning with a commitment to thoroughgoing 
institutional reforms. After 1945, as Donald Sassoon pointed out, ‘the Left participated 
in institutional changes and constitution-making only in countries where it was 
necessary to do so’ but in general showed no inclination to question traditional 
parliamentary rule: ‘it was as if, throughout Western Europe, the socialist and social-
democratic Left had accepted the Leninist view of politics with a special twist: the 
bourgeois state could not be reformed, it could only be smashed; as the socialists did not 
wish to smash it, they accepted it in its entirety.’938 This streak of conservatism caught 
the eye of de Man. In one of his very rare post-war contributions on the prospects of 
socialism939, a private letter written in January 1949 and published after his death, he 
held that ‘the greatest fault of this last generation of socialists has been to mistake 
democracy with the parliamentary regime’, the latter being ‘in total decline since the 
end of the era of bourgeois revolutions.’940 The parliamentary system, de Man 
continued, was only ‘a recent and transient variant’ of democracy which worked ‘well, 
more or less, only in Britain and Scandinavia’ but elsewhere had proved itself unable to 
‘transform the social order by structural reforms’, paving the ground for ‘coalition 
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governments’ dominated by ‘the power of money.’941 Overall, this can be regarded as 
too bleak picture of post-war Europe, which reflected the mounting Kulturpessimismus 
of the author. Besides, one could observe that dismissing parliamentary rule as a fraud 
is only a step away from slipping into authoritarianism, a mistake de Man had made in 
1940. On the other hand, de Man was probably right in suggesting that, with 
proportional representation and upper chambers still in place, democratic socialism was 
bound to stay afloat, lurching from compromise to compromise, slowly losing its 
original impetus. Here, once again, a major intuition behind the Labour Plan was lost: 
planning alone was not enough, a detailed set of measures had to be clearly outlined and 
offered to the voters. Multi-party coalition governments made this impossible, and 
eventually altered the very nature of democratic socialist parties, which, by the 1970s, 
frequently stood for the status quo.942 The fate of the SFIO under the French Fourth 
Republic is revealing in that regard, and it may not be an accident that unrepentant 
planists like Louis Vallon and André Philip wholeheartedly supported de Gaulle’s new 
constitution in 1958.943 Certainly a semi-presidential system was better suited to fulfil 
the planist vision of an energetic and accountable executive power. 
 All that said, there is plenty of evidence that former planists recognised the 
paramount role played by the Labour Plan in their Bildung. Most notably, Paul Henri 
Spaak opened his memoirs with a heartfelt, almost emphatic, tribute to de Man: he 
explained that the latter had ‘largely contributed’ to persuade him to abandon his 
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‘romantic and unrealistic’ positions of the early 1930s, confessed he had been ‘seduced, 
perhaps even a bit subdued’ by his personality, and wished that, despite his ‘severe 
blunders’ during the war, the father of the Labour Plan would be eventually 
acknowledged as ‘the most authentic socialist thinker of the twentieth century’ as well 
as ‘one of the greatest socialists of our time.’944 More prosaically, André Philip and 
Jules Moch drew heavily from the CGT Plan of 1934-1935 in setting out their schemes 
for the future nationalisations and reorganisation of the state during the Resistance 
period.945 Furthermore, former planists occupied key positions in the early post-war 
years. Paul Ramadier served as Prime Minister in 1947 whilst Robert Lacoste became a 
highly influential Minister of Labour between 1945 and 1950.946 Hugh Dalton, Stafford 
Cripps, and Hugh Gaitskell – however loosely associated with de Man 947 – were pivotal 
figures in the 1945-51 Labour governments.948 The PSB gained much of his electoral 
strength under the leadership of Buset, who served as President for nearly fifteen 
years.949 Marjolin and Hendrik Brugmans were instrumental to the advance of European 
integration through their involvement in the implementation of the Marshall Plan and in 
the founding of the European Movement respectively.950 Planism was defeated but 
planists gained power. 
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Hence, the final and most difficult question to raise is therefore not whether de 
Man had influenced a number of democratic socialists at individual level – because he 
did –, but whether his role in ushering in a new phase in social democratic politics could 
not have been greater, had the Western European Left been less reluctant to throw off 
the Marxist heritage at an earlier stage. No conclusive answer can be given but the 
doubt seems legitimate. If we accept the argument that the establishment of the mixed 
economy was not only a step forward in economic and social policy but also a major 
accomplishment for Western European social democracy, then we may speculate 
whether an earlier, more constructive engagement with planism would have 
strengthened the appeal of democratic socialism during the interwar years as well as 
after 1945. Critics blamed de Man and planists in general for having moved too far 
away from orthodox Marxism. In retrospect, one could at least wonder whether interwar 
social democratic leaders who opposed de Man were really so wise in their unbending 
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